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INTRODUCTION 
An injunction against libel, backed by the threat of prosecution for 
criminal contempt,1 is like a miniature criminal libel law—just for this 
defendant, and just for statements about this plaintiﬀ.2 That is its virtue. That 
is its danger. And that is the key to identifying how the First Amendment 
and equitable principles should constrain such injunctions. 
From the 1960s to the 1990s, libel was conventionally understood to be 
controlled (to the extent that it can be controlled) by the threat of civil 
damages. Criminal libel was seen as an anachronism.3 Injunctions against 
libel were seen as unavailable.4 Many still assume this is so.5 
When one considers the famous libel scenarios, focusing on damages makes 
sense. For libels by a newspaper, magazine, or credit rating agency,6 damages are 
likely both a fair remedy and a reasonable deterrent.7 Criminal liability seems 
like overkill, and an injunction is usually pointless: those defendants aren’t likely 
to keep saying false things about the plaintiffs in any event, especially after a 
libel judgment, so nothing will need enjoining. Print defamation is generally a 
short, sharp shock, which causes harm that an injunction can’t stop.8 
 
1 For examples of such injunctions enforced through threat of jail, see infra Appendix D. 
2 See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 8 (1978) (making a similar point about 
injunctions generally); Doug Rendleman, The Defamation Injunction, 56 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 615 (2019); 
see also United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 581 (1971) (noting, as to an 
injunction against nonlibelous speech, that an injunction, “like a criminal statute, prohibits conduct 
under fear of punishment,” and that courts must therefore “look at the injunction as we look at a 
statute”). 
3 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1961) 
(discussing “the paucity of prosecutions and the near desuetude of private criminal libel 
legislation”). 
4 E.g., RONALD D. ROTUNDA, JOHN E. NOWAK & J. NELSON YOUNG, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 163 n.8 (1986) (“It has long been 
established that courts simply cannot enjoin a libel. Such an injunction would be contrary to 
equitable principles and would violate the ﬁrst amendment.” (citations omitted)); LAURENCE H. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 861-86, 1039-61 (2d ed. 1988) (failing to mention the 
possibility of injunctions in the defamation section of the treatise, while discussing damages in great 
detail, and not mentioning defamation in the injunction section of the treatise). 
5 Even some sources that recognize that there’s a split of authority say that “the majority view” 
is “that, absent extraordinary circumstances, injunctions should not ordinarily issue.” NYC Med. 
Practice, P.C. v. Shokrian, No. 19-cv-162 (ARR) (RML), 2019 WL 1950001, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 
2019) (quoting Miller v. Miller, No. 3:18-cv-01067 (JCH), 2018 WL 3574867, at *2 (D. Conn. July 25, 
2018) (quoting in turn Metro. Opera Ass’n, Inc. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. & Rest. Emps. Int’l 
Union, 239 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2001))). As Appendix A shows, this is now a minority view, and a 
small minority at that. 
6 E.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
7 Even people who have libel insurance don’t want to risk losing it. 
8 Even defamation in a credit report will usually stop when the credit agency is shown its error 
(and especially when it is ordered to pay damages). 
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But the judgment-proof libeler, always a hazard,9 has become still more 
common—and more dangerous—in the Internet age.10 The Internet lets 
speakers publish libels to a potentially broad audience at little cost, and these 
libels can cause enduring damage. Every time someone Googles a plaintiﬀ ’s 
name, the libels pop up again. 
Moreover, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) generally immunizes intermediaries, 
such as search engines or online service providers, that do have money. In any 
practical sense, damages awards do not leave plaintiﬀs in such cases with an 
“adequate remedy at law”11—damages cannot be collected from the judgment-
proof, and cannot eﬀectively deter them. But the judgment-proof are not jail-
proof: If libelers who lack money are to be deterred, the threat of criminal 
punishment is the one tool that can do the job. 
Consider, then, several different ways that such criminal punishment can be 
threatened. Assume that judgment-proof Don says Paula cheated him in 
business, and Paula thinks he’s lying. We can imagine several possible responses: 
The criminal libel prosecution: Paula goes to the prosecutor, who tells Don, “Our 
state has a criminal libel law; I think your statements about Paula are lies, and if 
you keep libeling her, I’ll prosecute you for criminal libel.” That doesn’t violate 
the First Amendment, as I’ll discuss in Part I, though it may be condemned as 
too likely to chill speech and too likely to be abused by prosecutors. 
The catchall injunction: Paula goes to court and gets an injunction against 
Don saying, “You may not libel Paula, or you will be prosecuted for criminal 
contempt.” That, I’ll argue in Part II, also doesn’t violate the First 
Amendment, because Don can’t be convicted of violating the injunction 
unless his post-injunction statements are proved libelous beyond a reasonable 
doubt at the criminal contempt trial. At the same time, such injunctions may 
be inadvisable, because they chill speech too much; appellate courts generally 
frown on them. 
The specific preliminary injunction: Paula goes to court and quickly gets a 
preliminary injunction against Don saying, “You may not say that Paula has 
cheated you in business, or you will be prosecuted for criminal contempt.” 
Though the injunction is less chilling than criminal libel law, it fails to oﬀer 
some of the important procedural protections that criminal libel law does (as 
Part III discusses). In particular, such a speciﬁc preliminary injunction lets 
speech be suppressed based on just a likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits 
 
9 ”[M]ost libellers are penniless,” an 1881 treatise author wrote, “and a civil action has no terrors 
for them.” 1 W. BLAKE ODGERS, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 390 (1881). 
10 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2015) (recognizing this danger); 
Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 351 (Cal. 2007) (same). 
11 See, e.g., Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 308 (Ky. 2010). 
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preliminary ﬁnding, rather than a full decision on the merits, following a trial. 
Because of this, appellate courts generally condemn such injunctions. 
The specific permanent injunction: Paula goes to court, and after a full trial gets 
a permanent injunction against Don saying, “You may not say that Paula has 
cheated you in business, or you will be prosecuted for criminal contempt.” 
Thirty-four states allow such injunctions, at least in some situations, and only 
six have generally rejected them (Appendix A documents this). If “equity will 
not enjoin a libel”12 was ever a firm rule, it isn’t so now. But, I’ll argue in Part IV, 
these injunctions also fail to provide certain important procedural protections. 
The hybrid permanent injunction: Paula goes to court and gets a permanent 
injunction against Don saying, “You may not libelously say that Paula has 
cheated you in business, or you will be prosecuted for criminal contempt.” 
This sort of injunction, I’ll argue in Part V, can provide the procedural 
protections that criminal libel law and catch-all injunctions oﬀer, chieﬂy 
because the injunction by its terms only punishes speech if it’s found libelous 
both at the injunction hearing and at the ultimate criminal contempt trial. But 
at the same time, the hybrid permanent injunction has the narrower chilling 
eﬀect that characterizes the speciﬁc permanent injunction. 
The hybrid preliminary injunction: Paula goes to court and gets a preliminary 
injunction against Don saying, “You may not libelously say that Paula has 
cheated you in business, or you will be prosecuted for criminal contempt.” I’ll 
argue in Part VI that this also provides the constitutionally required procedural 
protections (unlike the widely condemned specific preliminary injunctions), but 
at the same time protects Paula against libel more quickly. 
One way of understanding this is by focusing on exactly what kind of 
speech each remedy actually criminalizes: 
 
 
12 E.g., Austin Congress Corp. v. Mannina, 196 N.E.2d 33, 41 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (Burke, P.J., 
dissenting). 
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Criminal libel law All statements found by jury to be libelous 
beyond a reasonable doubt 
Catchall injunction All statements by Don about Paula found by 
jury at contempt trial to be libelous beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
Speciﬁc preliminary 
injunction 
Speciﬁc statements by Don about Paula found 
by judge, based on abbreviated hearing, to 
probably be libelous 
Speciﬁc permanent 
injunction 
Speciﬁc statements by Don about Paula found 
by judge at trial to be libelous by a 
preponderance of the evidence 
Hybrid permanent 
injunction 
Speciﬁc statements by Don about Paula found 
by judge at trial to be libelous by a 
preponderance of the evidence and then found 
by jury at contempt trial to be libelous beyond 
a reasonable doubt 
Hybrid preliminary 
injunction 
Speciﬁc statements by Don about Paula found 
by judge, based on abbreviated hearing, to 
probably be libelous and then found by jury at 
contempt trial to be libelous beyond a 
reasonable doubt 
 
I will argue that: 
1. Properly crafted criminal libel laws and catchall injunctions are 
constitutional, though probably too broad to be a good idea. 
2. Speciﬁc injunctions, permanent or preliminary, are unconstitutional 
(whether under the First Amendment or under state constitutions). 
3. Hybrid injunctions, permanent or preliminary, are constitutional 
and may indeed be well-advised. 
Properly crafted anti-libel injunctions are thus permissible under the First 
Amendment, if a state chooses to implement them, as some state courts13 and 
state legislatures14 have done. (I set aside here injunctions that forbid more 
than just the libelous statements; those are generally unconstitutionally 
 
13 See infra note 39 and accompanying text. 
14 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1809(A), (S) (2019) (authorizing injunctions against 
“harassment,” deﬁned to include at least two acts “directed at a speciﬁc person . . . that would cause 
a reasonable person to be seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed,” that do in fact “seriously alarm[], 
annoy[] or harass[]” and that “serve[] no legitimate purpose,” expressly “includ[ing]” defamation of 
an employer); id. at § 23-1325 (authorizing “injunctive relief from . . . defamation” of an employer), 
invalidated by United Food & Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Bennett, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1196 
(D. Ariz. 2013) (striking down the statute because it created special remedies for defamation of 
employers, as opposed to defamation of others). 
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overbroad, and I discuss them in a separate article.15) Such properly crafted 
anti-libel injunctions should also be seen as constitutional under state 
constitutions, even those that contain language that has sometimes been seen 
as categorically foreclosing injunctions.16 
But deciding whether to allow such injunctions also requires a diﬃcult 
judgment about state remedies law, again precisely because each injunction 
eﬀectively creates a mini criminal libel law. 
For instance, about a dozen states have criminal libel laws, and most of 
those states at least occasionally use them.17 A properly crafted anti-libel 
injunction would thus cut out the opportunity for prosecutors to use their 
discretion to decline to launch a criminal libel prosecution: a contempt-of-
court prosecution for violating an injunction can be started by the court 
itself—or, in some states, even by the plaintiﬀ—with no need for 
prosecutorial approval. As I’ll discuss in Part VII, courts need to decide 
whether this is a feature or a bug.18 
In Part VIII, I’ll turn to states that have repealed their criminal libel laws. 
Should courts view the legislative judgment behind repealing criminal libel 
laws as condemning all criminal punishment for libel, in which case even the 
narrow injunctions should be unavailable? Or should they view the legislative 
judgment as condemning only the broad chilling eﬀect of normal criminal 
libel laws, in which case the narrow injunctions would be permissible?19 These 
are hard questions to answer, but state courts need to ask them when deciding 
whether to recognize a novel remedy that seems to recriminalize what the 
legislature decriminalized. 
In Part IX, I’ll shift to federal courts, since many libel cases end up in 
federal court because of the parties’ diversity of citizenship. I’ll argue that, 
even if a federal court concludes that an injunction in such a case would be 
consistent with the First Amendment, it should also (following Erie20) 
consider whether such an injunction is consistent with state law, as set forth 
by state courts or as predicted by the federal court.21 
 
15 See Eugene Volokh, Overbroad Injunctions Against Libel and Other Speech (unpublished 
manuscript) (on ﬁle with author). 
16 Compare, e.g., Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1157 (Pa. 1978) (reading the Pennsylvania 
Constitution as foreclosing injunctions), with Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d at 312 (reading nearly 
identical language in Kentucky Constitution as allowing injunctions after a “judicial determination 
of falsity”). 
17 See infra note 25. 
18 See infra Part VII. 
19 See infra Part VIII. 
20 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
21 See infra Part IX. 
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CRIMINAL LIBEL LAW 
The threat of jail has historically been one potential deterrent to libelers—
though under the rubric of criminal libel rather than anti-libel injunctions—
and it remains a potential deterrent in some states. 
Criminal libel laws are constitutional if they are consistent with First 
Amendment libel law’s mens rea rules (generally speaking, if they require a 
showing of defendant’s “actual malice”22). Civil and criminal libel cases “are 
subject to the same constitutional limitations,” even when the speech is on a 
matter of public concern and is about a public ﬁgure or oﬃcial.23 
All the other First Amendment exceptions that the Court has explicitly 
recognized authorize criminal liability for speech, since such criminal liability 
is often the only viable way to punish and deter the unprotected speech: 
incitement, obscenity, child pornography, ﬁghting words, fraud, threats, or 
speech that is an integral part of criminal conduct.24 The Court has never 
 
22 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 328 (1974), requires a showing of “actual malice” 
before punitive damages are recovered, even in lawsuits brought by private ﬁgures. It follows that 
criminal punishment should also require such a showing, even as to libels of private ﬁgures. See 
Myers v. Fulbright, 367 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1174 (D. Mont. 2019) (holding as much); State v. Turner, 
864 N.W.2d 204, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015) (same). 
A similar showing might not be required as a First Amendment matter as to speech about 
matters of purely private concern. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 
749, 763 (1985) (allowing punitive damages without a showing of “actual malice” in such cases). But 
general principles of criminal liability would, in any event, usually call for a showing of at least 
recklessness as to attendant circumstances—such as the falsehood of a libelous statement—in 
criminal cases. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (using language that roughly maps to actual 
malice). This may reasonably be viewed as a First Amendment requirement when it comes to 
criminal libel in particular. 
23 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 157 n.1 (1979); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 
(1964) (taking the same view as Herbert); Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1073 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(upholding a narrowly drawn criminal libel statute); In re Gronowicz, 764 F.2d 983, 988 n.4 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(en banc) (following Garrison in rejecting a distinction between “criminal fraud and libel prosecutions on 
the one hand and civil fraud and libel actions on the other”); People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935, 941 (Colo. 
1991) (upholding a narrowly drawn criminal libel statute, when limited to speech on matters of purely 
private concern); State v. Carson, 95 P.3d 1042 (unpublished table opinion), 2004 WL 1878312, at *2-3 
(Kan. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2004) (noting that the trial court had upheld a narrowly drawn criminal libel 
statute; the defendant did not raise the First Amendment argument on appeal). 
24 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion) (giving this 
list of exceptions, together with “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the 
Government has the power to prevent”); United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008) 
(upholding criminalization of solicitation of crime, which was seen as integral to criminal conduct); 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-62 (2003) (upholding criminalization of true threats); New York 
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982) (upholding criminalization of child pornography); Smith v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 291, 309 (1977) (upholding Iowa’s criminal obscenity law, despite Justice Stevens’ 
argument in dissent, id. at 317, 321, that obscenity law should only be enforceable through civil 
remedies); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36-37 (1973) (upholding criminalization of obscenity); 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (describing when incitement may be 
criminalized); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1942) (upholding 
criminalization of ﬁghting words). 
 
2019] Anti-Libel Injunctions 81 
suggested that the defamation exception, alone of the First Amendment 
exceptions, excludes such criminal liability. 
True, many legislatures have repealed criminal libel laws, or declined to 
reenact them after old and overbroad criminal libel statutes have been struck 
down as inconsistent with the modern libel law rules. But thirteen states still 
have generally applicable criminal libel statutes,25 and criminal libel 
prosecutions continue in most of those states.26 Indeed, after the Minnesota 
criminal libel statute was struck down as overbroad in 2015,27 the Minnesota 
legislature reenacted a properly narrowed statute.28 
A 1978 Alaska Supreme Court decision struck down a criminal libel 
statute on the grounds that the deﬁnition of “defamatory”—“any statement 
which would tend to disgrace or degrade another, to hold him up to public 
hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to cause him to be shunned or avoided”—
“falls far short of the reasonable precision necessary to deﬁne criminal 
conduct.”29 Those who agree that criminal libel statutes are unconstitutionally 
vague should take the same view about catchall anti-libel injunctions 
enforceable through criminal contempt law. 
 
25 IDAHO CODE §§ 18-4801–4809 (2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6103 (2018); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:47–50 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.370 (2018); MINN. STAT. § 609.765 (2018); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 644:11 (2019); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-1 (2019); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-47, 15-168 
(2019); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01 (2019); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 771-774, 776-778 (2019); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-9-404 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-417 (2019); WIS. STAT. § 942.01 (2017–2018); 
see also V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 1171–1179 (2018). Two of these statutes have been held 
unconstitutional as to statements on matters of public concern, but remain in force as to statements 
on matters of private concern. State v. Snyder, 277 So. 2d 660, 668 (La. 1972), rev’d on other grounds, 
304 So. 2d 334, 334 n.1 (La. 1974); State v. Powell, 839 P.2d 139, 147 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). 
A few states have libel statutes that are focused on libels of particular businesses, such as banks. 
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-5A-46 (2016); TEX. FIN. CODE ANN. § 119.202 (2019). Query whether that 
sort of content classiﬁcation is constitutional given R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992), 
which states that libel laws that distinguish among libels based on content may be unconstitutional, 
unless the content distinction focuses just on more damaging libels. See, e.g., United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 99 v. Bennett, 934 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1196 (D. Ariz. 2013) (striking down 
a statute because it created special remedies for defamation of employers, as opposed to defamation 
of others). 
26 See, e.g., David Pritchard, Rethinking Criminal Libel: An Empirical Study, 14 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 303, 313 (2009) (ﬁnding, on average, four criminal libel prosecutions per year in Wisconsin 
from 2000 to 2007); Exh. A, ECF No. 1-2, Frese v. MacDonald, No. 1:18-cv-01180, 2019 WL 5537948, 
at 26 (D.N.H. ﬁled Dec. 18, 2018) (reporting, on average, three criminal libel prosecutions per year 
in New Hampshire from 2009 to 2017); Eugene Volokh, Criminal Libel: Survival and Revival 
(unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with author) (discussing prosecutions in other states). 
27 State v. Turner, 864 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 2015). 
28 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765 (2018). 
29 Gottschalk v. State, 575 P.2d 289, 292 (Alaska 1978). A federal district court has also recently 
suggested that the New Hampshire libel statute was unconstitutionally vague, Frese v. MacDonald, 
No. 1:18-cv-01180, 2019 WL 5537948 (D.N.H. Oct. 25, 2019), motion for reconsideration pending (ﬁled 
Nov. 25, 2019). 
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But it seems to me that, if a criminal libel law statute is limited to 
knowingly (or perhaps recklessly30) false and defamatory speech—the Alaska 
statute was not so limited—it should be clear enough to be constitutional, as 
several courts have indeed held.31 The limitation to knowing or reckless 
falsehoods would limit the substantive reach of the statute, diminishing any 
concern that the vagueness of the law would chill a wide range of speech.32 
The deﬁnition of libel also has a well-established “common law meaning,” a 
matter that the vagueness precedents view as signiﬁcant.33 
And the line between falsehoods that tend to lead to disgrace, hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule and other falsehoods yields a good deal of black and 
white, though also some grey. “[T]he mere fact that close cases can be 
envisioned” doesn’t “render[] a statute vague”—“[c]lose cases can be imagined 
under virtually any statute.”34 Rather, a statute is unconstitutionally vague 
only when an element is “indeterminate[],” as with statutes that criminalized 
 
30 ”Reckless” here means writing something false “with a high degree of awareness 
of . . . probable falsity” or “entertain[ing] serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication.” Harte-
Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 667 (1989). 
31 See, e.g., How v. City of Baxter Springs, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1300, 1305-06 (D. Kan. 2005); Davis 
v. Weston, 501 S.W.2d 622, 623 (Ark. 1973); State v. Stephenson, No. 06CA0901, at 2-3 (Colo. App. 
Mar. 6, 2008) (upholding criminal libel law and relying on People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1991), 
which didn’t expressly address a vagueness challenge but implicitly rejected the dissent’s vagueness 
argument); Pegg v. State, 659 P.2d 370, 372 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983); see also State v. Gile, 321 P.3d 
36 (unpublished table opinion), 2014 WL 1302608, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2014) (rejecting a 
vagueness challenge to a blackmail statute punishing threats to expose a person to “public ridicule, 
contempt, or degradation”); Roberts v. State, 278 S.W.3d 778, 791 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting 
vagueness challenge to a theft by extortion statute that punished threats to “expose a person to 
hatred, contempt or ridicule”);. 
Ashton v. Kentucky struck down a common-law criminal libel rule on vagueness grounds, but 
only because the rule—inconsistent with modern libel law—extended to “any writing calculated to 
create disturbances of the peace.” 384 U.S. 195, 198-99 (1966); see also Williamson v. State, 295 S.E.2d 
305, 306 (Ga. 1982) (same). Likewise, Fitts v. Kolb, 779 F. Supp. 1502, 1515-18 (D.S.C. 1991), and 
Parmelee v. O’Neel, 186 P.3d 1094, 1104 (Wash. Ct. App. June 19, 2008), rev’d only as to attorney fees, 
229 P.3d 723, 728 (Wash. 2010), struck down criminal libel statutes as unconstitutionally vague only 
because they banned “malicious” speech without making clear that this referred to the New York 
Times “actual malice” standard rather than to the normal English deﬁnition of the term. See also 
Tollett v. United States, 485 F.2d 1087, 1097-98 (8th Cir. 1973) (striking down a federal ban on 
defamatory mailings as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad because, among other things, the 
law made it unclear “whether truth would still be punishable unless coupled with good motives,” 
“whether Congress deemed it necessary that ‘malice’ be an element of the oﬀense for either private 
or public libels,” “whether libel must be knowingly falsely made or may be ‘negligently’ made,” and 
“whether the libelous or defamatory statements must necessarily lead to an immediate breach of 
peace”). 
32 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 873 (1997) (concluding that a statutory criterion becomes 
less vague when other required elements of the oﬀense “critically limit[] the uncertain sweep” of the 
overall statutory deﬁnition). 
33 See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1948); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
34 United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 305-06 (2008). 
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“annoying” or “indecent” speech—“wholly subjective judgments without 
statutory deﬁnitions, narrowing context, or settled legal meanings.”35 
“Condemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical 
certainty from our language”;36 but the deﬁnition of libel seems no more 
uncertain than the constitutionally valid deﬁnitions of ﬁghting words and of 
incitement, which also turn on the tendency of words to produce certain 
actions or beliefs among listeners.37 And while it may be unclear whether an 
allegation is false, or spoken with knowledge of its falsehood, that sort of 
factual uncertainty isn’t enough to render a statute unconstitutionally vague.38 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE CATCHALL PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION 
A. The Catchall Injunction as a Narrower Criminal Libel Provision 
Properly limited criminal libel laws, then, are constitutional. But one can 
certainly be worried about their potential chilling eﬀect. If they are enforced, 
then any time anyone writes anything potentially derogatory about anyone 
else, the writer should worry about the risk of prosecution. Though criminal 
libel laws generally require the prosecutor to prove that the speaker made a 
knowingly or recklessly false statement of fact, some speakers might worry 
that the prosecutor and the factﬁnder will misjudge this; and even the threat 
of an unsuccessful prosecution can deter many speakers. 
Criminal libel laws also give prosecutors broad power to suppress criticism 
of their political allies; many speakers could be silenced just by the threat of 
criminal prosecution for something that the prosecutor claims (even 
unsoundly) to be libelous. In theory, of course, the threatened prosecution 
could not succeed unless the prosecutor persuades the judge on the law and the 
jury on the facts. But in practice, many speakers might not want to face the risk 
of conviction, or even just of the arrest and the expense of a criminal lawyer. 
All this may help explain why criminal libel laws have largely fallen out of favor. 
 
35 Id. at 306 (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870-71 & n.35 (1997), and Coates v. City of 
Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)). 
36 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972). 
37 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (endorsing an incitement test limited to 
“directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such 
action”); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942) (holding that a ﬁghting words 
statute interpreted as limited to “words likely to cause an average addressee to ﬁght” was not 
unconstitutionally vague). 
38 Williams, 553 U.S. at 306 (“What renders a statute vague is not the possibility that it will 
sometimes be diﬃcult to determine whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; 
but rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is.”). 
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Let’s imagine, then, that a legislature enacts a narrower statute: Before 
anyone (again, call him Don) can be prosecuted for criminal libel, the alleged 
victim (Paula) must ﬁrst go to court and get a judicial decision that Don has 
already said something libelous about her. Only once Paula has that decision, 
and Don is aware of this (indeed, he may have been in court to object to any 
such decision), could any future libelous statements by Don about Paula lead 
to a libel prosecution. This would be a less chilling variant of criminal libel 
law—a one-free-bite-at-the-apple version—and would thus be constitutional, 
as criminal libel law itself is. 
And this hypothetical law, it turns out, is very much like one variety of 
permanent injunction—what we might call a “catchall permanent injunction,” 
such as “Defendants . . . are prohibited from any further acts of 
defamation . . . [of] Plaintiffs . . . on the Internet.”39 To be sure, some of these 
injunctions are imperfectly worded. But if limited to prohibiting future 
libelous statements (i.e., statements that are knowingly40 false, defamatory, 
and unprivileged), these injunctions would essentially mirror the hypothetical 
only-after-a-ﬁnding-of-past-libel criminal libel statute that I described above; 
they just operate by threatening punishment for criminal contempt rather 
than punishment for criminal libel. 
Let’s compare criminal libel laws with these catchall permanent injunctions: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 Boyd v. Does, No. 14BA-CV03038, ¶ a (Mo. Cir. Ct. Jan. 20, 2015); see also Appendix B 
(citing many more cases that involve such catchall injunctions). 
Some jurisdictions authorize such injunctions in some circumstances even in the absence of a 
ﬁnding of past defamation. One Ohio court categorically orders such injunctions in divorce cases: “In 
all cases, upon the filing of the initial Complaint for divorce, . . . both spouses shall be restrained 
from . . . [u]sing the Internet . . . for the purpose of posting . . . [materials] which threaten, harass or 
defame and/or slander the other spouse . . . .” CUYAHOGA CTY., OHIO DOM. REL. CT. R. 
24(A)(1)(c). And a Pennsylvania statute, enacted in 1937 but still occasionally used today, provides 
that all injunctions arising out of a labor dispute must order that “complainant and/or the 
employer . . . shall be enjoined from any and all . . . acts or threats of violence, intimidation, 
coercion, molestation, libel or slander against the respondents or organizations engaged in the labor 
dispute.” 43 PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. ANN. § 206n (West 2019); Brief of Appellants at 3, Turner 
Constr. v. Plumbers Local 960, Nos. 2754 EDA 2014, 2421 EDA 2014, 2422 EDA 2014 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 23, 2014) (quoting trial court order). 
40 See infra note 184 and accompanying text for why these injunctions are limited to knowing 
falsehoods. 
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Criminal libel law Catchall permanent injunction 
Deters derogatory speech  
about everyone 
Deters derogatory speech only about the 
plaintiff 
Deters derogatory speech  
at any time 
Deters derogatory speech only after the 
injunction is entered 
Speech punished only if found 
to be false beyond a reasonable 
doubt 
Same41 
... at a criminal trial where an 
indigent defendant would have 
a court-appointed lawyer 
Same42 
... and where finding is by jury Same, if judge or legislature provides that any 
criminal contempt trial will be before jury 
 
Note that the last three rows all stem from the injunction by its terms 
prohibiting only libelous statements. Because that’s an element of the 
injunction, any future statements by Don must be proved to be libelous at the 
criminal contempt trial. And as at any criminal trial, there must be proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt, and (if there’s a risk of jail time) a court-appointed lawyer. 
The initial ﬁnding that Don had libeled Paula is only made by a 
preponderance of the evidence, and with no entitlement to a lawyer, because 
the entry of the injunction (as opposed to its enforcement) is a civil 
proceeding. But that ﬁnding doesn’t bind the jury at the criminal contempt 
hearing—that jury must itself separately ﬁnd that Don’s post-injunction 
statements (or his post-injunction repetitions of his pre-injunction 
statements) were libelous. The injunction only opens the door to the criminal 
courthouse; it doesn’t itself conclusively determine that certain speciﬁc 
statements can’t be repeated. 
The one possible diﬀerence between the criminal libel trial and the 
criminal contempt trial in a catchall injunction case has to do with whether a 
jury is available. A jury must be provided in most criminal cases—including 
criminal libel cases—if the maximum statutory authorized sentence is over six 
months (or some lower threshold set by state law); all but one of the states 
that have criminal libel statutes either provide for such a punishment or 
otherwise provide for a right to trial by jury under state law.43 A jury must be 
 
41 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 (1911); Matanuska Elec. Ass’n v. 
Rewire the Bd., 36 P.3d 685, 701 (Alaska 2001). 
42 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 442 (2011). 
43 See infra Part IV.C. 
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provided in criminal contempt cases, on the other hand, only if the judge 
expects to impose an actual sentence of over six months.44 
But even if juries aren’t normally available in such criminal contempt 
cases, the judge can simply make clear that any criminal contempt trial for 
violating this particular injunction will be before a jury, at least unless the 
prosecutor and the defense both agree to waive a jury trial.45 Indeed, this 
could be provided by statute or by rule, as it is, for instance, under the Norris-
LaGuardia Act for certain labor injunctions46 and under some state laws for 
various kinds of contempt cases.47 
Jailing someone for civil contempt as a coercive measure—generally until 
he removes posts that the court has found to be false and defamatory48—
would, I think, violate the First Amendment precisely because it would lack 
the protections provided by the criminal justice process.49 But criminal 
contempt sanctions would be as permissible as criminal libel prosecutions. 
This having been said, catchall permanent injunctions have not enjoyed 
much success in appellate courts. Several courts have expressly struck down 
such injunctions, in part because they are so “broad and general.”50 I have 
found only one case expressly upholding such a catchall injunction against a 
 
44 See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512-13 (1974). 
45 This assumes, of course, that state law doesn’t mandate bench trials when shorter terms are 
involved, but I don’t know of any laws that impose such mandates. 
46 18 U.S.C. § 3692 (2018). 
47 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-19-9 (West, Westlaw through 2019 ﬁrst spec. sess.) (same); 
VT. R. CRIM. P. 42(b) (3) (providing for jury trial in all contempt cases, regardless of the length of 
punishment or of the subject matter); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-1-304 (West, Westlaw through Aug. 
1, 2019) (providing for jury trial in criminal contempt cases for violations of orders in family law 
cases, even though the maximum sentence is set at only six months). 
48 See, e.g., Enovative Techs., LLC v. Leor, 110 F. Supp. 3d 633, 637 (D. Md. 2015) (ordering 
that defendant “be held in jail as a coercive sanction for civil contempt, unless and until he purges 
himself of contempt and complies with the preliminary injunction”). “If the relief provided [in a 
contempt hearing] is a sentence of imprisonment, it is remedial [and thus civil contempt] if ‘the 
defendant stands committed unless and until he performs the aﬃrmative act required by the court’s 
order.’” Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 632 (1988) (quoting Gompers v. Bucks Stove & 
Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911)). 
49 See infra note 147 and accompanying text. Note that ﬁnancial sanctions for violating an anti-
libel injunction, imposed in a civil contempt proceeding, see, e.g., Schwartz v. Rent-a-Wreck of Am., 
261 F. Supp. 3d 607, 621-22 (D. Md. 2017), should be permissible (at least if the injunction follows a 
civil jury trial), just as damages liability for libel is permissible. The criminal procedure protections 
that I discuss here are required, I think, only when jail time is imposed. 
50 Hill v. Stubson, 420 P.3d 732, 744 n.7 (Wyo. 2018); see Metro. Opera Ass’n. v. Local 100, 239 
F.3d 172, 176-78 (2d Cir. 2001); Karnaby v. McKenzie, 54 Conn. L. Rptr. 71 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2012); 
Royal Oaks Holding Co. v. Ready, No. C4-02-267, 2002 WL 31302015, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 
7, 2002); D’Ambrosio v. D’Ambrosio, 610 S.E.2d 876, 886 (Va. Ct. App. 2005); see also Gold & 
Diamond Buyers, LLC v. Friedlich, No. 11-21843, 2011 WL 13322791, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2011); 
cf. Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 311 n.5 (Ky. 2010) (condemning “wide-sweeping 
language” in anti-libel injunctions, apparently including the prohibition of “publishing . . . [any 
defamatory] public comments pertaining in any way to the Plaintiﬀs” (alteration in original)). 
 
2019] Anti-Libel Injunctions 87 
First Amendment challenge, and there the decision was heavily inﬂuenced by 
the interest in protecting the parties’ children—the injunction had been 
entered as a result of a contentious divorce, and barred the ex-husband from 
defaming his ex-wife.51 
Yet many trial courts do issue such injunctions, without discussing the First 
Amendment.52 Moreover, these are close analogs of the modern 
“antiharassment” injunctions, in which a finding of “harassment”—often 
involving speech—leads to an injunction against all further harassment, rather 
than just repetition of specific conduct or speech that had been found to be 
harassing. Many courts have upheld such catchall anti-harassment 
injunctions.53 Whether or not those decisions are correct as to “harassment” 
(given the vagueness and potential breadth of that term), their logic would 
apply even more forcefully to prohibitions of defamation, which is more clearly 
established as falling within a First Amendment exception than harassment is.54 
B. The Prior Restraint Objection 
Nor is there any basis for treating catchall anti-libel injunctions as 
forbidden “prior restraints” while criminal libel laws impose mere 
“subsequent punishments.” Both punish speakers only after they speak. Both 
deter speech before it is said.55 
Indeed, anti-libel injunctions that ban repeating speciﬁc statements deter 
less speech than criminal libel law does: they forbid defendants only from 
saying particular things about the plaintiﬀs, while criminal libel law threatens 
defendants with punishment for any false and defamatory statements about 
 
51 In re Marriage of Olson, 850 P.2d 527, 532 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). Rightly or wrongly, courts 
have been considerably more open to restricting speech when they view the restrictions as necessary 
to protect the speaker’s children, especially against speech that seems likely to interfere with the 
children’s relationship with the other parent. See generally Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and 
Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 640-41 (2006). 
In Loden v. Schmidt, the Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld an injunction forbidding the 
defendant from “making any untrue or defamatory statements regarding” plaintiﬀ. No. M2014-
01284-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1881240, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2015). But the court speciﬁcally 
noted that the plaintiﬀ hadn’t argued that the injunction was too broad and that the court was 
therefore not discussing the question. Id. at *9 n.11. 
52 See infra Appendix B. 
53 See, e.g., R.D. v. P.M., 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 791, 799-800 (Ct. App. 2011); Huntingdon Life Sci., 
Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 538-39 (Ct. App. 2005). 
54 “There is no categorical ‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment . . . .” State v. 
Burkert, 174 A.3d 987, 1000 (N.J. 2017) (quoting Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 
204 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.)). 
55 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. 
REV. 11, 11 (1981); Louis Henkin, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon 
Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 278 (1971); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: 
Unraveling the “Chilling Eﬀect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 728 (1978). 
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anyone.56 In this respect, they are much narrower than the prior restraints 
that the Court has struck down in its classic prior restraint cases—injunctions 
barring all future publication of a newspaper,57 requiring all movies to be 
submitted for administrative review before being shown,58 barring all speech 
about a particular person,59 and the like. 
The premise behind the prior restraint doctrine, the Court has held, is 
that “a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after 
they break the law than to throttle them and all others beforehand.”60 But 
catchall anti-libel permanent injunctions do not throttle all speakers before 
they break the law—they threaten only that defendants will be punished after 
they have been found to have to have libeled the plaintiﬀ. 
Indeed, the Court “has never held that all injunctions [against speech] are 
impermissible”; “[t]he special vice of a prior restraint is that communication 
will be suppressed . . . before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by 
the First Amendment.”61 After speech is conclusively judicially determined to 
be unprotected, a permanent injunction should be no more troubling on 
constitutional grounds than a civil or criminal penalty, because “the order will 
not have gone into eﬀect before [the court’s] ﬁnal determination that the 
[speech was] unprotected.”62 “An injunction that is narrowly tailored, based 
upon a continuing course of repetitive speech, and granted only after a ﬁnal 
 
56 See Stephen R. Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539, 550-51 (1977) 
(making this point as to speech-restrictive injunctions more broadly); John Calvin Jeﬀries, Jr., 
Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 427–29 (1983) (same); William T. Mayton, Toward a 
Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punishment, and the Costs of the Prior 
Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 270 (1982) (likewise); Martin H. Redish, The Proper 
Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 93 (1984) (likewise); 
Schauer, supra note 55, at 728-29 (likewise). To be sure, the injunctions can deter particular 
statements more strongly. “[B]ecause an injunction can be drawn more precisely than a criminal 
statute, it can have a greater deterrent eﬀect by removing any doubt in the mind of the enjoined 
party that particular conduct is forbidden.” FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1202 (10th Cir. 
2009). But if the injunction speciﬁcally covers statements that the court has found to be false, it is 
likely good that it will especially deter repetition of those statements—and also good that it won’t 
deter other statements. 
57 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931). 
58 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 54-55 (1965). 
59 See Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1971). 
60 Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13 (1980). 
61 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973) 
(emphasis added); see also Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Pittsburgh Press on this point). The injunction in N.Y. Times Co. v. United States (the Pentagon Papers 
case), 403 U.S. 713 (1971), for instance, was a preliminary injunction issued a few days after the 
government asked for it, United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), not 
following a trial at which the speech was found to be unprotected. 
62 See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 390. 
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adjudication on the merits that the speech is unprotected does not constitute 
an unlawful prior restraint.”63 
The Court has held that courts may properly enjoin the continued 
distribution of material that has been found to be obscene64 or to be 
unprotected commercial speech.65 Other courts have held the same as to other 
unprotected speech.66 The logic of those cases extends to libel as well, and 
the Court’s occasional dicta labeling all injunctions as prior restraints are 
somewhat erroneous overgeneralizations.67 
C. The “Adequate Remedy at Law” Objection 
Some courts have said that the mere theoretical availability of a libel 
damages claim makes it a legally adequate remedy, even if it’s a practically 
useless remedy.68 But that seems more to assume the conclusion—injunctions 
should not be allowed because damages are the legally exclusive remedy 
(whether or not they are practically adequate)—than to justify it.69 
When injunctions are available, they should be equally available whether 
or not damages are also practically available (for instance, even when the libel 
defendants do have assets or insurance). There can’t be a rule under which 
 
63 See Auburn Police Union, 8 F.3d at 903. 
64 See Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 443-44 (1957). 
65 See Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 390. 
66 See, e.g., Auburn Police Union, 8 F.3d at 903 (allowing an injunction against unprotected 
charitable solicitation); Lassalle v. Daniels, 96-0176 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/10/96); 673 So. 2d 704, 710 
(upholding an injunction against unprotected true threats of criminal attack). 
67 Compare Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (“[P]ermanent injunctions . . . 
are classic examples of prior restraints.”), with Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 
763 n.2 (1994) (holding that certain content-neutral injunctions are not prior restraints), Pittsburgh 
Press, 413 U.S. at 389-90 (same as to injunction barring sex-segregated want ads), and Kingsley Books, 
354 U.S. at 441-45 (same as to injunction against obscenity). 
68 See, e.g., Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1157-58 (Pa. 1978) (“In deciding whether a 
remedy is adequate, it is the remedy itself, and not its possible lack of success [when a defendant is 
insolvent] that is the determining factor.” (citations omitted)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Injunctions in Defamation Cases, 57 SYRACUSE L. REV. 157, 170 (2007) (taking the same view). But see 
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK & RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 346 (5th ed. 2019) 
(“Does it make any sense at all to say that a damage judgment is adequate if it can never be collected? 
The Pennsylvania rule is in a tiny minority; it might not even be the rule in Pennsylvania if the 
issue were squarely presented outside a free speech context.”). 
69 Outside libel cases, courts have in practice abandoned the theory that injunctions are 
available only when there is no adequate legal remedy. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF 
THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 4-5 (1991) (“Courts have escaped the irreparable injury rule by 
deﬁning adequacy in such a way that damages are never an adequate substitute for plaintiﬀ ’s loss. 
Thus, our law embodies a preference for speciﬁc relief if plaintiﬀ wants it.”). And in cases involving 
continuous distribution of libelous allegations—for instance, on the Internet—damages seem 
especially inadequate. “Both because the thing lost is irreplaceable and because the loss is hard to 
measure, damages are a seriously inadequate remedy for defamation.” Id. at 165; see also Rendleman, 
supra note 2, at 37. 
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“poor people . . . have their speech enjoined, while the rich are allowed to 
speak so long as they pay damages”:70 “Conditioning the right of free speech 
upon the monetary worth of an individual is inconsistent” with constitutional 
principles.71 Yet while this reasoning has sometimes been used to reject 
injunctions against both poor and rich defendants,72 it can also be a reason to 
allow properly crafted injunctions as to both.73 
D. The “Equity Will Not Enjoin a Libel” Objection 
Many past cases do say that “equity will not enjoin a libel,” but that was a 
descriptive claim, describing a rule that no longer applies in many states.74 
Indeed, even in the past it had not been an entirely accurate description. 
Historically, some courts had been willing to enjoin libels if the defendant’s 
libels affected the plaintiff ’s business.75 Some have been willing to enjoin libels 
if the defendant was engaging in a pattern of repeated defamatory speech 
(which would be the very scenario where an injunction would be most useful).76 
 
70 Chemerinsky, supra note 68, at 170. Though Dean Chemerinsky had argued that this was a 
reason to reject anti-libel injunctions entirely, id., he later concluded that there was no “reason to 
continue the traditional rule that there can never be an injunction in defamation cases,” at least when 
the injunction is “limited to speciﬁc speech that is proven to be false.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Tucker 
Lecture, Law and Media Symposium, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1449, 1460 (2009). 
71 Willing, 393 A.2d at 1158; see also Reyes v. Middleton, 17 So. 937, 939 (Fla. 1895) (“[T]he alleged 
insolvency of the libellant . . . will not, of itself, authorize the interference of the court of equity.”); 
Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 100 (Tex. 2014) (“[T]he constitutional protections afforded Texas 
citizens are not tied to their financial status.”). This principle dates back at least to 1876: 
[I]f this remedy be given on the ground of the insolvency of the defendant, the 
freedom to speak and write, which is secured, by the Constitution of Missouri, to all 
its citizens, will be enjoyed by a man able to respond in damages to a civil action, and 
denied to one who has no property . . . . 
Life Ass’n of Am. v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173, 176 (Ct. App. 1876). 
72 See supra notes 70-71. 
73 See LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 68, at 346. 
74 See, e.g., Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 349 (Cal. 2007) (quoting this 
maxim but ultimately authorizing such injunctions); Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 
308 (Ky. 2010) (same); In re Conservatorship of Turner, No. M2013-01665-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 
1901115, at *20 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2014) (same). 
75 E.g., Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 11 So. 2d 383, 385 (Ala. 1943); Menard v. Houle, 11 N.E.2d 
436, 437 (Mass. 1937). 
76 E.g., Palmer v. Travers, 20 F. 501, 501 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884) (“Courts of equity have no 
jurisdiction of . . . slander or libel, unless threatened or apprehended repetition makes preventive 
relief proper and necessary.”); M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagen, 93 N.E. 584, 585 (Mass. 1911) (“The 
case does not come within the doctrine that equity will not enjoin the publication of a libel. There 
is here a wrongful act maliciously done, continuing and repeated day by day . . . .”). Some such cases 
limited themselves to defamation that damages the plaintiﬀ ’s business, on the theory that this aﬀects 
property rights and not just personal rights. E.g., Menard, 11 N.E.2d at 437 (“[E]quity will take 
jurisdiction where there is a continuing course of unjustiﬁed and wrongful attack upon the plaintiﬀ 
 
2019] Anti-Libel Injunctions 91 
And some decisions, rendered when the states still had separate law and equity 
courts, said that equity will not enjoin a libel only in the sense that any 
injunctions would have to be ancillary to damages claims filed on the law side.77 
E. The Vagueness Objection 
Unlike specific injunctions, catchall injunctions leave future prosecutors 
and juries to decide which statements are false and defamatory, and thus leave 
speakers to guess what those prosecutors and juries would do.78 But in this 
respect they are no more vague than criminal libel statutes: if an injunction bars 
you from knowingly saying false and defamatory things about me, you may be 
uncertain about what is factually false and about what might be found to be 
legally defamatory—but that is also true if a criminal libel statute bars you from 
knowingly saying false and defamatory things about anyone. And, as Part I 
explained, criminal libel statutes are indeed not unconstitutionally vague. 
F. The Singling Out Objection 
Nor should injunctions be rejected on the grounds that they especially 
deter speech by “aﬃrmatively singling out the would-be disseminator.”79 The 
same eﬀect would ﬂow from a prosecutor accurately warning a speaker that 
continuing to make a particular statement would lead to a criminal libel 
charge. Such prosecutorial threats are not unconstitutional;80 similarly 
targeted injunctions should not be either.81 
 
motivated by actual malice, and causing damage to property rights as distinguished from ‘injury to 
the personality aﬀecting feelings, sensibility and honor . . . .’”). 
77 See, e.g., Francis v. Flinn, 118 U.S. 385, 389 (1886); Organovo Holdings, Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 
A.3d 102, 125-26 (Del. Ch. 2017); Warren House Co. v. Handwerger, 213 A.2d 574, 576 (Md. 1965); 
Prucha v. Weiss, 197 A.2d 253, 256 (Md. 1964). 
78 See Rendleman, supra note 2, at 60 (arguing that catchall anti-libel injunctions are “both too 
broad and too vague,” because they “forbid[] the defendant’s expression that had not already been 
found to be defamatory” and “provide[] the defendant with insuﬃcient notice of expressions that 
would violate it”). 
79 TRIBE, supra note 4, at 1042 n.2. 
80 See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71-72 (1963); State Cinema of Pittsﬁeld, Inc. 
v. Ryan, 422 F.2d 1400, 1402 (1st Cir. 1970). Bantam Books barred a scheme through which a state 
commission tried to pressure booksellers to stop selling books that the commission found 
“objectionable” by threatening the booksellers with obscenity prosecutions. 372 U.S. at 61-63. But 
the Court expressly said that “law enforcement oﬃcers” are free to engage in “informal contacts 
with persons suspected of violating valid laws . . . . with the purpose of aiding the distributor to 
comply with such laws and avoid prosecution under them . . . .” Id. at 71-72. A prosecutor in a state 
where libel is a crime is thus free to warn a speaker that, if the speaker continues saying things that 
the prosecutor believes to be false and defamatory, the prosecutor will ﬁle charges—just as 
prosecutors are free to do the same as to other crimes. 
81 Frederick Schauer suggests that some very prominent speakers—for example, publishers of 
the New York Times—may feel they have little to fear from prosecutors, but more to fear from judges 
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G. The “No Obey-the-Law Injunctions” Objection 
A catchall anti-libel injunction forbidding defendant from making any 
libelous statements about plaintiff essentially orders the defendant to comply 
with libel law. But while courts sometimes say that “[i]njunctions that broadly 
order the enjoined party simply to obey the law . . . are generally 
impermissible,”82 there is an important limitation on that principle: “[W]hen one 
has been found to have committed acts in violation of a law he may be restrained 
from committing other related unlawful acts.”83 Catchall anti-libel injunctions are 
generally issued precisely when a defendant has engaged in a campaign of 
 
who have specially targeted them in an injunction, at least when it comes to national security 
injunctions: 
Those who are both highly visible and at the same time socially or politically or 
culturally unlikely to serve time in prison will have special reason to fear the prior 
restraint, for disobedience to such a restraint may create a possibility of punishment 
where for all practical purposes none existed before. 
Frederick Schauer, Parsing the Pentagon Papers 4 (Joan Shorenstein Barone Center Research 
Paper R-3, 1991). But I’m not sure this is so, at least as to the anti-libel injunctions we’re discussing—
newspaper publishers may assume that they won’t be sent to jail for violating an anti-libel injunction 
any more than for violating a criminal libel statute. And in any event, even if this is so for a few 
speakers, it is unlikely to be so for most. 
82 Spreadbury v. Bitterroot Pub. Library, No. CV 11-64-M-DWM-JCL, 2011 WL 7462038, at 
*12 (D. Mont. Nov. 30, 2011) (cleaned up) (applying this principle to reject a proposed catchall anti-
libel injunction); Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 
817 (2013) (“However they are phrased, orders that amount to ‘no more harassment’ without 
specifying the acts to be avoided violate the rule against ‘obey the law’ injunctions.”); see also generally 
Perez v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 655 F. App’x 404, 411 (6th Cir. 2016) (condemning obey-the-law 
injunctions more broadly, outside defamation law); EEOC v. AutoZone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 841-42 
(7th Cir. 2013) (same); SEC v. Goble, 682 F.3d 934 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 
884 F.2d 312, 318 (7th Cir. 1989) (same). 
83 NLRB v. Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S. 426, 436 (1941); see also AutoZone, 707 F.3d at 842-43 
(holding that obey-the-law injunctions can be proper “where the evidence suggests that the proven 
illegal conduct may be resumed”). Both these cases are often cited as precedents against obey-the-
law injunctions, but even they recognize that such injunctions may be proper when the defendant is 
engaging in a pattern of illegal behavior. For an illustration, see Lineback v. Spurlino Materials, 
LLC, 546 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2008), which upheld an injunction banning all illegal retaliation by an 
employer against union members, even though the employer had been found only to have 
discriminated against three particular members. 
[T]he district court reasonably found a continuous and deliberate eﬀort on the part of 
Spurlino to undermine the Union organization eﬀort. Accordingly, it concluded that 
there was a likelihood that the company would act further to thwart the Union’s eﬀorts 
. . . . Given these speciﬁc ﬁndings, . . . paragraphs 1 and 2 do not exceed the scope of 
the court’s authority to enjoin similar actions by the company. 
Id. at 504. 
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defaming a plaintiff, and they restrain only future defamation of the same 
plaintiff—a continuation of the same campaign of “related [libelous] acts.”84 
To be sure, some obey-the-law injunctions in other areas have been 
condemned as being too vague, and as not giving defendants enough notice 
of what is forbidden.85 That makes sense when an injunction categorically 
bans a defendant from, say, “violat[ing] the Clean Water Act”86 or “violating 
First Amendment rights.”87 Those legal rules may be well-deﬁned enough for 
civil liability, but not for criminal punishment for contempt of court. But, for 
reasons given above in Part II.B, orders that ban knowingly false and 
defamatory statements—like criminal libel statutes that ban such 
statements—are suﬃciently clear.88 
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE SPECIFIC PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
Let’s now shift from an anti-libel injunction that I argue is 
constitutionally permissible (even if perhaps unsound in other ways)—the 
catchall injunction—to one that is broadly viewed as unconstitutional: the 
speciﬁc preliminary injunction. Paula sues Don for libel, arguing that Don 
lied when he said that Paula had cheated him in business. She gets a 
preliminary injunction, just weeks after ﬁling, or even a temporary 
restraining order (whether or not ex parte) just days after ﬁling. That 
injunction says, “Don shall not accuse Paula of cheating him,” and lasts until 
 
84 Express Publ’g Co., 312 U.S. at 436; see also Autozone, 707 F.3d at 841 (“[I]njunctions should 
prohibit no more than the violation established in the litigation or similar conduct reasonably related 
to the violation.”). 
85 See, e.g., Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting a 
proposed injunction barring “the City from discriminating on the basis of race in its annexation 
decisions,” because it “would do no more than instruct the City to ‘obey the law’” and thus “would 
not satisfy the speciﬁcity requirements of Rule 65(d) and . . . it would be incapable of enforcement”). 
86 See, e.g., Hughey v. JMS Dev. Corp., 78 F.3d 1523, 1531-32 (11th Cir. 1996) (rejecting 
injunction barring defendant from “discharg[ing] stormwater into the waters of the United States 
from its development property in Gwinnett County, Georgia, known as Rivercliﬀ Place if such 
discharge would be in violation of the Clean Water Act” (emphasis added)). 
87 See, e.g., Elend v. Sun Dome, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1211 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (rejecting 
“prohibition against violating First Amendment rights”); cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 
97-98 (1945) (plurality opinion) (rejecting interpretation of criminal statute that would criminalize 
any “act which some court later holds deprives a person of due process of law,” because “[t]he 
enforcement of a criminal statute so construed would indeed cast law enforcement agencies loose at 
their own risk on a vast uncharted sea”). 
88 Metro. Opera Ass’n. v. Local 100, held that an injunction barring a union from making 
“defamatory representations” was too vague. 239 F.3d 172, 174-78 (2d Cir. 2001). But that analysis 
rested largely on how broadly the trial court had interpreted the prohibition—for instance, including 
statements such as “Shame On You” and “No More Lies,” id. at 176, 178, which are pretty clearly 
opinion. The Second Circuit didn’t discuss why the ban on defamatory statements is inherently any 
more vague than similar bans in constitutionally permissible criminal libel statutes. 
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trial (which could be years, or at least many months, in the future).89 It is 
speciﬁc rather than catchall because it bans only the repetition of a speciﬁc 
allegation or set of allegations (here, of cheating). 
Such speciﬁc preliminary injunctions have been sharply condemned by 
most appellate courts that have seriously considered them—even by courts 
that authorize speciﬁc permanent injunctions—because those injunctions 
suppress speech without a ﬁnding on the merits that the speech is 
unprotected. In the words of the California Supreme Court in Balboa Village 
Island Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, the most inﬂuential recent decision allowing 
permanent injunctions against libel, 
In determining whether an injunction restraining defamation may be 
issued, . . . it is crucial to distinguish requests for preventive relief prior to 
trial and post-trial remedies to prevent repetition of statements judicially 
determined to be defamatory. . . . The attempt to enjoin the initial 
distribution of a defamatory matter meets several barriers, the most 
impervious being the constitutional prohibitions against prior restraints on 
free speech and press. . . . In contrast, an injunction against continued 
distribution of a publication which a jury has determined to be defamatory 
may be more readily granted.90 
Likewise, when the Kentucky Supreme Court authorized permanent 
injunctions against libel, it expressly rejected preliminary injunctions: 
[T]he speech alleged to be false and defamatory by the Respondents has not 
been ﬁnally adjudicated to be, in fact, false. Only upon such a determination 
could the speech be ascertained to be constitutionally unprotected, and 
therefore subject to injunction against future repetition . . . . [W]hile the rule 
may temporarily delay relief for those ultimately found to be innocent 
victims of slander and libel, it prevents the unwarranted suppression of 
speech of those who are ultimately shown to have committed no defamation, 
and thereby protects important constitutional values.91 
The Nebraska Supreme Court took the same view: 
A jury has yet to determine whether Sullivan’s allegations about Dillon and 
his business practices are false or misleading representations of fact. For these 
 
89 For examples of such injunctions, see Appendix C. 
90  156 P.3d 339, 350 (2007) (quoting 1 HANSON, LIBEL AND RELATED TORTS 139-40 (1969)) 
(cleaned up); see also LAYCOCK & HASEN, supra note 68, at 346-48 (interpreting the precedents as 
drawing the same line); Redish, supra note 568, at 55 (same); David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, 
Defamation, and Injunctions, 55 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 59-60 (2013). But see Rendleman, supra note 
2, at 41-42 (arguing that preliminary injunctions should be allowed, so long as the judge concludes 
that “success on the merits is 51% likely”). 
91 Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 311 (Ky. 2010). 
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reasons, we conclude that the temporary restraining order, as well as the 
permanent injunction restraining Sullivan’s speech, constitute 
unconstitutional prior restraints in derogation of Sullivan’s right to speak.92 
Or in the words of the Alaska Supreme Court, “[p]reliminary injunctions 
are almost always held to be unconstitutional burdens on speech because they 
involve restraints on speech before the speech has been fully adjudged to not 
be constitutionally protected.”93 And while the court went on to say that “[a] 
preliminary injunction barring speech may be permissible only if the trial court 
has fully adjudicated and determined that the affected speech is not 
constitutionally protected,” the injunction that it was authorizing this way isn’t 
really so preliminary.94 The few appellate cases that have upheld preliminary 
injunctions against libel have not squarely responded to this criticism.95 
 
92 Sid Dillon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc. v. Sullivan, 559 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Neb. 1997). 
93 Alsworth v. Seybert, 323 P.3d 47, 57 (Alaska 2014); see also id. at 57 n.36 (“The U.S. Supreme 
Court has suggested that a preliminary injunction against speech might be permissible if special 
procedural safeguards are in place to ensure that no protected speech is enjoined, but the injunction 
in this case contains no safeguards whatsoever.”). 
94 Id. at 57; see also Auburn Police Union v. Carpenter, 8 F.3d 886, 903 (1st Cir. 1993) (stressing 
that an injunction of charitable solicitation was permitted only “after a ﬁnal adjudication on the 
merits that the speech is unprotected”); Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 519 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (“A preliminary injunction is a prior restraint.”); Cohen v. Advanced Med. Grp. of Ga., 
Inc., 496 S.E.2d 710, 711 (Ga. 1998) (overturning a preliminary injunction against libel on the 
grounds that the injunction was not “entered subsequent to a verdict in which a jury found that 
statements made by [defendant] were false and defamatory” (quoting High Country Fashions, Inc. 
v. Marlenna Fashions, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 576, 577 (Ga. 1987))); Hartman v. PIP-Grp., LLC, 825 S.E.2d 
601, 606 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (“We have found no Georgia case upholding an interlocutory 
injunction prohibiting speech . . . . [A]n injunction [against publication] has been upheld only when 
it ‘was entered subsequent to a verdict in which a jury found that statements made by [the defendant] 
were false and defamatory.’” (internal citation omitted)); Mishler v. MAC Sys., Inc., 771 N.E.2d 92, 
98-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (condemning a preliminary injunction issued “after only the most 
preliminary of determinations by the trial court”); St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Cent., Inc. v. 
Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220, 1223-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (dissolving a preliminary injunction on First 
Amendment grounds, because speech cannot be restricted “before an adequate determination that 
it is unprotected by the First Amendment”); Anagnost v. Mortg. Specialists, Inc., No. 216-2016-CV-
277, 2016 WL 10920366, at *3 (N.H. Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 2016) (“[B]y asking for a preliminary 
injunction, the plaintiﬀs seek to enjoin Gill from making statements that have not yet been found 
to be unprotected.”) (emphasis omitted). 
95 But see San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1239 
(9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a preliminary injunction in a labor union libel case was not a prior 
restraint because the statements were so misleading as to be fraudulent, and “[t]he First Amendment 
does not protect fraud”); Parland v. Millennium Constr. Servs., LLC, 623 S.E.2d 670, 673 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2005) (allowing a preliminary injunction so long as there is a showing of irreparable harm); 
Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (allowing preliminary injunction as to speech 
on matters of “primarily private concern”); Gillespie v. Council, No. 67421, 2016 WL 5616589, at *3 
(Nev. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2016) (allowing preliminary injunction in libel case because a 1974 Nevada 
Supreme Court opinion had allowed such injunctions); Bingham v. Struve, 591 N.Y.S.2d 156, 158-59 
(App. Div. 1992) (ordering a preliminary injunction against a libel on a matter of private concern, 
after concluding that the libel was constitutionally unprotected but without considering the prior 
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More generally, the Supreme Court likewise held in Vance v. Universal 
Amusement, Co.96 that alleged obscenity cannot be enjoined simply based on 
a pretrial showing that the speech was likely to be obscene—at least absent 
the procedural protections oﬀered by Freedman v. Maryland97—even though 
it could be enjoined after a ﬁnding of obscenity on the merits.98 Likewise, in 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, the Court upheld 
an injunction against an illegal advertisement only “because no interim relief 
was granted,” so that “the order will not have gone into eﬀect before our ﬁnal 
determination that the actions of Pittsburgh Press were unprotected.”99 
The problem with the speciﬁc preliminary injunction, then, is that it 
doesn’t just lead to punishment of speech that a jury has found libelous 
beyond a reasonable doubt (or even by a preponderance of the evidence). It 
leads to punishment of speech that a judge has found will likely be shown to 
be libelous, and this ﬁnding may have been based on a highly abbreviated 
(and sometimes even ex parte) adjudicative process. 
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE SPECIFIC PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION 
A. How the Specific Injunction Underprotects Speech 
Specific permanent injunctions, unlike specific preliminary injunctions, do 
follow a civil trial on the merits at which the speech has been found to be libelous. 
In fact, the trial might even be a jury trial. If a jury has found that speech is 
 
restraint problem). In the Ninth Circuit, Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 409 F.3d 1199 (9th 
Cir. 2005), expressly concluded that “issuing a preliminary injunction against speech based on its 
falsity would create particularly signiﬁcant risks to the First Amendment,” because an injunction 
issued “before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment presents 
the “special vice of a prior restraint,” id. at 1218 (cleaned up), and distinguished San Antonio 
Community Hospital on those grounds, id., even though San Antonio Community Hospital itself 
involved a preliminary injunction 
96 445 U.S. 308 (1980); see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1990) 
(reaﬃrming the principle that a judicial ﬁnding of “probable cause” that speech is obscene is 
insuﬃcient to justify a restriction, and applying this principle to “prior restraint[s] in advance of a 
ﬁnal judicial determination on the merits”); Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 420 (1971) (same); State 
v. Book-Cellar, Inc., 679 P.2d 548, 553-55 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984) (upholding a statute that authorized 
preliminary injunctions against the distribution of obscenity by requiring “that a ﬁnal judicial 
determination [be] made by the end of 60 days from the issuance of a preliminary injunction,” a 
safeguard compelled by Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)); City of Cadillac v. Cadillac 
News & Video, Inc., 562 N.W.2d 267, 270 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (overturning a preliminary 
injunction of obscenity on the grounds that the injunction would permit “removal of allegedly 
obscene materials from circulation before a judicial determination whether the material is obscene, 
with none of the safeguards” established in Freedman). 
97 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965). 
98 Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 440-43 (1957). 
99 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973). 
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libelous and therefore constitutionally unprotected, why then shouldn’t a court 
enjoin the defendant from repeating the speech? “Once specific expressional acts 
are properly determined to be unprotected by the first amendment, there can be 
no objection to their subsequent suppression or prosecution,”100 and many courts 
have therefore indeed treated permanent injunctions against libel as generally 
permissible, at least in certain classes of cases.101 
But while such speciﬁc injunctions are indubitably narrower than criminal 
libel laws, and even than catchall injunctions, they also fail to provide some 
of the key procedural protections that even criminal libel laws and catchall 
injunctions oﬀer.102 Consider: 
 
Catchall permanent injunction Speciﬁc permanent injunction 
Deters derogatory speech only 
about the plaintiﬀ 
Same 
Deters derogatory speech only after 
the injunction is entered 
Same 
Deters all derogatory speech about 
the plaintiﬀ 
Deters only particular derogatory 
statements about the plaintiﬀ 
Speech punished only if found to be 
false beyond a reasonable doubt 
Speech punished based on ﬁnding 
of falsehood by preponderance of 
the evidence 
... at a criminal trial where an 
indigent defendant would have a 
court-appointed lawyer 
... at a civil hearing where an 
indigent defendant would generally 
not have a lawyer 
... and where ﬁnding is by jury, if 
judge provides that any criminal 
contempt trial will be before jury 
... and where no jury would be 
present 
 
Because the injunction categorically forbids Don from repeating the 
cheating allegation (in our hypothetical), the criminal contempt hearing will 
determine only whether that allegation was repeated. The allegation’s falsity 
was conclusively determined at the injunction hearing, where the judge only 
had to ﬁnd the allegation to be false, defamatory, and unprivileged by a 
 
100 Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 349 (Cal. 2007) (quoting LAURENCE 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1054-55 (2d ed. 1988)). 
101 See infra Appendix A. 
102 Cf. Jonathan C. Medow, The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v. United States, 
130 U. PA. L. REV. 775, 807 n.210 (1982) (noting that Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 
(1957), which upheld an injunction against distributing obscenity, “relied heavily on the fact that the 
[New York] statute provided injunctive defendants with procedural safeguards on a par with those 
aﬀorded criminal defendants”). 
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preponderance of the evidence.103 Under the “collateral bar” rule (applicable 
in most states and in federal courts) the only question at the contempt trial 
would be whether Don violated the injunction by repeating the statements, 
not whether the injunction had been properly issued.104 
Likewise, while Don could get a lawyer at the criminal contempt hearing, 
that lawyer would be unable to argue to the factﬁnder that the statement was 
true, was opinion, was privileged, or was otherwise not libelous. And at the 
initial civil hearing, when truth, opinion, and privilege were debated, Don 
had no right to a court-appointed lawyer. 
The speciﬁc injunction is also more speech-restrictive than the catchall 
injunction in one important respect: it makes repeating a statement a crime 
regardless of changed circumstances and context.105 Yet “[u]ntrue statements 
may later become true; unprivileged statements may later become 
privileged.”106 Even if after Don’s ﬁrst false statement that Paula had cheated 
him, Paula did end up cheating him, he’d still be barred from repeating the 
statement despite its now being true.107 
 
103 See LAYCOCK, supra note 69, at 218 (noting this as a consequence of allowing injunctions in 
libel cases). 
Some courts conclude that statements on matters of public concern about public ﬁgures or 
public oﬃcials must be proved false by clear and convincing evidence in civil cases. See, e.g., Harte-
Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 661 n.2 (1989) (noting, but not resolving, the 
“debate as to whether the element of falsity must be established by clear and convincing evidence or 
by a preponderance of the evidence”); DiBella v. Hopkins, 403 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying 
New York law, which required “clear and convincing proof”). This, though, does not aﬀect my 
general argument. 
104 See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) (“[Petitioners] could not bypass 
orderly judicial review of the injunction before disobeying it.”). Three of the ﬁve California Supreme 
Court justices who voted to approve injunctions against libel in Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. 
Lemen, 156 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2007), stressed that California doesn’t follow the collateral bar rule, and 
thus, an enjoined defendant may still “speak out, notwithstanding the injunction, and assert the 
present truth of those statements as a defense in any subsequent prosecution for violation of the 
injunction.” Id. at 353 (Baxter, J., concurring). Likewise, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Ctr., Inc, condemns speech-restrictive injunctions in part because, “Normally, 
when injunctions are enforced through contempt proceedings, only the defense of factual innocence 
is available. The collateral bar rule . . . eliminates the defense that the injunction itself was 
unconstitutional.” 512 U.S. 753, 793 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
105 See, e.g., Friedman v. Schiano, No. 16-cv-81975, 2017 WL 2901211, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 
2017) (ordering defendants not to publish “any statement that accuses, claims, states, or implies that 
Plaintiﬀs have engaged in, are engaging in, or will engage in any crime, fraud, scam, or other act of 
misconduct”). 
106 Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 98 (Tex. 2014) (giving this as a reason to reject anti-libel 
injunctions); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 69, at 171 (likewise). 
107 This is especially likely if the original injunction bans not just a speciﬁc, detailed accusation 
but, for instance, any claim that plaintiﬀ is “either directly or indirectly engaged, aﬃliated or 
connected with, illegal activity,” e.g., Irving v. Palmer, No. 18-cv-11617, 2018 BL 351936, at *2 (E.D. 
Mich. Sept. 27, 2018), or any claim that “[a] court of law found that [plaintiﬀ] is liable in damages.” 
Power Places Tours, Inc. v. Free Spirit, No. 16-cv-02725, 2017 WL 2718473, at *4 (D. Colo. June 23, 
2017). 
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Relatedly, a statement may be libelous in one context but hyperbole in 
another. Yet an injunction simply barring repeating a statement will prohibit 
the statement regardless of context.108 The catchall injunction requires a jury 
ﬁnding of libelousness at the criminal contempt hearing, based on whether 
the statement was libelous at the time it was repeated (rather than at the time 
it was initially said), and thus doesn’t suﬀer from this problem. 
And each of these defects, I think, is of constitutional signiﬁcance. 
B. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt 
Before people go to jail for their speech, there should be proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt that their speech is indeed constitutionally unprotected. 
This is especially true because jail time not only powerfully deters speech but 
also incapacitates speakers, given that their speech rights are sharply limited 
when they’re in jail. Criminal libel law mandates proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt before sending someone to jail for allegedly false and defamatory 
statements. A civil injunction, which likewise threatens jail, should embody 
the same protection.109 
The Supreme Court has rejected this argument in obscenity cases 
(California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater110), though 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart had urged it in McKinney v. 
Alabama.111 To enjoin a theater from showing a ﬁlm, the Court held in Mitchell 
Bros., a judge need not ﬁnd it obscene beyond a reasonable doubt, but could 
use a lower quantum of proof.112 But proof beyond a reasonable doubt is more 
important in libel injunctions cases than it is in obscenity cases. 
In obscenity cases, factﬁnder error generally risks restricting only 
nonobscene pornography, which the Court has, rightly or wrongly, treated as 
 
108 This is the basis on which the First Circuit reversed the injunction in Sindi v. El-
Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 33-34 (1st Cir. 2018), and on which Justice Kennard on the California 
Supreme Court, writing for the dissenters, would have reversed the injunction in Balboa Island Vill. 
Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 356 (Cal. 2007) (Kennard, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). Likewise, Griﬃs v. Luban, No. CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2002), 
set aside a provision that banned defendant from calling plaintiﬀ a liar, partly “because this provision 
is not restricted to any particular context,” so that, “[f]or example, the injunction prohibits Luban 
from calling Griﬃs ‘a liar’ even if Griﬃs were to say that ‘John F. Kennedy was never President of 
the United States.’ On its face, the injunction prohibits speech even if non-defamatory and protected 
by the First Amendment.” Id. at *6. 
109 See also Medow, supra note 102, at 807 n.210 (observing similarly, though as to injunctions 
against speech that falls within an asserted narrow national security exception, that “an attempt to 
secure civil injunctive relief [as opposed to criminal punishment] does not trigger a presumption of 
innocence,” and “injunctive defendants are not guaranteed the assistance of counsel and cannot have 
their case tried to a jury” (citations omitted)). 
110 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981) (per curiam). 
111 424 U.S. 669, 683-87 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
112 454 U.S. at 93. 
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being of lesser constitutional value.113 (To the extent that the controversy in 
a case is whether the work has serious literary, artistic, scientiﬁc, or political 
value, that standard is in essence a legal judgment,114 for which the quantum 
of proof is less important than for factual judgments.) In libel cases, factﬁnder 
error risks restricting accurate statements of fact, including in many cases 
statements on matters of public concern.115 And, as noted in the next section, 
there is a long tradition of reading constitutional free expression guarantees 
as leaving the ﬁnding of truth and falsehood to the jury. Until libel 
injunctions came to be broadly accepted in the last few decades, such ﬁndings 
would generally yield criminal punishment for libel only in criminal cases, 
where proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. 
Finally, even if courts do rely on the obscenity precedents, those 
precedents should cut in favor of requiring at least a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence: this is what the California Court of Appeal held on 
remand in Mitchell Bros. because such a standard was needed “to protect 
particularly important interests” in free speech. 116  The speaker’s interest in 
libel cases is at least as important as in obscenity cases. 
C. Jury Factfinding 
In criminal libel cases, a ﬁnding that the statements are false must 
generally be made by a jury. That’s a Sixth Amendment requirement in those 
states where the criminal libel statute authorizes more than six months in 
jail.117 It’s a state constitutional requirement under the state constitutions that 
 
113 See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 529 (2009) (concluding that 
there was little need to be concerned with the possible unconstitutionality of a regulation of 
broadcast indecency because “any chilled references to excretory and sexual material ‘surely lie at 
the periphery of First Amendment concern’” (citation omitted)); Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, 
and the Chilling Eﬀect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1665 n.50 (2013). 
114 See, e.g., Athenaco, Ltd. v. Cox, 335 F. Supp. 2d 773, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (characterizing 
this as “a mixed question of law and fact,” which is to say of the application of a legal standard to the 
facts); State v. Harrold, 593 N.W.2d 299, 312 (Neb. 1999) (likewise treating it as a question of the 
application of law to fact that is to “be weighed independently by an appellate court after a de novo 
review of the relevant evidence”). 
115 As I argue in Part V.D, I think the public/private concern line is ﬂawed in libel cases as well 
as others. I must acknowledge, however, that the Court has held that, in libel cases, speech on matters 
of private concern is indeed treated as “of less First Amendment concern” and less protected (though 
“not totally unprotected”). See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 
759-60 (1985) (lead opinion). 
116 People ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 180 Cal. Rptr. 728, 728 (Ct. App. 
1982). 
117 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968). The criminal libel statutes that authorize 
such punishments are KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6103, 21-6602 (2018); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765 
(2018); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-6, 30-11-1 (2019); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-15-01 (2019), 12.1-32-
01 (2012 & Supp. 2017); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 773; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.51, 942.01 (2017-2018). 
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provide jury trials for all criminal libel cases.118 And it’s a state law 
requirement in all the other states that have criminal libel statutes (except 
Louisiana) because those states authorize jury trials for all misdemeanors.119 
These jury trials should be seen as a First Amendment requirement, and 
American free speech traditions support this view. Leaving the question of 
truth entirely to a judge is much like the pattern in pre-Revolutionary libel 
prosecutions, such as in the notorious John Peter Zenger trial. There, too, the 
judge decided whether a statement was libelous, and then the criminal jury 
decided only whether the defendant had published the statement.120 
American law roundly rejected this approach for criminal libel, even when 
criminal libel prosecutions were common, and instead insisted that the 
criminal jury must determine whether the statement was indeed false.121 The 
law should likewise take the same approach to anti-libel injunctions, given 
that they are enforced through criminal prosecution.122 
 
118 OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 22; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 15. The Oklahoma Constitution also 
expressly requires jury trial in all criminal cases except ones punishable just by a fine, OKLA. CONST. 
art. II, § 19, and the Utah Constitution has been read as requiring jury trial in all criminal cases 
“punishable by more than thirty days of imprisonment.” South Salt Lake City v. Maese, 2019 UT 58 
(2019). The Oklahoma criminal libel authorizes jail time, OKLA. STATS. tit. 21, § 773, and the Utah statute 
authorizes penalties of up to six months in jail. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-3-204, 76-9-404(2). 
119  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1201 (2019); IDAHO CRIM. R. 23(b); MICH. CT. R. 6.401. New 
Hampshire criminal libel law does not authorize jail time. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 644:11, 
651:2(III) (2019). 
120 See, e.g., Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 672 & n.15 (3d. Cir. 1991) (noting the 
importance of the jury in libel determinations); David S. Ardia, Freedom of Speech, Defamation, and 
Injunctions, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 23 (2013) (describing this history); William T. Mayton, 
Seditious Libel and the Lost Guarantee of a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 91, 107 n.93 
(1984) (likewise). The jury was also asked to decide whether the statement was about the plaintiﬀ, 
but that detail is irrelevant here. 
121 E.g., Montee v. Commonwealth, 26 Ky. (3 J.J. Marsh.) 132, 151 (1830) (denouncing the older 
English approach—leaving the jury to decide only the fact of publication—as “odious” and “subversive 
of personal security”); People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 337, 364-65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804) (Kent, J.) 
(likewise concluding that jurors must determine whether the defendant’s publication was libelous, not 
just whether the defendant had published it). Though Chancellor Kent’s position in Croswell lost 
because the court was equally divided, it quickly prevailed both in the New York Legislature and in 
American law more broadly. An Act Concerning Libels, ch. 90, 1805 N.Y. Laws 232. 
122 See Organovo Holdings, Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 A.3d 102, 124-25 (Del. Ch. 2017) (refusing to 
enjoin libel because of the “longstanding preference for juries addressing defamation claims”); 
Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1159 (Pa. 1978) (Roberts, J., concurring) (“One of the 
underlying justiﬁcations for equity’s traditional refusal to enjoin defamatory speech is that . . . [a 
court-imposed injunction] deprives appellant of her right to a jury trial on the issue of the truth or 
falsity of her speech.”); see also, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 793 (1994) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting in relevant part) (noting the implications of allowing a single judge to aﬀect 
free speech rights as a reason to reject injunctions against speech); Citizens’ Light, Heat & Power 
Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 F. 553, 556 (M.D. Ala. 1909) (taking the same 
view); Marlin Firearms Co. v. Shields, 64 N.E. 163, 165 (N.Y. 1902) (same); Kwass v. Kersey, 81 
S.E.2d 237, 247 (W. Va. 1954) (same). 
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One could reasonably be skeptical about whether juries are indeed great 
protectors of free speech.123 But American libel law has long treated jury 
decisionmaking as important, and this historical judgment should not be 
lightly set aside. Jury decisionmaking coupled with judicial gatekeeping may 
provide better protection than either jury decisionmaking or judicial 
decisionmaking alone124—among other things, dispensing with a jury verdict 
would leave the defendant’s right to speak at the mercy of a single 
governmental decisionmaker. 
Indeed, twenty-nine state constitutions expressly provide that in 
prosecutions for libel, the jury shall determine the facts (and, in many states, 
the law).125 The same principle should apply to prosecutions for violating 
anti-libel injunctions, even if they are labeled criminal contempt 
prosecutions. And, for the reasons given above, this principle should be 
understood as a facet of federal First Amendment law as well. 
Note that, if a speciﬁc injunction is entered following a civil jury trial, the 
jury requirement would likely be satisﬁed.126 But the other three elements 
would still be lacking: proof of falsehood beyond a reasonable doubt before 
speakers are jailed for their speech, the assistance of counsel, and the 
requirement that speech be found to be false at the time and in the context 
in which it is repeated. 
 
123 See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 540 
(1991); John Calvin Jeﬀries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 428 n.60 (1983); Henry 
P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 529 (1970) (“The jury may be 
an adequate reﬂector of the community’s conscience, but that conscience is not and never has been 
very tolerant of dissent.”); Redish, supra note 56, at 65-66 (raising a similar concern); Rendleman, 
supra note 2, at 45 (likewise). 
124 LAYCOCK, supra note 69, at 166. 
125 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 12; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 6; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 10; CONN. 
CONST. art. 1, § 6; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 5; IOWA CONST. art. 1, § 7; KAN. CONST. Bill of Rights, 
§ 11; KY. CONST. § 9; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 19; MISS. CONST. art. 3, 
§ 13; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 8; MONT. CONST. art. 2, § 7; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 9; N.J. CONST. art. 
1, ¶ 6; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 17; N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 4; OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 11; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 22; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 7; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 16; S.D. CONST. 
art. 6, § 5; TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 19; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 15; TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 8; W. VA. 
CONST. art. 3, § 8; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 3; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 20. These provisions date back 
to the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790. PA. CONST. of 1790 art. IX, § VII. 
126 For decisions that suggest this view, see Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 675-77 (3d. 
Cir. 1991); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62 (Ga. 1975); Advanced Training Sys. v. 
Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984); see also Robert Allen Sedler, Injunctive Relief and 
Personal Integrity, 9 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 147, 154 (1964); Stephen A. Siegel, Injunctions for Defamation, 
Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 655, 732 n.420 (2008). 
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D. Assistance of Counsel 
In criminal libel cases, defendants who can’t afford lawyers will get 
court-appointed lawyers who can argue that their statements are true, are 
opinions, are privileged, or are otherwise not libelous.127 This, too, is an 
important protection for speech. 
Speakers who lack a lawyer will often be unable to effectively defend 
themselves. They aren’t experts at proving facts. They don’t know how to 
conduct discovery. They don’t know the details of various libel law privileges. 
They don’t know the precedents that help distinguish, say, facts from opinions. 
If they lose at trial, they would ﬁnd it very hard to eﬀectively appeal. 
Indeed, they might feel so hamstrung by the lack of a lawyer that they might 
not contest the injunctions in the ﬁrst place.128 The injunctions may also be 
entered far from where the speakers live, making it even harder for them to 
eﬀectively litigate the case.129 And when a defendant is absent, unrepresented, 
or practically unable to appeal, the fact-ﬁnding at the initial civil injunction 
hearing is especially likely to be inaccurate.130 
This might be an unavoidable reality in the everyday operation of the civil 
justice system. Defendants who lack the resources to defend themselves may 
ﬁnd themselves subject to civil judgments—though this is constrained, at 
 
127 This requirement only applies if I am to be sentenced to jail, rather than just a ﬁne, Scott 
v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); but the discussion in the text focuses on the special procedures 
required before a person can be jailed for their speech. 
128 See, e.g., Baker v. Kuritzky, 95 F. Supp. 3d 52, 59 (D. Mass. 2015) (entering anti-libel 
injunction following default judgment). 
129 See id. at 55-56 (lawsuit brought in Massachusetts against poster who apparently lived in 
Georgia). Courts in the state where plaintiﬀ resides will sometimes have personal jurisdiction even 
over faraway defendants. See, e.g., Abiomed, Inc. v. Turnbull, 379 F. Supp. 2d 90, 95 (D. Mass. 2005). 
130 For examples of such unsound injunctions, see, e.g., Baker 95 F. Supp. 3d at 56-59 (issuing 
an injunction following default judgment banning defendant from stating, among other things, that 
the plaintiﬀ is “dishonest,” though such allegations would often be seen as nonactionable opinion, 
see, e.g., Kerr v. Marshall Univ. Bd. of Governors, 824 F.3d 62, 75 (4th Cir. 2016); Standing Comm. 
on Discipline v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430, 1440 (9th Cir. 1995)); Baker v. Joseph, 938 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 
1269-70 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (vacating an injunction, entered after a default judgment, that barred a 
journalist from “publishing any ‘future communications’ regarding” the Prime Minister of Haiti and 
a prominent South Florida businessman “in either their professional, personal, or political lives”); 
see also Johnson v. Lewis, No. 1:08-cv-06269, ¶ 2.b (N.D. Ill. Dec. 12, 2008) (describing statements 
made about a pastor, which included “unethical” and “engages in ‘sinister schemes and behavior,’”); 
DeJager v. Burgess, No. 112CV219299, ¶ 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cty. Aug. 6, 2012) 
(“dysfunctional, hypocrite[], fake, and [a] bad parent[]”); Murphy v. Gump, No. 2016-CC-002126-
O (Fla. Cty. Ct. Orange Cty. July 18, 2016) (“unprofessional,” “loose cannon”); Khang v. Chambers, 
No. 1684CV03642, at 6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Suﬀolk Cty. May 17, 2018) (issuing injunction following 
default judgment banning defendant from repeating claim that plaintiﬀ was “shady”); Grant 
Atlantic, Ltd. v. Doe, No. cv-16-870991, at 7 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Cuyahoga Cty. Sept. 6, 2017) 
(“foolish,” “a narcissist”). 
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least when it comes to lawsuits for damages, by the reluctance of most 
plaintiﬀs to spend money suing judgment-proof defendants. 
But when courts issue injunctions against libel, they turn that reality into 
something with criminal law consequences: defendants might be threatened 
with jail for repeating certain statements without ever having had lawyers 
who could eﬀectively argue that the statements were not actually libelous. 
That should not happen. 
E. Lack of Provision for Changing Circumstances and Changing Context 
Speciﬁc permanent injunctions ostensibly bar only statements that have 
been found libelous. But, as discussed in Part IV.A, a statement that was 
libelous when ﬁrst said, and that was found libelous at the injunction hearing, 
might not be libelous if repeated when the facts and the context have changed. 
True, a defendant could go to court to modify the injunction,131 arguing 
that the circumstances had changed,132 but any such motion, like all legal 
proceedings, will necessarily be expensive and time-consuming. Or a 
defendant could ask the court to exercise its discretion not to initiate criminal 
contempt proceedings in light of the changed facts,133 but the judge may of 
course not agree that the facts have changed, or may think that in any event 
the defendant should have complied with the injunction. And, more 
generally, speakers should not have to “request the trial court’s permission to 
speak truthfully in order to avoid being held in contempt.”134 
* * * 
Judge David Barron’s recent First Circuit partial dissent argues, in 
response to an earlier version of the argument in this article, that 
“criminalizing the violation of an injunction that has been issued as a properly 
predicated prophylactic protection against the future expression of 
unprotected speech found likely to recur” ought not be equated with 
 
131 See Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2018) (Barron, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part); Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 353 (Cal. 2007); In re 
Conservatorship of Turner, No. M2013-01665-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1901115, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
May 9, 2014). 
132 See, e.g., Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 447 (2009) (discussing this option as to injunctions 
generally); Rendleman, supra note 2, at 65-66 (concluding that anti-libel injunctions are permissible 
in part because they can be modiﬁed as circumstances change). 
133 See, e.g., Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 135 (4th Cir. 2011). 
134 Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 98 (Tex. 2014); see also Sindi, 895 F.3d at 35 (majority 
opinion) (“A decree that requires a judicial permission slip to engage in truthful speech is the 
epitome of censorship.”); McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 465 (7th Cir. 2015) (Sykes, J., concurring) 
(arguing that, when “the person enjoined must risk contempt or seek the court’s permission to speak 
. . . . This is the essence of censorship” (citation omitted)). 
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“criminalizing defamation as primary conduct (as in the case of criminal 
libel).”135 Yet the two are very similar: both involve threat of criminal 
punishment for speech that the legal system ﬁnds to be false and defamatory. 
If we think that certain procedural safeguards—proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, jury decisionmaking, a defense lawyer—are important to determining 
whether a statement is false in criminal libel cases, we should think the same 
in injunction cases, when the injunction is enforceable through the threat of 
criminal punishment. 
An injunction, “like a criminal statute, prohibits conduct under fear of 
punishment. Therefore, we look at the injunction as we look at a statute, and 
if upon its face it abridges rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, it 
should be struck down.”136 An injunction banning speciﬁc instances of alleged 
defamation thus is indeed tantamount to a statute “criminalizing defamation 
as primary conduct.”137 
To be sure, as Judge Barron’s partial dissent notes, “there were no criminal 
safeguards provided for in the injunctions [upheld in whole or in part] in 
Madsen and Schenck,” the Court’s abortion clinic protest cases.138 But those 
cases upheld narrow content-neutral restrictions on the time, place, and manner 
of speech.139 The injunctions there didn’t purport to criminalize the making of 
particular statements, nor did they rest on judicial determination of whether 
certain statements were false. Here, as elsewhere in First Amendment law, 
content-based restrictions on speech that the government believes to be wrong 
and valueless should be subject to more constraint than content-neutral 
restrictions on loud speech or speech that blocks building entrances. 
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE HYBRID PERMANENT 
INJUNCTION 
A. The Hybrid Permanent Injunction 
What if, instead of saying either “Don may not libel Paula” (as in the 
catchall injunction) or “Don may not accuse Paula of cheating him” (as in the 
 
135 Sindi, 896 F.3d at 48 n.31 (Barron, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (responding to 
an amicus brief I ﬁled in the case); see also Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 
97 B.U. L. REV. 1533, 1580 (2017) (“To be sure, violations of [injunctions against speech] could and 
would produce convictions for criminal contempt. But criminality of that kind is founded not so 
much on speech itself as on disobedience of the judicial decree.”). 
136 United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 581 (1971). 
137 Sindi, 896 F.3d at 48 n.31 (Barron, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
138 Id. 
139 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 361 (1997); Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 768-76 (1994); see also Sindi, 896 F.3d at 35 (distinguishing Madsen and 
Schenck on these grounds). 
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speciﬁc injunction), the injunction instead says, “Don may not libelously 
accuse Paula of cheating him”? Like the speciﬁc injunction, such a hybrid 
injunction has a relatively narrow scope. But like the catchall injunction, the 
hybrid injunction requires that Don not be punished for criminal contempt 
unless, at the contempt hearing, his speech is found to be libelous. Thus, we 
have this comparison: 
 
 
Catchall permanent 
injunction: “Don may 
not libel Paula” 
Specific permanent 
injunction: “Don may 
not accuse Paula of 
cheating him” 
Hybrid permanent 
injunction: “Don may 
not libelously accuse 
Paula of cheating him” 
Deters derogatory speech 
only about the plaintiff 
Same Same 
Deters derogatory speech 
only after the injunction 
is entered 
Same Same 
Deters all derogatory 
speech about the plaintiff 
Deters only particular 
derogatory statements 
about the plaintiff 
Deters only particular 
derogatory statements 
about the plaintiff 
Speech punished only if 
found to be false beyond 
a reasonable doubt 
Speech punished based 
on finding of falsehood 
by preponderance of the 
evidence 
Speech punished only 
if found to be false 
beyond a reasonable 
doubt 
... at a criminal trial 
where an indigent 
defendant would have a 
court-appointed lawyer 
... at a civil hearing 
where an indigent 
defendant would 
generally not have a 
lawyer 
... at a criminal trial 
where an indigent 
defendant would have 
a court-appointed 
lawyer 
... and where finding is 
by jury, if judge provides 
that any criminal 
contempt trial will be 
before jury 
... and where no jury 
would be present 
... and where finding is 
by jury, if judge 
provides that any 
criminal contempt trial 
will be before jury 
... and prohibits only 
future statements that are 
libelous when spoken 
... and prohibits future 
statements even without 
a showing that they are 
libelous when spoken 
... and prohibits only 
future statements that 
are libelous when 
spoken140 
 
140 CertainTeed Corp. v. Seattle Roof Brokers, oﬀers a helpful (albeit imperfect) analogy. In that 
case, the court enjoined the defendant from “making . . . three speciﬁed false statements” about 
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As with the catchall injunction, the hybrid injunction thus just opens the 
door to the possibility of criminal punishment for continued libels—it doesn’t 
purport to authoritatively decide that a particular statement is libelous, but 
leaves the matter to the jury in any future criminal contempt prosecution. 
But unlike with the catchall injunction, the hybrid injunction only opens that 
door for particular statements, and thus has less of a chilling eﬀect.141 
In a sense, then, the hybrid injunction is close to the opposite of a 
declaratory judgment. A declaratory judgment that a particular statement is 
false and defamatory, for instance, wouldn’t be a court order, and thus 
wouldn’t criminalize any repetition of the statements. But it would 
conclusively decide that the statement is false and defamatory, in a way that 
likely has a binding eﬀect on future civil litigation.142 A hybrid injunction 
does criminalize behavior—the repetition of a particular statement—but it 
doesn’t conclusively decide that the statement is false and defamatory, at least 
in any way that would bind the jury in any future criminal contempt hearing. 
Let’s be a bit more speciﬁc about what the hybrid injunction should say. 
First, it should ban only “libelous” repetition of certain statements. Any 
injunction that lacks this extra element should be seen as unenforceable—or, 
alternatively, courts could hold that such an element is necessarily implicit in 
any anti-libel injunction.143 
 
plaintiﬀ ’s product “in any advertising promoting his rooﬁng business.” No. C09-563RAJ, 2011 WL 
13354031, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 14, 2011). Defendant eventually reposted the statements, and 
plaintiﬀ moved for contempt sanctions; but defendant responded that he had closed his rooﬁng 
business, and his continued speech would no longer violate the terms of the injunction. Id. The court 
agreed on that score, noting that the defendant could not have violated the injunction if he had 
indeed been out of the rooﬁng business since the injunction was issued. Likewise, if an injunction 
by its terms bans only “false” or “libelous” statements, and a formerly false and libelous statement 
becomes true and nonlibelous, then the injunction would no longer forbid it. 
141 See Rendleman, supra note 2, at 697 (similarly arguing that even speciﬁc permanent 
injunctions are less chilling than the threat of criminal libel prosecution). 
142 See, e.g., Samuel L. Bray, The Myth of the Mild Declaratory Judgment, 63 DUKE L.J. 1091, 1113-
19 (2014). 
143 A state would not be able to satisfy this element simply by abrogating the collateral bar 
rule. See, e.g., Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 353-54 (Cal. 2007) (Baxter, J., 
concurring) (noting the absence of a collateral bar rule under California law as an argument in favor 
of allowing anti-libel injunctions); Barnett, supra note 56, at 552-53 (noting the presence of the 
collateral bar rule as an argument against allowing injunctions against speech); Rendleman, supra 
note 2, at 688 (arguing that anti-libel injunctions should be permissible, but that “[a] state that 
adheres to the collateral bar rule should suspend it” in contempt trials for violating such injunctions). 
Without the collateral bar rule, a defendant would be able to argue to the court at the contempt 
hearing (and on appeal) that the injunction was legally invalid; but, for the reasons given in the text, 
the defendant must be able to argue to the jury that (among other things) the enjoined statements 
were true, or at least that there was a reasonable doubt about their falsehood. 
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Second, it would help if the injunction were explicit about the 
consequences of including this element. The injunction might expressly say 
something like: 
If a defendant is prosecuted for contempt of court for making statements that 
violate this injunction, at any contempt proceeding it must be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that those statements are indeed false, defamatory, and 
unprivileged, and that the defendant knew that they were false.144 
Third, the law of anti-libel injunctions should expressly provide that any 
criminal contempt prosecutions should be conducted with a jury, unless the 
defendant waives the jury trial at the time of the criminal contempt hearing.145 
As noted above, one precedent for this is the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which 
provides for jury trial in criminal contempt prosecutions stemming from labor 
injunctions.146 The jury should be expressly instructed that it’s not bound by 
any prior judicial finding that the speech is libelous—a finding that was in any 
event made only by a preponderance of the evidence—and that its task is to 
decide the question for itself, beyond a reasonable doubt.147 
Fourth, the law of anti-libel injunctions should provide that such 
injunctions cannot be enforced through the threat of jail for civil contempt. 
Civil contempt would otherwise be a common means of coercing speakers to 
take down past posts, if the injunctions order such takedowns.148 But when it 
comes to libel cases, courts should require that any remedy involving loss of 
liberty go through the criminal contempt process, so as to enforce the 
principle that speakers can only be jailed for their speech if the full 
protections of the criminal law are provided.149 (Fines as civil contempt 
 
144 See Advanced Siding & Window Co. v. Kenton, No. 218-2013-CV-01155, at 7-8 (N.H. Super. 
Ct. Rockingham Cty. Dec. 30, 2013) (expressly providing that, “[i]f Mr. Kenton repeats one of these 
statements, at any contempt proceeding, Mr. Kenton shall have the opportunity to demonstrate that 
changed circumstances mean he has not ‘failed to exercise reasonable care in publishing, without a 
valid privilege, a false and defamatory statement . . . .’” (citation omitted)). 
145 See Ardia, supra note 90, at 63-64; Siegel, supra note 126, at 729-30. Without this provision, 
criminal contempt trials could be held without a jury, so long as the sentence is six months in jail or 
less. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840; Wells v. State, 654 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). 
146 See supra note 46. 
147 Cf., e.g., DONALD G. ALEXANDER, 1 MAINE JURY INSTRUCTION MANUAL § 7-76 (2018) 
(explaining to the jury that, though a “prelitigation [medical malpractice] screening panel reached a 
unanimous ﬁnding” allowing the case to go forward, “[t]hat hearing was not a substitute for a full 
trial,” and “[y]ou are not bound by the panel ﬁndings”); State v. Peeples, 64 A.3d 370, 378 n.10 
(Conn. App. Ct. 2013) (noting that jury had been instructed that “If the court has expressed . . . any 
opinion as to the facts, you are not bound by that opinion.”). 
148 See infra Appendix D. 
149 Cf. Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1991) (describing the trial judge’s 
use of civil contempt proceeding to jail the libel defendant until he wrote a confession and apology); 
Sayer v. Mont. Fourth Judicial Dist. Ct., No. OP 12-0551 (Mont. Oct. 9, 2012) (describing the trial 
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penalties should be permissible, so long as the initial injunction was issued 
following a jury ﬁnding that the speech was libelous;150 just as monetary 
damages awards in libel cases may be issued without the protections of the 
criminal justice process, so monetary sanctions for violating anti-libel 
injunctions may be as well.) 
With these protections, hybrid anti-libel injunctions would provide 
speakers with the First Amendment protections that they would have in 
criminal libel prosecutions. Given that criminal libel prosecutions are 
constitutional, such anti-libel injunctions should be as well. 
B. The Futility-or-Vagueness Objection 
The Texas Supreme Court has held that anti-libel injunctions were 
impermissible, partly because the injunctions would either be pointlessly 
narrow (if they are read as forbidding only the literal repetition of particular 
statements) or unconstitutionally vague, if read as forbidding paraphrased 
repetition as well.151 But criminal libel laws can be constitutional if they 
include the constitutionally mandated mens rea requirements, even though 
they ban all knowingly false and defamatory statements.152 An injunction that 
bans repeating, or even paraphrasing, particular statements would be less 
broad and less vague than those laws. 
C. The Discretion Objection 
Justice Scalia has argued that allowing injunctions against speech leaves 
judges with too much discretion.153 Even facially content-neutral injunctions, 
Justice Scalia argued, may stem from judges’ hostility to the content of the 
speech—judges know the targeted speakers’ ideas and may enjoin the 
speakers because of those ideas, when they would not have enjoined speakers 
who had engaged in the same conduct but expressed other ideas.154 
Presumably the argument would be even stronger as to anti-libel injunctions. 
 
judge’s use of civil contempt proceeding to try to coerce the libel defendant into removing online 
posts). 
150 See infra Appendix D. 
151 Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 97 (Tex. 2014). 
152 See supra Part I. 
153 See generally Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 794-95 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting in relevant part). 
154 Id.; see also Lawson v. Murray, 515 U.S. 1110, 1114 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in the denial 
of certiorari) (condemning injunctions under which “speech may be quashed, or not quashed, in the 
discretion of a single oﬃcial, who necessarily knows the content and viewpoint of the speech subject 
to the injunction”). 
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Yet discriminatory enforcement is possible with any speech restrictions 
imposed through criminal statutes: a prosecutor could, after all, apply such a 
statute equally selectively. Justice Scalia argued, 
Although a [facially content-neutral] speech-restricting injunction may not 
attack content as content . . ., it lends itself just as readily to the targeted 
suppression of particular ideas. When a judge, on the motion of an employer, 
enjoins picketing at the site of a labor dispute, he enjoins (and he knows he is 
enjoining) the expression of pro-union views. Such targeting of one or the 
other side of an ideological dispute cannot readily be achieved in speech-
restricting general legislation except by making content the basis of the 
restriction; it is achieved in speech-restricting injunctions almost invariably.155 
But precisely the same thing can be said about the enforcement of 
constitutionally permissible content-neutral statutes: 
Although a [facially content-neutral] speech-restricting [statute] may not 
attack content as content . . . , it lends itself just as readily to the targeted 
suppression of particular ideas. When a [prosecutor], on the [request] of an 
employer, [enforces a noise regulation or a crowd size restriction] at the site 
of a labor dispute, he [restricts] (and he knows he is [restricting]) the 
expression of pro-union views. Such targeting of one or the other side of an 
ideological dispute cannot readily be achieved in speech-restricting general 
legislation except by making content the basis of the restriction; it is achieved 
in [enforcement of] speech-restricting [laws] almost invariably.156 
Yet that danger is not reason to require strict scrutiny of content-neutral 
speech-restrictive statutes, or of prosecutorial decisions related to such 
statutes. Indeed, the danger doesn’t even invalidate narrowly deﬁned criminal 
libel statutes, though of course they may well be enforced (like all statutes 
may be enforced) in surreptitiously viewpoint discriminatory ways. The 
danger should likewise not require heightened scrutiny of content-neutral 
injunctions (as in Madsen) or of injunctions limited to forbidding 
constitutionally unprotected speech, such as defamation.157 
 
155 Madsen, 512 U.S. at 794 (Scalia, J., dissenting in relevant part). 
156 Id. at 793. 
157 As Justice Scalia noted in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, restrictions on speech based on its falling 
within the unprotected categories (such as ﬁghting words or libel) are generally treated as similar 
to restrictions on speech based on its “noncontent element[s].” 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992). 
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D. Restricting Injunctions to Libels on Matters of Private Concern? 
Some courts allow injunctions only as to speech on matters of “private 
concern”;158 David Ardia has recently argued the same.159 Such a rule would at 
least diminish the risk of criminal punishment (via contempt) for speech on 
public matters. And indeed speech on matters of supposedly private concern is 
already treated differently by libel law: such speech can lead to punitive and 
presumed damages even without a showing of “actual malice.”160 It’s also possible 
that states may require defendants in private-concern cases to prove their 
statements were true rather than requiring plaintiffs to prove their falsity.161 
But unfortunately, despite decades of trying, courts have done a poor job 
of deﬁning what constitutes a matter of public concern. (Nat Stern discussed 
this in detail in a 2000 article,162 and I have as well in a more recent piece.163) 
And that is so in the very class of cases where injunctions against libel 
seem most common: claims that businesses or professionals have defrauded 
or mistreated consumers. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, has held that a jet 
ski seller’s supposed refusal to give a refund for an allegedly defective product 
was a matter of public concern;164 it also held the same for a claim that a 
mobile-home-park operator charged unduly high rents.165 Other courts have 
taken a similar view, for instance as to consumer criticism of a plastic surgeon, 
a life-insurance-policy broker, and a wedding venue.166 But some disagree, 
treating as a matter of private concern a TV station’s criticism of a home seller 
who allegedly wrongfully took advantage of a blind buyer, consumer criticism 
of a construction company, and consumer criticism of a car dealer.167 
Courts are likewise divided on another common category of libels that 
often lead to injunctions: accusations of crime. The Ninth Circuit, for 
instance, has held that, “[p]ublic allegations that someone is involved in crime 
 
158 See infra notes 299, 297, & 330. 
159 Ardia, supra note 90, at 68. 
160 See generally Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985). 
161 See, e.g., Parrish v. Allison, 656 S.E.2d 382, 391-92 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007). Phila. Newspapers, Inc. 
v. Hepps, held that the plaintiff must prove falsity when the statements were on matters of public concern, 
but didn’t resolve whether this is required for private concern statements. 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). 
162 Nat Stern, Private Concerns of Private Plaintiﬀs: Revisiting a Problematic Defamation Category, 
65 MO. L. REV. 597 (2000). 
163 Eugene Volokh, The Trouble with the “Public Discourse” Test as a Limitation on Free Speech 
Rights, 97 VA. L. REV. 567 (2011); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: 
The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1990). 
164 Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2009). 
165 Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. v. Cty. of San Diego, 544 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2008). 
166 See Gilbert v. Sykes, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 752 (Ct. App. 2007); Wilbanks v. Wolk, 17 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 497, 506-08 (Ct. App. 2004); Neumann v. Liles, 369 P.3d 1117, 1125 (Or. 2016). 
167 See Mackin v. Cosmos Broad., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-331-H, 2008 WL 2152188, at *5, *9 (W.D. 
Ky. May 21, 2008); Gosden v. Louis, 687 N.E.2d 481, 490 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996); Vern Sims Ford, 
Inc. v. Hagel, 713 P.2d 736, 741 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986). 
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generally are speech on a matter of public concern,” in a case where a solo 
blogger accused a court-appointed trustee of tax fraud in a bankruptcy 
reorganization of a company.168 A California Court of Appeal likewise held 
that including a plaintiﬀ ’s name in a leaﬂet containing a list of alleged rapists 
was speech on a matter of public concern, and a Texas Court of Appeals 
reached the same result as to allegations that a youth pastor had, more than 
ten years before, seduced a seventeen-year-old parishioner.169 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, held that a person’s online allegation that 
his uncle had molested him when the person was a child was a matter of 
purely “private concern” for libel law purposes;170 the Iowa Supreme Court 
held likewise in a similar case.171 
Similarly, consider three cases dealing with allegations of substance abuse. 
Ayala v. Washington held that a letter to an airline alleging that one of its pilot—
the defendant’s ex-boyfriend—was a marijuana user was merely on a subject of 
“private concern.”172 Starrett v. Wadley, on the other hand, held that an allegation 
that a supervisor at a tax assessor’s office had an alcohol problem was a matter 
of “public concern,” because it revealed improper behavior by a government 
official.173 And Veilleux v. NBC expressly rejected liability for true reports of 
drug use by a truck driver under the disclosure-of-private-facts tort, concluding 
that the named driver’s “drug test results were of legitimate public concern.”174 
What’s more, many cases seem to suggest that the public/private concern 
line should turn on “context, form, and content,”175 without much elaboration 
of how those factors should be evaluated. Thus, for instance, Dun & Bradstreet 
v. Greenmoss Builders concluded that an allegation in a credit report that a small 
business had declared bankruptcy was not a matter of public concern, partly 
because the report was sent only to a handful of subscribers.176 Perhaps, then, 
the same report posted to the world at large, even just on a gripe site, might be 
on a matter of public concern—or would it be? What if the business were larger, 
 
168 Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284, 1292 (9th Cir. 2014). 
169 Carney v. Santa Cruz Women Against Rape, 271 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32, 37 (Ct. App. 1990); 
Crews v. Galvan, No. 13-19-00110-CV, 2019 WL 5076516 (Tex. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2019) (precedential); 
see also Forrester v. WVTM TV, Inc., 709 So. 2d 23, 26 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (concluding that a 
depiction of a man slapping his child at the child’s baseball game, included in a broadcast about 
excessive pressure on children in youth sports, “brought up a matter of public concern, i.e., whether 
adults put too much pressure on children in sports”). 
170 W.J.A. v. D.A., 43 A.3d 1148, 1158 (N.J. 2012). 
171 Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 455 (Iowa 2013). 
172 679 A.2d 1057, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
173 876 F.2d 808, 817 (10th Cir. 1989). 
174 206 F.3d 92, 134 (1st Cir. 2000). 
175 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985) (lead 
opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
176 Id. at 761-63 (lead opinion). 
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so that more creditors, employees, and consumers might be affected by the 
supposed bankruptcy? It’s not clear how courts are to draw this line. 
Similarly, Connick v. Myers concluded that questions about whether 
prosecutors had lost confidence in the district attorney and his top assistants were 
not on a matter of public concern.177 Surely, though, if a newspaper had published 
a story about the same matter, few people would be surprised. The underlying 
topic is indeed a public matter since it bears on the conduct of a powerful 
government department and the competence of important government officials. 
Rather, the Court’s focus seemed to be on the speakers being employees 
rather than outsiders, and on their motivation apparently stemming from their 
own personal interests. Perhaps, then, the same statements posted by someone 
else, with a different motive, might be seen as matters of public concern.178 But 
again, it’s not obvious how courts should draw such distinctions. 
In some situations, courts might be able to conﬁdently say that speech is 
just a matter of private concern—allegations of promiscuity, noncriminal 
adultery, and the like might qualify.179 But in many cases, deciding whether 
particular accusations are on a matter of private concern may be quite hard, 
not just because the law is unsettled but because the vagueness of the 
underlying test is likely to continue leading to uncertainty.180 
It’s not just that the line is hard to draw, or risks slipping over time. 
Rather, courts have been trying to draw the line in related areas for thirty-
ﬁve years (at least since Connick v. Myers), and they have failed to come up 
with a rule that works predictably in the very cases where it’s needed. That 
should counsel against expanding the rule to a new ﬁeld. 
E. Restricting Injunctions Against Libels of Public Oﬃcials or Public Figures? 
Perhaps there might be a rule categorically forbidding injunctions against 
libel of public oﬃcials or public ﬁgures. The Idaho Supreme Court has so 
held as to public oﬃcials,181 though it didn’t have occasion to opine on the 
much more common cases brought by other plaintiﬀs. A Tennessee court 
 
177 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). 
178 See Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1366, 1335, 
1377-78 (2016). 
179 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 n.7 (lead opinion) (giving such an accusation as 
an example of speech on matters of purely private concern). 
180 See Rendleman, supra note 2, at 670 (“Public [concern] versus private [concern] is not a 
workable or useful distinction. It is unstable, indeterminate, meaningless, and subject to 
manipulation.”). 
181 Nampa Charter Sch., Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 89 P.3d 863, 867 (Idaho 2018). 
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likewise suggested that injunctions against libels of public ﬁgures (and not 
just public oﬃcials) might be especially hard to get.182 
A New York court, on the other hand, was willing to issue even a 
preliminary anti-libel injunction in a case brought by a high-level appointed 
public oﬃcial (a water district superintendent).183 Courts in Arkansas 
temporarily enjoined alleged libels against a state supreme court justice who 
was running for reelection, though the injunctions were later vacated.184 A 
court in North Carolina likewise temporarily enjoined alleged libels against 
a judicial candidate.185 And a court in Mississippi temporarily, and then 
permanently, enjoined alleged libels against a sheriﬀ who had been ousted in 
an election that may have been aﬀected by the libels.186 
I think such a distinction might make sense as a policy matter. A legislature, 
for instance, might be well-advised to enact it as a statute, and a state court 
might articulate it as a judge-made limitation on judges’ equitable powers. 
But I don’t think there’s a basis to view such a distinction as mandated by 
the First Amendment. Knowing or reckless falsehoods about public ﬁgures 
and public oﬃcials can be criminally punished;187 it’s hard to see why criminal 
punishment through criminal contempt prosecutions for violating an 
injunction should be any more unconstitutional. 
 
182 In re Conservatorship of Turner, No. M2013-01665-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1901115, at *8 
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2014); see also Brummer v. Wey, 89 N.Y.S.3d 11, at 2 (App. Div. 2018) 
(seeming to make the same suggestion). 
183 Carey v. Ripp, 60 Misc. 3d 1016, 1018-19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2018), appeal pending. 
184 See Tegna, Inc. v. Goodson, 2018 Ark. App. 611, at 1, 567 S.W.3d 99, 101 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018) 
(vacating one such order as moot); Eugene Volokh, Arkansas Judge Issues Temporary Restraining Order 
Against Allegedly Libelous Political Ad, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (REASON) (May 14, 2018, 10:13 pm), 
https://reason.com/2018/05/14/arkansas-judge-issues-temporary-restrain/ [https://perma.cc/AZJ7-
VCHR] (discussing another such order); Eugene Volokh, Arkansas Prior Restraint Saga—One Court Says 
Yes, One Says No, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (REASON) (May 18, 2018, 7:24 pm), 
https://reason.com/2018/05/18/arkansas-prior-restraint-saga-one-court/ [https://perma.cc/M32E-
PU2S] (discussing yet another such order, as well as a different judge’s vacating an earlier order). 
185 See Lewis v. Rapp, No. 10 CVS 932, 2010 WL 9598800 (N.C. Super. Ct. Brunswick Cty. 
Apr. 19, 2010) (discussing the temporary restraining order in that case); see also Moore v. Doe, No. 
01-JC-10-227 (Tex. Just. Ct. Collin Cty. May 11, 2010) (issuing injunction ordering removal of 
YouTube videos about a sitting judge). 
186 Lewis v. Lewis, No. 25CH1:15-cv-00927, 2019 WL 1245272, at *15, *17, *22 (Miss. Ch. Ct. 
Hinds Cty. Aug. 25, 2015 & Feb. 13, 2019). See also MacKinnon v. Light, No. CV201800186, at 3-4 
(Ariz. Super. Ct. Cochise Cty. July 23, 2018) (issuing injunction against speech that defamed city 
attorney, and noting that the court had earlier issued a temporary restraining order); Burfoot v. 
May4thCounts.com, 80 Va. Cir. 306 (2010) (noting that the court had issued an ex parte temporary 
restraining order against speech that allegedly defamed a city councilman who was running for 
reelection, but then vacating the order, because the alleged defamation “does not justify the ex parte 
closing of the website”). 
187 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 157 n.1 (1979) (citing Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 
(1964), for the proposition that the rules for criminal libel and civil libel are generally the same). 
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Indeed, knowing or reckless falsehoods about public oﬃcials, public 
ﬁgures, and private ﬁgures are treated the same way even for civil liability.188 
The First Amendment distinction between the classes of ﬁgures is that 
negligent falsehoods can lead to proven compensatory damages for private 
ﬁgures but not for others (whether public oﬃcials or non-oﬃcial public 
ﬁgures); as the next subsection notes, injunctions would generally not punish 
merely negligent falsehoods in any event. And, unlike with speech on matters 
of private concern, the Court has never suggested that speech about private 
ﬁgures is less constitutionally valuable than speech about public ﬁgures. 
F. The Limited Role of Mens Rea 
So far, I’ve said virtually nothing about speaker mens rea, though that’s 
normally quite important in libel damages actions (and in criminal libel 
prosecutions).189 This is because the Court’s mens rea decisions aim to solve 
a problem that is largely absent in hybrid injunction cases: the “chilling” of 
speakers caused by the risk of liability where the facts are uncertain. 
Say that I’m contemplating writing about Bob Builder, because I think he 
has cut corners in making his building earthquake-safe. I think this is true, 
but I can’t be completely certain, and, even if I’m certain of the facts, I can’t 
be certain that the jury will agree. I may therefore be deterred from making 
my allegations, because I’m afraid of a massive damages verdict or even of a 
criminal verdict in those states that have criminal libel statutes. Mens rea 
requirements (sometimes actual malice, sometimes negligence) are meant to 
diminish this chilling eﬀect of civil and criminal liability. 
But hybrid anti-libel injunctions don’t create this hazard. First, I’m unlikely 
to be deterred from speaking before an injunction is entered by the mere risk 
that my speech will lead to an injunction; the injunction itself won’t send me 
to jail or cost me money. To be sure, few people are enthusiastic about being 
enjoined, and fighting an injunction does cost money. But that prospect is not 
as likely to be chilling as the prospect of jail or ruinous damages.190 
Second, once the court ﬁnds that my allegations were false and 
defamatory and issues the injunction, I will indeed face jail or ﬁnes if I keep 
making the allegations. But at that point, the court will already have found 
that the statements were false. I would know they were false, or at least very 
likely false. The injunction itself would thus come close to assuring that I 
have “actual malice” (in the sense of knowledge or recklessness as to 
 
188 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347, 350 (1974). 
189 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); see also Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. 
190 See Rendleman, supra note 2, at 57-58 (taking the same view). 
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falsehood). More importantly, the injunction will only chill statements that 
have indeed been found to be false. 
Indeed, recall that liability based on “actual malice” is tolerated even 
though it has some chilling eﬀect on true speech (since a speaker might fear 
that the jury will misjudge both the truth of the statement and the speaker’s 
mental state).191 The much smaller potential chilling eﬀect on true speech 
from injunctions should be tolerable too. 
It might thus be constitutional to allow speciﬁc anti-libel injunctions 
based on a ﬁnding of falsehood, even without a showing of culpable mental 
state—just as some have suggested that a declaratory judgment should be 
allowable in such cases.192 And the principles of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. shouldn’t necessarily require a showing of mens 
rea as to falsehood in any contempt proceeding for violating the injunction. 
But a showing of a culpable mental state might in any event be required 
by criminal contempt law principles, at least if I’m right that (as Part V.A 
argues) any anti-libel injunction must by its terms ban only libelous 
statements. To be guilty of criminal contempt for violating a court order, the 
defendant generally has to have acted “with knowledge that the act was in 
violation of the court order, as distinguished from an accidental, inadvertent 
or negligent violation of an order.”193 If the injunction expressly bars only 
libelous statements, which is to say only false, defamatory, and unprivileged 
statements, then a defendant shouldn’t be criminally punished for violating 
the injunction unless he knew that the statements were false. 
And that showing should usually be easy to make, given that the 
injunction alerts the speaker that the judge or jury has found the speech to be 
false. In principle, the speaker might be able to evade punishment by 
persuading the criminal contempt jury that he was sincerely certain the 
statement was true, even despite that earlier ﬁnding. But in practice that is a 
claim that many juries will be unlikely to believe. 
 
191 This continuing chilling eﬀect is one reason why Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg in 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan would have imposed a rule of absolute immunity in public concern libel 
cases. See 376 U.S. 254, 293, 295 (1964) (Black, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 300 (Goldberg, 
J., concurring in the judgment). But the majority was willing to tolerate this danger. 
192 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS div. 5, ch. 27 special note (1977); Marc A. 
Franklin, A Declaratory Judgment Alternative to Current Libel Law, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 809, 812 (1986); 
David S. Han, Rethinking Speech-Tort Remedies, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1155 n.112 (2014) (citing David 
A. Barrett, Declaratory Judgments for Libel: A Better Alternative, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 847 (1986)); 
Pierre Leval, The No-Money, No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in Its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. 
REV. 1287, 1288 (1988); Rodney A. Smolla & Michael J. Gaertner, The Annenberg Libel Reform 
Proposal: The Case for Enactment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 25, 33-34 (1989)). 
193 O’Rourke v. O’Rourke, 337 S.W.3d 189, 197 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting 17 C.J.S. 
Contempt § 14, 2019) (cleaned up). 
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VI. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE HYBRID PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
A. The Hybrid Preliminary Injunction 
If I am right that the hybrid permanent injunction is constitutional—
because it gives defendants all the First Amendment protections oﬀered by 
valid criminal libel laws, and does so while chilling less nonlibelous speech—
then hybrid preliminary injunctions should be constitutional, too. They 
would adequately protect defendants, while protecting plaintiﬀs by letting 
courts deter libels starting shortly after a lawsuit is ﬁled rather than only after 
the lawsuit is adjudicated. 
Let us return to Paula and Don, and imagine that Paula gets a preliminary 
injunction against Don. Shortly after she files her lawsuit, a judge concludes 
that she is likely to succeed on the merits: Don’s statement that Paula cheated 
him is likely untrue. 
This is just a tentative decision, the judge acknowledges, based on limited 
time for brieﬁng and likely no discovery. But that’s what the judge thinks, so 
the judge issues an injunction: “Don shall not libelously state that Paula 
cheated him”; as with the hybrid permanent injunction, the injunction 
provides that any criminal contempt trial for violating it shall be before a jury. 
Like the hybrid permanent injunction, the hybrid preliminary injunction 
would provide all the procedural protections oﬀered by criminal libel law: 
Don can’t be convicted of criminal contempt unless the criminal jury ﬁnds, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that his post-injunction statements about Paula 
are indeed libelous; and Don would be entitled to a court-appointed defense 
lawyer to argue that the statements weren’t libelous. Such hybrid preliminary 
injunctions thus lack the primary defect of speciﬁc preliminary injunctions—
the punishment of speech without a prior ﬁnding on the merits that the 
speech is actually constitutionally unprotected.194 
 
194 See supra Part III. 
In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980), Justice White argued in dissent 
that the Court wrongly struck down a statute that authorized anti-obscenity injunctions. On its face, 
the statute appeared to authorize injunctions banning distribution of “obscene material” generally, 
and Justice White argued that such an injunction 
would not by its terms forbid the exhibition of any materials protected by the First 
Amendment and would impose no greater functional burden on First Amendment 
values than would an equivalent—and concededly valid—criminal statute. It simply 
declares to the exhibitor that the future showing of obscene motion pictures will be 
punishable. 
Id. at 321-22 (White, J., dissenting). This would suggest that, under the holding of Vance, catchall 
preliminary injunctions would be unconstitutional, and hybrid preliminary injunctions might be 
too. 
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Also like the hybrid permanent injunction, the hybrid preliminary 
injunction exposes Don to criminal punishment only for repeating speciﬁc 
statements. Unlike with the hybrid permanent injunction, those would be 
statements that the judge found libelous based on the abbreviated preliminary 
injunction process rather than after a full trial. But despite that, the hybrid 
preliminary injunction would still be less chilling than a catchall injunction 
or than a criminal libel law, which would put Don in jeopardy as to any 
potentially libelous statements. And unlike the hybrid permanent injunction, 
the hybrid preliminary injunction opens the door to criminal punishment—
and therefore helps deter future libels—near the start of the lawsuit, rather 
than years later. 
Hybrid preliminary injunctions, like hybrid permanent injunctions, haven’t 
yet been tested in appellate courts, or even issued by trial courts. But I think 
they would be consistent with the First Amendment, and often a good idea. 
Indeed, one recent preliminary injunction seems to lean in this direction. 
In 2 Sons Plumbing, LLC v. Herring, 2 Sons claimed that Romare Herring had 
criticized 2 Sons while falsely claiming to be a customer (in some places) and 
a former employee (in others). The company sued for, among other things, 
violating California law that bars such impersonation.195 The District Court 
concluded that there was enough to the claim to justify a temporary 
restraining order, but it crafted the injunction so that any impersonation 
would still have to be shown at a criminal contempt hearing, rather than 
treating this preliminary conclusion as binding in such a hearing: 
 
But the court of appeals in Vance had read the statute as authorizing specific preliminary 
injunctions, and not just catchall injunctions: “the state can obtain, ex parte, a 10-day temporary 
restraining order against the showing of an allegedly obscene ﬁlm,” without “a ﬁnal judicial 
determination of obscenity,” and “[o]n appeal from the temporary injunction, the theater operator 
who has been enjoined cannot argue that the suppressed ﬁlm is not obscene.” Universal Amusement 
Co. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 169-70 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc). And the Supreme Court followed the 
Court of Appeals’ interpretation: 
Presumably, an exhibitor would be required to obey such an order pending review of 
its merits and would be subject to contempt proceedings even if the ﬁlm is ultimately 
found to be nonobscene. Such prior restraints would be more onerous and more 
objectionable than the threat of criminal sanctions after a ﬁlm has been exhibited, 
since nonobscenity would be a defense to any criminal prosecution. 
Vance, 445 U.S. at 316. The Court thus condemned these injunctions because, unlike with true 
catchall (or hybrid) injunctions, they allowed speech to be criminally punished without a ﬁnal 
determination that it was constitutionally unprotected. Indeed, Justice White himself (joined by 
Justices Brennan and Marshall, who had been in the Vance majority) later stressed that, “Fatal to 
that statute [in Vance] were particular procedural inﬁrmities of the Texas nuisance scheme whereby 
the subject of an abatement order or injunction ‘would be subject to contempt proceedings even if 
the ﬁlm (was) ultimately found to be nonobscene.’” Ave. Book Store v. City of Tallmadge, 459 U.S. 
997, 998 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (quoting Vance, 445 U.S. at 316). 
195 2 Sons Plumbing, LLC v. Herring, No. CV 19-1868 SVW-MRW (C.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2019), 
ECF No. 15. 
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(2) Defendant Romare Herring is barred, prohibited, and restrained from 
posting reviews of 2 Sons Plumbing, LLC and/or Joe’s Plumbing Co. claiming 
that Defendant was a customer of such business when Defendant was not 
actually a customer; . . . 
(4) Defendant Romare Herring is barred, prohibited, and restrained from 
posting on the Internet a webpage claiming to be aﬃliated with 2 Sons 
Plumbing, LLC and/or Joe’s Plumbing Co. if Defendant is not aﬃliated with 
those businesses.196 
If it turns out that Herring is aﬃliated with 2 Sons or Joe’s, and he repeats 
that statement, the terms of provision (4) wouldn’t make him liable; likewise, 
if he was indeed a customer, and posts reviews of 2 Sons or Joes so stating. 
The order isn’t as precise as it could be; for instance, the “when” in (2), unlike 
the “if ” in (4), could be read as a statement that the court is deciding that 
Herring wasn’t actually a customer, rather than a provision that the order 
applies only under the circumstances (to be found conclusively later) that 
Herring wasn’t a customer. Moreover, provisions (1) and (3) require the 
takedown of earlier posts without any such condition. Still, the order, and 
especially provision (4), points towards the approach that I describe here. 
B. The Hybrid Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order 
In principle, even temporary restraining orders—including ones obtained 
ex parte—could be permissible so long as they only ban libelously repeating 
certain statements. Such an order would, as with the hybrid preliminary 
injunction, punish no more speech than a criminal libel law would, since any 
criminal contempt punishment would be contingent on the jury ﬁnding (after 
a full trial) that the statements were indeed libelous. By its very terms, it 
would be limited to constitutionally unprotected speech; whether any 
particular statement is unprotected and therefore forbidden would have to be 
determined at an adversarial criminal contempt hearing.197 
But while such hybrid ex parte TROs may be constitutional, they should 
be avoided. The advantage of hybrid injunctions over catchall injunctions is 
that they are limited to speciﬁc statements that a judge has concluded is likely 
false and defamatory. This judicial conclusion doesn’t itself suﬃce for 
 
196 Id. at 2. 
197 This distinguishes such hybrid orders from the ex parte order in Carroll v. President & 
Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968), which by its terms prohibited speech that would 
generally be constitutionally protected, without an adversarial hearing at which the defendants could 
respond to the plaintiﬀs’ arguments that this protection should be lost on the facts of the case. See 
id. at 183-84 (criticizing “the failure to invite participation of the party seeking to exercise First 
Amendment rights”). 
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forbidding the statements outright, since the defendant should have an 
opportunity to argue his case to a jury (which is the advantage of hybrid 
injunctions over speciﬁc injunctions). Still, this conclusion is still an 
important protection for speakers—and for the conclusion to be relatively 
reliable, it has to be made based on the judge’s hearing both sides’ factual 
theories, both sides’ legal analyses, and both sides’ analyses of how the 
injunction should be crafted.198 
Sometimes, of course, such an adversary presentation is impossible, for 
example if the defendants are anonymous and can’t be identiﬁed using 
reasonable pre-injunction discovery, or if they simply refuse to show up. But 
plaintiﬀs should be required to at least try to serve defendants and give them 
an opportunity to be heard before even a hybrid injunction is issued. 
VII. BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: INJUNCTIONS AND 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
I’ve argued that criminal contempt prosecutions for violating anti-libel 
injunctions are similar to criminal libel prosecutions. But they are missing 
one important feature of most prosecutions—the normal prosecutor. 
In criminal libel prosecutions, a prosecutor exercises discretion about 
whether to prosecute. In criminal contempt proceedings, a judge would 
normally refer the case to the prosecutor’s office, but if that office declines to 
act, the judge may appoint a special prosecutor.199 And in some states, the 
litigants could initiate the criminal contempt prosecution themselves,200 or move 
for contempt and ask for the court to appoint their lawyers as the prosecutors.201 
 
198 See id. (“The participation of both sides is necessary . . . .”). 
199 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a)(2); COLO. R. CIV. P. 107(d)(1); WIS. STAT. 
§ 785.03(1)(b)(2019). 
200 See, e.g., ALASKA R. CIV. P. 90(b); MICH. COMP. LAWS 3.606(A); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 
§ 846 (McKinney 2010); DeGeorge v. Warheit, 741 N.W.2d 384, 387 (Mich. Ct. App. 2007); Note, 
Permitting Private Initiation of Criminal Contempt Proceedings, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1506 (2011). 
For an example, see Motion for Issuance of Order, Injunction, and Order to Show Cause for 
Criminal Contempt, Rath v. Martin, No. 15-21701 CACE (04) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Broward Cty. Oct. 30, 
2017); this ultimately did lead to the defendant, faced with the threat of jail, taking down the 
enjoined material. See infra Appendix D. 
In some jurisdictions, a party can institute criminal contempt proceedings for violation of a 
protection order, see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1002; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 764.15b(7); 16 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1409; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6113.1. Those orders sometimes include 
provisions that expressly or implicitly ban defamation; see, e.g., Best v. Marino, 404 P.3d 450, 459-
60 (N.M. Ct. App. 2017); In re Marriage of Meredith, 201 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009). 
201 See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 960 So. 2d 31, 33, (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) clarified on denial of 
reh’g, 967 So.2d 357, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Wilson v. Wilson, 984 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Tenn. 
1998). In the federal system, the judge may not appoint the plaintiﬀ ’s lawyer as prosecutor, Young 
v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987), which may make it hard to ﬁnd a 
lawyer willing to take the task (which would presumably be at most lightly compensated, see id. at 
806 n.17). But that is a principle of federal contempt procedure, not a constitutional mandate. 
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Indeed, in states that still have criminal libel laws, the injunction’s cutting 
out of the prosecutor is especially vivid.202 Why, after all, would a person who 
is being libeled seek an anti-libel injunction in that state? Why not just ask 
the prosecutor to threaten the defendant with a criminal libel prosecution? 
After all, an injunction works in large part because it makes the target worry 
about the threat of a criminal contempt prosecution; why wouldn’t a 
prosecutor’s threat of a criminal libel prosecution work as well? 
Presumably the defamed person would spend the time and money to get 
an injunction precisely because the prosecutor is not inclined to act. Maybe 
prosecuting libels is a low prosecutorial priority, compared to violent crimes, 
property crimes, or drug crimes. Or maybe the prosecutor thinks the criminal 
libel law is archaic, and that people shouldn’t be jailed merely for lying about 
others. Or maybe the prosecutor wants to prosecute only the most egregious 
libels (such as the ones that most threaten reputation), and this libel isn’t one. 
The prosecutor is thus using prosecutorial discretion to choose not to 
prosecute a particular kind of crime.203 And the injunction bypasses that 
prosecutorial decision. 
The question for judges, then, is whether leaving the matter to prosecutorial 
discretion in such cases is a virtue or a vice. Prosecutorial discretion is 
sometimes touted as an important protector of liberty: before a person goes to 
jail for something, the theory goes, all three branches must agree—the 
legislature must criminalize the action, the executive must prosecute, and the 
judiciary must convict.204 In the words of then-Judge Kavanaugh, 
 
202 In the early 1900s, labor injunctions were likewise often used in part to cut out the 
discretion of local oﬃcials (though mainly police departments rather than prosecutors) who 
supported strikers. See WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN 
LABOR MOVEMENT 101-05 (1991) (describing ways in which labor injunctions operated on various 
categories of local actors). 
203 Only a few states authorize judicial review of prosecutorial decisions to reject victims’ 
demands to prosecute. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions 
Not to Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 843, 882 n.125 (2018) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-209 
(2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.41 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606 (2017); PA. R. CRIM. P. 
506(B)(2), discussed in In re Hickson, 765 A.2d 372, 376-77 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); State ex rel. Clyde 
v. Lauder, 90 N.W. 564, 569 (N.D. 1902), quoted favorably in Olsen v. Koppy, 593 N.W.2d 762, 765-
67 (N.D. 1999)). 
204 This doesn’t describe the historical rule in the states, where private prosecutions were 
common during the early Republic; but it describes the general modern practice, in which private 
prosecutions have been largely rejected. See Brown, supra note 203, at 870. Even the rare private 
prosecutions that remain are subject to the state prosecutor’s power to enter a nolle prosequi that 
would lead to a dismissal. See Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 874-75 (R.I. 2001); 
Eugene Volokh, How I Was a Criminal Defendant in a N.J. Harassment Case, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(REASON) (Aug. 22, 2019, 8:01 am), https://reason.com/2019/08/22/how-i-was-a-criminal-
defendant-in-a-n-j-harassment-case/ [https://perma.cc/4DR5-BV7D]. 
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The Executive’s broad prosecutorial discretion . . . illustrate[s] a key point of 
the Constitution’s separation of powers. One of the greatest unilateral powers 
a President possesses . . . is the power to protect individual liberty by 
essentially under-enforcing federal statutes regulating private behavior . . . . 
The Framers saw the separation of the power to prosecute from the power to 
legislate as essential to preserving individual liberty.205 
Judge Kavanaugh was writing of prosecutorial discretion as a check on the 
legislative power, but it may also be seen as a check on the judicial power.206 
Indeed, such a check may be especially necessary to rein in criminal contempt 
prosecutions, in which judges might be unduly skewed by the sense that the 
violation of an injunction is a “personal aﬀront” to their own authority.207 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 
for instance, argued that federal contempt prosecutions must always be 
initiated by the Executive Branch, partly because Justice Scalia saw a threat 
to liberty in “judges in eﬀect making the laws, prosecuting their violation, 
and sitting in judgment of those prosecutions.”208 
On the other hand, prosecutorial discretion is sometimes seen as unduly 
favoring those victims who have the prosecutors’ ears—indeed, one criticism 
of criminal libel laws has been that they are disproportionately used to punish 
speech critical of political oﬃcials and law enforcement.209 And people 
sometimes fault prosecutors for not paying enough attention to crimes that 
are seen as too hard (or too unglamorous) to prosecute. This was, for instance, 
part of the criticism of prosecutors’ attitudes towards domestic violence cases, 
which led many states to enact statutes speciﬁcally authorizing injunctions 
against continued domestic violence.210 
More broadly, injunctions are available in many other contexts where torts 
are also crimes. The occasional assertion that “equity will not enjoin the 
commission of a crime”211 means simply that equity “would not enjoin 
 
205 In re Aiken Cty., 725 F.3d 255, 264 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (emphasis removed). 
206 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 429-30 (2012) 
(likewise characterizing prosecutorial discretion as an important protection for liberty and an 
important check on Congress and the federal judiciary). 
207 See, e.g., Warren Cty. Cmty. Coll. v. Warren Cty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 796 A.2d 257, 
272 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
208 481 U.S. 787, 822 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Peter L. Markowitz, 
Prosecutorial Discretion Power at Its Zenith: The Power to Protect Liberty, 97 B.U. L. REV. 489 (2017). 
209 See, e.g., ACLU Files First Amendment Challenge to Criminal Defamation Law, ACLU (Dec. 
18, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-ﬁles-ﬁrst-amendment-challenge-criminal-defamation-
law [https://perma.cc/BL4V-SW8J]. 
210 See generally Joan Meier, The “Right” to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: 
Unpacking Public and Private Interests, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85 (1992) (defending the private party 
initiation of criminal contempt proceedings). 
211 See, e.g., Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 F.3d 685, 691 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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violation of . . . criminal law as such,” but would only enjoin acts that harmed 
the particular plaintiﬀ in some legally cognizable way.212 Injunctions against 
trespass are issued without concern about undermining prosecutorial 
discretion not to prosecute trespasses as crimes; the same is true for 
injunctions against copyright infringement, even though willful copyright 
infringement for commercial gain is also criminal.213 
And perhaps the availability of criminal contempt proceedings in such 
cases, even without the opportunity for prosecutorial discretion, might be 
especially justiﬁed by the need to vindicate a particular victim’s interest. The 
Third Circuit, for instance, has taken the view—expressed, to be sure, as to 
administrative enforcement proceedings rather than as to criminal contempt 
of court prosecutions—that “the doctrine of prosecutorial discretion[] should 
be limited to those civil cases which, like criminal prosecutions, involve the 
vindication of societal or governmental interest, rather than the protection of 
individual rights.”214 
I don’t think that the availability of prosecutorial discretion should be seen 
as a necessary First Amendment protection that renders invalid injunctions 
that cut out such discretion. Indeed, prosecutorial discretion may introduce 
an extra risk of viewpoint discrimination,215 and enforcement of injunctions 
without a prosecutorial veto would decrease this risk. 
Judges issuing injunctions often write opinions explaining why they exercise 
their discretion in a particular way, which constrains their discretion in some 
measure; prosecutors don’t. Judges’ decisions not to issue injunctions are 
reviewable on appeal (even if under the relatively deferential abuse-of-discretion 
standard); prosecutors’ decisions not to prosecute are generally not reviewable. 
Prosecutorial discretion cannot save an overbroad law.216 The absence of 
prosecutorial discretion should not invalidate a narrowly crafted injunction. 
This having been said, though, courts might still choose to consider 
whether separation of powers concerns should counsel against injunctions 
that evade prosecutorial discretion, especially in those states where criminal 
libel statutes exist. The Court has spoken of its “cautious approach to 
equitable powers,” especially when the powers involve “substantial expansion 
of past practice”;217 state courts may choose to take a similar approach. Such 
 
212 United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 695 (1993). 
213 17 U.S.C. §§ 501, 506 (2018). 
214 Bachowski v. Brennan, 502 F.2d 79, 87 (3d Cir. 1974), aff ’d sub nom. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 
U.S. 560, 567 n.7 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, Furniture 
Store Drivers, Helpers, Warehousemen & Packers v. Crowley, 467 U.S. 526, 549 n.22 (1984). 
215 Robert A. Leﬂar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 TEX. L. REV. 984, 
984-86 (1956) (ﬁnding that many American criminal defamation cases from 1922 to 1955 stemmed 
from political disputes). 
216 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010). 
217 Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 329 (1999). 
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caution may be reason to avoid an end-run around prosecutorial judgment, 
especially with a remedy that has historically been frowned on—which makes 
anti-libel injunctions diﬀerent from, for instance, anti-trespass injunctions—
and in the absence of speciﬁc legislative authorization (which makes anti-libel 
injunctions diﬀerent from, say, anti-harassment or anti-stalking injunctions 
issued pursuant to a speciﬁc statute218). 
VIII. BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN STATES THAT HAVE 
REPEALED CRIMINAL LIBEL LAWS 
So far, I have argued that the First Amendment does not preclude 
properly crafted anti-libel injunctions, in part because they are similar to 
constitutionally valid properly crafted criminal libel laws. 
But should courts essentially recreate such mini-criminal-libel laws in 
states that have repealed their criminal libel laws?219 Or would that 
improperly contradict the legislature’s judgment embodied in that repeal? 
When the California Legislature, for instance, repealed its criminal 
slander law, it speciﬁcally said, “[t]he Legislature ﬁnds and declares that every 
person has the right to speak out, to poke fun, and to stir up controversy 
without fear of criminal prosecution.”220 It likely had much the same 
motivation for repealing its criminal libel law ﬁve years before. Likewise, in 
the words of the Model Penal Code drafters, who called for decriminalizing 
libel, “penal sanctions cannot be justiﬁed merely by the fact that defamation 
is evil or damaging to a person in ways that entitle him to maintain a civil 
suit.”221 The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on this reasoning in refusing 
to read the state’s criminal harassment statute as punishing defamation: 
At the time the Legislature passed the New Jersey Code of Criminal Justice 
[which was based on the Model Penal Code], it repealed New Jersey’s last 
criminal libel statute. . . . In doing so, the Legislature signaled that the 
 
218 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 527.6 (2018). 
219 See, e.g., 1978 Alaska Sess. Laws 118–19; 2005 Ark. Acts 7469-72, § 512; 1986 Cal. Stat. 311; 
2012 Colo. Sess. Laws 391-92; 2015 Ga. Laws 390, Act 70 § 3-1; 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245 § 526; 2002 
Md. Laws 686; 1978 N.J. Laws ch. 95, § 2C:98-2; 1985 Or. Laws 759; 1998 R.I. Pub. Laws 324-25; 
2009 Wash. Sess. Laws 597-98; Commonwealth v. Mason, 322 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. 1974) (Jones, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting) (noting that the Pennsylvania criminal libel law was repealed by 1972 Pa. 
Laws 1611, Act No. 334). 
220 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 186 (A.B. 436), § 1 (West). 
221 MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1961); see 
also State v. Burkert, 174 A.3d 987, 996-97 (N.J. 2017) (quoting this passage as a reason to reject 
criminal harassment liability for speaking falsehoods with the intent to harass); State v. Browne, 206 
A.2d 591, 596 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (concluding that mere “personal calumny” should 
not be the target of criminal law). 
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criminal law would not be used as a weapon against defamatory remarks, 
thereby aligning our new criminal code with the Model Penal Code.222 
It makes sense for courts to likewise look to legislative judgment in 
deciding whether criminal contempt law should “be used as a weapon against 
criminal remarks,” should limit people’s “right to speak out, to poke fun, and 
to stir up controversy without fear of criminal prosecution,” and should lead 
to “penal sanctions” for “defamation.”223 
To oﬀer an analogy: say that a state legislature repeals the state’s criminal 
adultery statute (as many states have), but the state courts continue to 
recognize the tort of “alienation of aﬀections,” under which a spouse can sue 
the other spouse’s lover.224 And say that a plaintiﬀ in a criminal conversation 
case not only seeks damages against the defendant, but an injunction ordering 
the defendant not to have sex with the plaintiﬀ ’s spouse. A court should be 
reluctant, I think, to issue such an injunction—an injunction that would 
threaten to punish the lover with criminal contempt for any continued 
adultery—when the legislature has generally concluded that adultery should 
not be criminally punished. 
And indeed courts sometimes do take the view that “judicial application 
of equity-rooted remedies should be informed by—and, sometimes, altered 
signiﬁcantly in deference to—the legislative policy judgments reﬂected in 
intervening statutory enactments, even where the statutes themselves would 
not directly reach the subject matter of the dispute before the court.”225 Texas 
courts, for instance, have so reasoned in refusing to authorize certain kinds of 
pre-suit depositions in libel,226 certain awards of prejudgment interest,227 and 
certain kinds of piercing of the corporate veil.228 In all those cases, courts 
looked closely at legislative judgments reﬂected in statutes that deal with 
similar questions, and tried to avoid judicial innovations that would conﬂict 
with those judgments. 
 
222 Burkert, 174 A.3d at 996-97. 
223 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 186 (A.B. 436), § 1 (West). 
224 The alienation of affections tort remains commonly used in North Carolina (with over 200 filings 
per year, and with the pattern in appellate cases suggesting that the filings are evenly split among men and 
women), and continues to exist in several other states. See Eugene Volokh, Alienation of Affections—Still 
Alive, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (July 28, 2009), http://volokh.com/posts/1248793691.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/XL7L-8UZ7]; DATA FROM N.C. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF COURTS, 2000–08. 
The alienation of affections tort can theoretically cover nonsexual behavior as well as adultery; to be precise, 
the criminal conversation tort is the one that focuses just on sex. But in the few jurisdictions where at least 
one of the torts survives—including in North Carolina—most such adultery-based cases are brought as 
alienation of affections cases. 
225 In re Elliott, 504 S.W.3d 455, 483 (Tex. App. 2016). 
226 Id. 
227 Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 529-31 (Tex. 1998). 
228 Shook v. Walden, 368 S.W.3d 604, 620-21 (Tex. App. 2012). 
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Likewise, many courts have limited the equitable laches defense in light 
of a legislatively enacted statute of limitations, on the grounds that, “[t]o 
import laches as a defense to actions at law would pit the legislative value 
judgment embodied in a statute of limitations . . . against the equitable 
determinations of individual judges,” and thus “would alter the balance of 
power between legislatures and courts regarding the timeliness of claims.”229 
Conversely, where a legislature has expressly authorized some tolling of 
statute of limitations, courts can rely on that legislative judgment in 
interpreting their own equitable principles: “[A] legislative policy judgment 
may be properly considered in determining the application of a common law 
[i.e., ‘judge-made’] doctrine such as equitable tolling.”230 
Indeed, some court opinions rejecting “obey-the-law” injunctions seem to 
reﬂect this concern with subjecting “defendants to contempt rather than [the] 
statutorily prescribed sanctions.”231 Congress, for instance, deliberately made 
employment discrimination, even repeated employment discrimination, a 
tort, not a crime.232 Enjoining a particular employer from engaging in 
discrimination would make such discrimination into contempt of court, 
courts stress.233 The courts generally don’t explain just why “subjecting the 
defendants to contempt proceedings”234 in such cases is wrong. But the reason 
may be that such proceedings would depart from the legislative decision to 
keep the criminal law out of employment discrimination cases. 
Of course, a court that is open to considering legislative judgments when 
deciding whether to create an innovative remedy must decide: just what 
judgment did the legislature make when repealing a criminal libel statute, 
beyond the necessary judgment that there ought not be such a statute? 
Perhaps the legislature took the view that false and defamatory statements 
don’t merit criminal punishment. As I noted above, that seemed to be the 
 
229 Naccache v. Taylor, 72 A.3d 149, 155-56 (D.C. Ct. App. 2013); see also Petrella v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 678 (2014); Ivani Contracting Corp. v. New York, 103 F.3d 257, 
260 (2d Cir. 1997); Doe v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 119 A.3d 462, 494 (Conn. 2015). 
230 Bernoskie v. Zarinsky, 890 A.2d 1013, 1021 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). 
231 Rowe v. N.Y. State. Div. of Budget, No. 1:11-CV-1150 (LEK/DRH), 2012 WL 4092856, at *7 
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012); see also Epstein Family P’ship v. Kmart Corp., 13 F.3d 762, 770–71 (3d Cir. 
1994) (striking down a “catch-all” prohibition on “violating any of the terms of the Declaration of 
Easements,” because that leaves defendant unable to “effectively use the land for fear of violating the 
provisions of the Declaration of Easements,” and citing the concern expressed in Davis v. Romney, 490 
F.2d 1360, 1370 (3d Cir. 1974), about subjecting defendants to the risk of criminal contempt). 
232 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 39.03(a)(3) (criminalizing quid pro quo sexual harassment 
by government employers), Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). 
233 See, e.g., EEOC v. Autozone, Inc., 707 F.3d 824, 843 (7th Cir. 2013); Gaddy v. Abex Corp., 884 
F.2d 312, 318 (7th Cir. 1989); Rowe, 2012 WL 4092856, at *7; see also Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 565 
F.2d 895, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1978) (overturning injunction banning employment discrimination by 
employer against any member of plaintiff class, as impermissible “obey the law” injunction). 
234 Gaddy, 884 F.2d at 318. 
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view endorsed by the California Legislature (at least as to spoken words) and 
by the drafters of the Model Penal Code.235 If so, then this suggests that anti-
libel injunctions, enforceable by punishment for criminal contempt, should 
likewise be rejected.236 
But perhaps the legislature took the view that criminal libel law is too 
likely to chill a broad range of speech, because speakers know that they can 
be punished for any factual allegation, even one they think is accurate (if the 
jury errs, as juries might, about the speaker’s mens rea). If so, then that 
suggests that catchall injunctions, which likewise ban all knowing falsehoods 
about a particular person, should be rejected—but perhaps speciﬁc or hybrid 
injunctions, which are limited to particular claims that courts have already 
found to be false, might be permissible. 
Or perhaps the legislature thought that people shouldn’t be imprisoned 
just for an isolated lie about someone, even a damaging lie, because such lies 
are so common—but the legislators might not have been contemplating what 
should be done about sustained campaigns of defamation. This would suggest 
that injunctions, which are aimed at preventing such repeated defamation, 
would be consistent with that legislative judgment. 
And, ﬁnally, perhaps the legislature lacked any widely shared judgment at 
all about the subject, other than that the criminal libel statute ought to be 
repealed. Maybe some legislators thought one thing, some thought another, 
and some simply voted for the repeal because it was part of a legislative 
package that gave them something else they wanted.237 
 
235 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 186 (A.B. 436), sec. 1 (West). 
236 Of course, if the legislature’s judgment repealing criminal libel law had been made in a 
legal regime where injunctions were commonplace, one could have inferred that the legislators were 
leaving the possibility of criminally enforceable prohibitions on libel to the discretion of judges in 
civil cases. Say, for instance, that the legislature criminalizes nuisances and then repeals that criminal 
ban. In a system where injunctions against nuisance are routine, we shouldn’t infer that the 
legislature meant to preempt these traditionally accepted injunctions. 
But when criminal libel laws were repealed in the states that repealed them, the conventional 
wisdom was that courts would not be enjoining libel. The legislature thus couldn’t reasonably be 
presumed to be preserving such a remedy. And the decision to repeal the criminal libel statute should 
be seen as barring “obey the [tort] law” injunctions that have the eﬀect of reinstituting criminal libel 
law for the defendant (at least when the defendant is speaking about the plaintiﬀ). 
237 Compare the statutory construction literature arguing that legislative intent ought not 
guide statutory interpretation because such intent generally can’t be determined or even just doesn’t 
exist. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (“Because 
legislatures comprise many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet 
discoverable.”); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 18 
(2001) (“Because statutory details may reﬂect only what competing groups could agree upon, 
legislation cannot be expected to pursue its purposes to their logical ends.”); Antonin Scalia, Judicial 
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989) (“[T]he quest for the 
‘genuine’ legislative intent is probably a wild-goose chase anyway. In the vast majority of cases I 
expect that Congress neither (1) intended a single result, nor (2) meant to confer discretion upon the 
agency, but rather (3) didn’t think about the matter at all.”). 
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Still, so long as courts take the view that judge-made principles should be 
developed in light of legislative decisions (rather than just that such 
principles shouldn’t outright violate express legislative commands), courts 
will have to infer something about the underlying legislative judgment. 
Perhaps the courts might err in their reading of what judgment the legislature 
made, but then the legislature can correct them. (A legislature can of course 
expressly forbid anti-libel injunctions; and, if my analysis in Part V is right, 
then it can expressly permit certain kinds of such injunctions.) In the 
meantime, if courts believe that the legislature has expressly rejected criminal 
punishments for libels, they shouldn’t recreate those criminal punishments 
through the route of injunctions and criminal contempt. 
IX. BEYOND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: ERIE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
Finally, when libel lawsuits are brought in federal courts—almost always 
under the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction—federal courts should 
consider whether the relevant state courts would allow anti-libel injunctions. 
“Erie doctrine requires courts to apply state substantive law to a request for 
permanent injunctive relief in diversity cases.”238 “Allowing diﬀerent 
remedies in state law cases heard in federal courts on pendent jurisdiction 
would undermine the ‘twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.’”239 
And this is especially so because, as Parts VII and VIII discuss, the 
decision whether to allow anti-libel injunctions should turn in part on state 
law judgments—there, about the proper role of state prosecutors and of state 
legislative decisionmaking. If a federal court concludes that anti-libel 
injunctions violate the First Amendment, then of course it must adhere to 
that decision about federal law. But if it concludes that such injunctions do 
not violate federal law, it also has to consider whether they are authorized 
under state law (whether by referring to state appellate cases or by certifying 
the question to a state court). 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Kramer v. Thompson followed this 
principle, ultimately following Pennsylvania law (which rejects anti-libel 
injunctions) rather than its own stated preferences (which were sympathetic 
 
238 Lord & Taylor, LLC v. White Flint, LP, 780 F.3d 211, 215 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Titan 
Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265, 273 (1st Cir. 1990) (“[S]tate remedies are 
available in federal diversity actions.”). 
239 LaShawn A. by Moore v. Barry, 144 F.3d 847, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Hanna v. 
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). This is something of an oversimpliﬁcation; for a more thorough 
analysis, see 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4513 (3d. ed. 2008), and id. at n.73 & accompanying text for 
more case citations on the subject. 
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to such injunctions).240 Yet defendants sometimes fail to raise the Erie 
argument, even when state law would reject anti-libel injunctions.241 And 
courts sometimes issue ex parte injunctions, where no defendant is present to 
raise the Erie objection, even when state law forbids anti-libel injunctions.242 
Likewise, the Seventh Circuit in McCarthy v. Fuller didn’t consider the 
Indiana law of anti-libel injunctions, though defendants had argued that it 
should apply.243 Perhaps the court thought that such consideration was 
unnecessary, because it ultimately concluded that the particular injunction in 
that case was overbroad.244 But its general endorsement, in dictum, of anti-
libel injunctions should be viewed with caution, since ultimately this should 
be a question for state courts, not for the Seventh Circuit. 
X. BEYOND LIBEL: FALSE LIGHT, INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS 
RELATIONS, DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS, AND MORE 
So far we’ve focused on anti-libel injunctions, but in principle the same 
analysis may help in evaluating injunctions against other speech, and 
especially against other communicative torts: false light, interference with 
business relations, disclosure of private facts, and the like.245 
The problem, of course, is that the constitutional rules related to the 
criminal punishment of such speech—or even civil damages liability for such 
speech—are not well settled. Recall that the core premise of the analysis in 
this Article is that, “[an] injunction, like a criminal statute, prohibits conduct 
under fear of punishment. Therefore, we look at the injunction as we look at 
a statute, and if upon its face it abridges rights guaranteed by the First 
 
240 947 F.2d 666, 676 (3d Cir. 1991); see also Graboﬀ v. Am. Ass’n of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 
No. 12-5491, 2013 WL 1875819, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2013), aﬀ ’d on other grounds, 559 F. App’x 191 
(3d Cir. 2014). 
241 See, e.g., Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 31 n.12 (1st Cir. 2018); Gorman v. Steinborn, 
No. 2:14-cv-00890-NS (E.D. Pa. May 20, 2015); Rodriguez v. Nat’l Freight, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 725, 
729-30 (M.D. Pa. 2014); see also Int’l Proﬁt Assocs. v. Paisola, 461 F. Supp. 2d 672 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
In Int’l Profit Assocs., 461 F. Supp. 2d at 679-80, the court ultimately entered an anti-libel injunction, 
without mentioning Illinois law, which limits such injunctions, see infra note 296; the same was so 
in Gorman, Rodriguez, and Pennsylvania law, which forbids such injunctions. In Sindi, 896 F.3d at 31 
n.12, the court concluded that “Massachusetts law and federal law seem to place substantially similar 
burdens on a party seeking a permanent injunction,” but there is at least a plausible case to be made 
that Massachusetts law more clearly condemns such injunctions. See infra note 330. 
242 See Palmaz Sci., Inc. v. Harriman, No. SA-15-CA-734-FB, 2015 WL 13298400, at *2 (W.D. 
Tex. Oct. 27, 2015) (TRO). 
243 See Reply Brief of Appellants at 17, McCarthy v. Fuller, Nos. 14-3308, 15-1839, 2015 WL 
4151888 (7th Cir. July 29, 2015). 
244 810 F.3d 456, 462-63 (7th Cir. 2015). 
245 My coauthor Mark Lemley and I have discussed copyright, trademark, and right of 
publicity cases in Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual 
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998). 
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Amendment, it should be struck down.”246 One can see how this would be 
done for injunctions against libel, because the Court has told us that criminal 
statutes punishing libel are constitutional (though only if they implement the 
various First Amendment limits on libel law).247 One can see the same as to 
content-neutral injunctions on the time, place, or manner of speech, such as 
injunctions against residential picketing.248 But the Court has never made 
clear, for instance, just how one should evaluate a criminal statute punishing 
disclosure of private facts, or interference with business relations. What I say 
below is thus necessarily quite tentative. 
A. Nondefamatory Falsehoods About People 
The Court has twice held that even nondefamatory falsehoods about 
particular people can lead to liability, at least if the speakers knew the 
statements were false, or were reckless about that possibility. One case, Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, involved a lawsuit by crime victims over a magazine article that 
exaggerated the violence of the crime.249 Another, Cantrell v. Forest City 
Publishing Co., involved a lawsuit brought by the widow of a man who had 
died in a then-recent disaster, over a magazine article that included a 
fabricated quote from her.250 
Such statements are actionable because of the “mental distress” caused by 
knowing that some aspect of one’s life has been falsely reported, rather than 
because of damage to reputation.251 United States v. Alvarez casts some doubt 
on whether such liability is constitutional, since it doesn’t ﬁt within the 
traditionally recognized First Amendment exceptions, such as defamation, 
fraud, and perjury.252 Still, it seems unlikely that Alvarez was silently 
overruling Time and Cantrell, and some language in both the Alvarez plurality 
and the concurrence suggests that knowing nondefamatory falsehoods about 
particular third parties can indeed be punished;253 for this discussion, I’ll 
assume that Time and Cantrell are still good law. 
 
246 United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S. 576, 581 (1971). 
247 See supra Part I. 
248 See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 774-75 (1994). 
249 385 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1967). This was the only case argued before the Supreme Court by 
then-ex-Vice-President Richard M. Nixon. 
250 419 U.S. 245, 248 (1974). The reporter responsible for the ﬁctional quotes, Joe Eszterhas, 
moved to a ﬁeld where ﬁction was encouraged: he became a prominent screenwriter, writing the 
screenplays for, among other ﬁlms, FLASHDANCE (Paramount Pictures 1983) and BASIC INSTINCT 
(TriStar Pictures 1992). 
251 Time, 385 U.S. at 384 n.9. 
252 567 U.S. 709, 717-18, 720 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
253 Id. at 719 (treating “some other legally cognizable harm associated with a false statement, 
such as an invasion of privacy”—likely referring to the false light tort—as comparable to 
“defamation” and “fraud” for First Amendment purposes); id. at 734 (Breyer, J., concurring in the 
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The common rubric for such claims is the “false light” tort. This is 
sometimes misleadingly labeled “false light invasion of privacy,” but—as Time 
and Cantrell show—it is not limited to “private” information in the sense of 
highly personal details, such as sexual, medical, or financial details that are 
usually kept confidential. And though the Restatement summarizes the tort as 
covering knowingly or recklessly false statements about a person that 
“unreasonably place[] the other in a false light before the public” that “would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person,”254 the requirement that the material be 
“highly offensive” doesn’t seem to be a constitutional mandate: Time concluded 
that liability was allowed, assuming “knowing or reckless falsehood” was shown, 
even under a statute that didn’t require a showing of offensiveness.255 
Speakers should be at least as protected against anti-false-light injunctions 
as they are against anti-libel injunctions.256 In particular, just as they shouldn’t 
be sent to jail for allegedly defamatory falsehoods without a jury ﬁnding 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements really are false (and with a 
lawyer available to argue to the jury and judge about that), so they shouldn’t 
be sent to jail for allegedly oﬀensive falsehoods without such a ﬁnding. This 
is especially so because most knowing or reckless defamation claims could 
alternatively be brought as false light claims (since defamatory falsehoods will 
usually be highly oﬀensive as well).257 
The harder question—which I will generally leave for others to explore—
is whether speakers should be more protected against anti-false-light 
injunctions. Anti-libel injunctions, I’ve argued, criminalize libelous 
statements, and can be constitutional because libel can indeed be criminalized 
(assuming the statute or injunction is properly crafted). But the Supreme 
 
judgment) (likewise); see also Araya v. Deep Dive Media, LLC, 966 F. Supp. 2d 582, 593 (W.D.N.C. 
2013); Holloway v. Am. Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (seeming to take 
the view that tortious knowing falsehoods about particular people remain actionable after Alvarez; 
Holloway itself involved knowing falsehoods that intentionally inﬂict emotional distress, but its logic 
would apply equally to falsehoods that are actionable under the false light tort). 
254 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A, 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977). The 
Restatement also oﬀers, as illustrations, publishing a poem knowingly misattributed to a particular 
poet (regardless of whether the poem is so bad that the attribution is defamatory), knowingly 
mischaracterizing a person’s political endorsements, or knowingly inserting a ﬁctional romance into 
a supposedly factual biography. Id. at § 652E cmt. b, illus. 3-5. 
255 Time, 385 U.S. at 390-91. Cantrell involved a tort that was called simply “false light,” but it 
too didn’t discuss the oﬀensiveness element. Cantrell, 419 U.S. at 248. 
256 For an example of an anti-false-light injunction, see Vonderheide v. Harrisburg Area 
Community College, No. 19-cv-3096, 2019 WL 5423089, *9, *11 n.3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2019), 
(dissolved when the federal claims were dismissed and the court declined to continue exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction, ECF No. 33, at 2, 5 n.5 (Dec. 18, 2019)). 
257 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also id. cmt. 
e (suggesting that, “[w]hen the false publicity is also defamatory so that either action can be 
maintained by the plaintiﬀ, . . . limitations of long standing that have been found desirable for the 
action for defamation” should likewise apply). 
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Court has never opined on whether statements that merely put someone in a 
false light—and thus only harm feelings rather than damaging one’s 
livelihood or social standing—can be criminalized.258 I’m inclined to see no 
reason why they can’t be criminalized, at least so long as they are civilly 
actionable. If, though, the Court disagrees on that, and concludes that they 
cannot be punished by a criminal statute, then they should not be punishable 
by an injunction that is enforceable through the threat of criminal contempt. 
B. Slander, Trade Libel, Slander of Title, and Injurious Falsehood 
Likewise, speakers accused of slander, trade libel,259 slander of title,260 or 
injurious falsehood261 should be at least as protected from injunctions as are 
speakers accused of ordinary libel. As with false light, the only question 
should be whether such injunctions are categorically forbidden, on the theory 
that such speech (unlike ordinary libel) cannot be criminalized.262 
C. Interference with Business Relations 
Plaintiﬀs often sue for interference with business relations alongside libel. 
Libelous statements about a business or a businessperson, after all, are often 
actionable precisely because they damage the target’s business prospects; they 
may therefore fall within both torts.263 In such situations, the intentional 
 
258 But cf. Stockwire Research Grp., Inc. v. Lebed, 577 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2008) 
(issuing a catchall injunction against “casting Adrian James in any false light, or publicizing anything 
regarding Adrian James that is misleading, false, or untruthful,” without discussing the First 
Amendment objections at all); Rooks v. Krzewski, No. 306034, 2014 WL 1351353, at *29-31 (Mich. 
Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2014) (concluding that a speciﬁc injunction against repeating statements that put 
plaintiﬀ in a false light is constitutional, based on caselaw that involved defamatory statements). 
259 See, e.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) 
(applying First Amendment principles in trade libel case); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 626 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (extending the “rules on liability for the publication of an injurious 
falsehood . . . to the publication of matter disparaging the quality of another’s land, chattels or 
intangible things”). 
260 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 624 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
261 Id. at § 623A. 
262 Historically, slander has not been criminalized, even when libel was. Two modern criminal 
defamation statutes, though, include spoken words as well as written ones. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-
6103 (2017 Supp.) (forbidding “[c]riminal false communication”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404 
(West 2017) (forbidding “criminal defamation”). To my knowledge, the constitutionality of such 
criminal slander bans has not been tested. 
263 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (deﬁning 
the interference tort as generally making actionable “intentionally and improperly interfer[ing] with 
another’s prospective contractual relation” through “inducing or otherwise causing a third person 
not to enter into or continue the prospective relation”). 
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interference claim is likely redundant of the libel claim, and should be 
analyzed the same way.264 
But while the interference tort may be triggered by constitutionally 
unprotected speech, such as defamation or perhaps true threats, there is no 
general “interference with business relations exception” to the First 
Amendment. Indeed, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the Court 
expressly held that speech urging a boycott of various businesses was 
protected against interference liability—though the speakers speciﬁcally 
intended to interfere with the businesses’ economic prospects, and to use that 
interference and its threat as a political lever.265 Thus, for instance, an 
injunction banning a disgruntled ex-tenant from “directly or indirectly 
interfering . . . via any . . . material posted on the internet or in any media 
with [the ex-landlords’] advantageous or contractual business 
relationships”266 should be unconstitutional, because even civil liability (and 
certainly criminal liability) on such a theory should be unconstitutional. 
D. Disclosure of Private Facts 
The disclosure of private facts tort—unlike the constitutional applications 
of the interference with business relations tort, and unlike the other torts 
discussed above—specializes in restricting true statements about people.267 
 
264 For cases holding that the First Amendment principles applicable to defamation cases 
equally apply to the interference tort, see, e.g., Farah v. Esquire Magazine, 736 F.3d 528, 540 (D.C. 
Cir. 2013); Jeﬀerson Cty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Inv’r’s Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856-58 
(10th Cir. 1999); Beverly Hills Foodland, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 
655, 39 F.3d 191, 196 (8th Cir. 1994); Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Fendler v. Phx. Newspapers, 636 P.2d 1257, 1262-63 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981); Blatty v. New York Times 
Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182, 1184 (Cal. 1986); Thompson v. Armstrong, 134 A.3d 305, 310 (D.C. Ct. App. 
2016); Lakeshore Cmty. Hosp. v. Perry, 538 N.W.2d 24, 28 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Dairy Stores, Inc. 
v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 465 A.2d 953, 961 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983); A & B-Abell Elevator Co. 
v. Columbus/Cent. Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d 1283, 1283-88, 1295 (Ohio 
1995); Evans v. Dolceﬁno, 986 S.W.2d 69, 79 (Tex. App. 1999). 
265 458 U.S. 886 (1982); see also, e.g., Moore v. Hoﬀ, 821 N.W.2d 591, 599 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2012). 
266 Chevaldina v. R.K./FL Mgmt., Inc., 133 So. 3d 1086, 1091 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(overturning this injunction on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally overbroad); see also Hutul 
v. Maher, No. 12-cv-01811, 2012 WL 13075673, at *18 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2012) (“Defendant . . . is 
hereby permanently enjoined from . . . [i]nterfering with Plaintiﬀ ’s business relationships and 
maligning her professional and business reputations.”). But see DeJager v. Burgess, No. 112CV219299, 
¶ 6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara Cty. Aug. 6, 2012) (enjoining defendant “from engaging in any 
conduct that interferes with Plaintiﬀ Shelley DeJager’s Photography business,” as part of an 
injunction that generally stems from defendant’s speech rather than any physical conduct). The 
injunction in Chevaldina went beyond just defamatory speech; indeed, a separate provision of the 
injunction already banned speech “calculated to defame.” Chevaldina, 133 So. 3d at 1091. 
267 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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The Supreme Court has never resolved whether it is constitutional.268 Most 
states have accepted it, though deﬁning it quite narrowly;269 but a few have 
rejected it outright.270 
I know of no cases generally discussing when speech that discloses private 
facts may be criminally punished or when it may be enjoined. A few recent 
cases have dealt with narrow statutes that criminalize the distribution of 
nonconsensual pornography but have not discussed the disclosure of private 
facts more broadly.271 One Minnesota case did uphold a statute that allows 
restraining orders against “repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, 
words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse eﬀect or are intended to 
have a substantial adverse eﬀect on the safety, security, or privacy of 
another”272—but it wasn’t clear whether the “privacy” there referred to 
disclosure of private facts or to other meanings of privacy (such as intrusion 
on seclusion).273 
Some injunctions against disclosure of private facts are clearly 
unconstitutional. For instance, an order stating, “Respondent shall not reveal 
any personal information about Petitioner in any communications with third 
parties,”274 is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.275 It doesn’t deﬁne 
what qualiﬁes as “personal information.”276 It covers information even if it is 
 
268 See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539 (1989) (striking down a statute that banned 
the publication of the names of rape victims, but suggesting that it was unconstitutional in part 
because it lacked some of the limitations contained in the disclosure tort). 
269 See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 365-67 (1983). 
270 See, e.g., Evans v. Sturgill, 430 F. Supp. 1209, 1213 (W.D. Va. 1977); Brunson v. Ranks Army 
Store, 73 N.W.2d 803 (Neb. 1955); Howell v. N.Y. Post Co., 612 N.E.2d 699 (N.Y. 1993); Hall v. Post, 
372 S.E.2d 711, 717 (N.C. 1988); Anderson v. Fisher Broad., 712 P.2d 803, 814 (Or. 1986); see also Doe 
v. Methodist Hosp., 690 N.E.2d 681, 693 (Ind. 1997) (splitting 2–2–1 on whether the tort should be 
recognized, with one Justice expressing no opinion). I tend to agree with the minority view here. 
See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of 
a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000). 
271 E.g., Ex parte Jones, No. 12-17-00346-CR, 2018 WL 2228888, at *8 (Tex. Ct. App. May 16, 
2018), review granted (July 25, 2018); State v. VanBuren, 214 A.3d 791, 794-95 (Vt. 2019). 
272 Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 564 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006). 
273 For more on the case and some follow-up cases, see Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-
to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and “Cyberstalking”, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731, 755-57 (2013). 
274 Hall v. Lund, No. BS147482, attachment 10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2014); see also Petition 
for Injunction [signed by judge], id. at 1 (Apr. 2, 2014) (declining to ﬁnd “credible threats on 
petitioner’s life” but ﬁnding that “the e-mails are unnecessarily disturbing to the petitioner”); 
Cardoza v. Ortiz, No. FAMSS 1707719 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Bernardino Cty. Sept. 28, 2017) 
(forbidding “posting of information on any social media website,” including “city of residence or 
past residences of petitioner”). 
275 See, e.g., Evans v. Evans, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 865 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that even a ban 
on “publishing . . . conﬁdential personal information about [plaintiﬀ] on the internet”—slightly 
narrower than the ban quoted in the text—was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad). 
276 See id. at 870. The order does not contain a deﬁnition of “conﬁdential personal information” 
and it is not reasonably possible to determine the scope of this prohibition from any other source. 
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“of legitimate concern to the public.”277 And it covers information that comes 
from public records (such as criminal history information) that is therefore 
categorically constitutionally protected.278 
But what about more specific injunctions, such as an order barring revealing 
that a plaintiff has diabetes, that plaintiffs met via a “mail order bride” site, or 
that plaintiff husband isn’t the biological father of plaintiff wife’s son?279 Or a 
ban on publishing plaintiff ’s “home address and unlisted telephone number” as 
well as “[p]laintiff ’s employment history at OfficeMax”?280 Or a ban on a 
defendant’s publishing statements discussing his molestation of plaintiff many 
years before?281 
I generally think such speech cannot be criminalized, and thus cannot be 
enjoined (with one exception I note below); indeed, three district courts have 
held that even publishing people’s home addresses is constitutionally 
protected.282 Those cases, though, involved the addresses of government 
oﬃcials and noted that they were connected to disputes on matters of public 
concern;283 query whether courts would take a diﬀerent view as to addresses 
of ordinary citizens, and, if so, how they would or should decide cases 
involving addresses of people who are involved in public debates, such as 
activists, businesspeople, journalists, and the like. Perhaps in some situations, 
a court would conclude that the speech is substantively unprotected by the 
First Amendment, and would then need to turn to the question at the heart 
of this article: can this speech be restricted through the procedural device of 
an injunction, or only through damages liability? 
This is too complicated a question to discuss fully here. But I do think 
that the hybrid injunction model—in which the defendant’s speech must be 
found to be constitutionally unprotected at the criminal contempt hearing, 
and not just at the initial injunction hearing—is at least necessary here 
(whether or not it’s suﬃcient). 
 
Without a deﬁnition, the injunction is not suﬃciently clear to determine whether Thomas’s privacy 
rights to the information substantially outweigh Linda’s free speech rights. Moreover, the reference 
to “conﬁdential personal information” did not provide Linda with a reasonable basis to understand 
what she was prohibited from placing on the Internet. 
277 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
278 Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 562 (Cal. 2004). 
279 Carag v. Kellogg, No. 27-2015-CV-00371, at 2-3 (N.D. Dist. Ct. McKenzie Cty. Mar. 24, 2016). 
280 Murphy v. Gump, No. 2016-CC-002126-O, at 2 (Fla. Cty. Ct. Orange Cty. July 18, 2016). 
281 Pelc v. Nowak, No. 8:11-cv-00079, at 2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 3, 2012); Pelc v. Nowak, No. 8:11-
cv-00079, 2012 WL 2568150, at *3 (M.D. Fla. July 2, 2012). 
282 Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 237 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1016 (E.D. Cal. 2017); Brayshaw v. City of 
Tallahassee, 709 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1249 (N.D. Fla. 2010); Sheehan v. Gregoire, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 
1150 (W.D. Wash. 2003). 
283 Publius, 237 F. Supp. at 1016; Brayshaw, 709 F. Supp. 2d at 1249; Sheehan, 272 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1139 n.2. 
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This is particularly so because of the importance of having a lawyer argue 
for the defendant that the speech is constitutionally protected. Just as in libel 
cases, a defendant in a disclosure-of-private-facts injunction case will often 
lack a lawyer. A plaintiﬀ who is really interested in damages will likely sue 
only if the defendant can pay the damages and, thus, likely can pay for a 
lawyer; but a plaintiﬀ seeking an injunction might sue even a defendant who 
lacks money. And the unrepresented defendant might not know how to make 
an argument that the speech isn’t a tortious disclosure of private facts—
perhaps because it’s on a matter of legitimate public concern—or more 
broadly that the speech is constitutionally protected. 
The injunction might thus be issued with no real adversary argument on 
the matter, and if the injunction is a speciﬁc injunction (e.g., “defendant shall 
not discuss the plaintiﬀ ’s employment history”), the defendant will be bound 
by the trial court’s decision, and could go to jail for criminal contempt if he 
repeats the forbidden statements. A hybrid injunction—“defendant shall not 
discuss the plaintiﬀ ’s employment history if that constitutes tortious 
disclosure of private facts”—would at least require that the tortious nature of 
the statement be proved at the criminal contempt hearing. And because that 
is a criminal hearing, at that hearing a poor defendant would be entitled to a 
lawyer, who can argue that the particular statement is indeed constitutionally 
protected (at least so long as the defendant is facing the risk of jail time). 
E. Nonconsensual Pornography 
I do think that narrowly focused bans on distributing nonconsensual 
pornography (often labeled “revenge porn”) are constitutional.284 If I’m right, 
then one implication of this Article’s analysis is that hybrid preliminary and 
permanent injunctions against distributing such material should be 
constitutional as well.285 
CONCLUSION 
Anti-libel injunctions threaten repeat libelers with criminal punishment. 
This may be necessary, especially when the Internet makes it easier than ever 
before for judgment-proof defendants to badly damage people’s personal and 
professional reputations. And, if drafted properly, such injunctions can be no 
 
284 See Volokh, supra note 178, at 1405-06. 
285 Courts have been willing to issue injunctions in some such cases, though some of the 
injunctions have been overbroad or procedurally defective. See, e.g., Beatty v. Haro, No. 15-003711-1 
(Ariz. Temp. Mun. Ct. Feb. 11, 2015); Black v. Starzlife, Inc., No. 2:09-cv-05380-RGK-RC (C.D. 
Cal. Nov. 6, 2009) (stipulated). 
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more speech-restrictive than are constitutionally permissible criminal libel 
statutes. 
But they need to be drafted properly. Most current anti-libel injunctions 
lack the procedural protections that even criminal libel law provides. If courts 
are to issue such injunctions, they need to make sure that those protections 
are present: any criminal punishment for violating an injunction should 
require that 
(1) a jury ﬁnd that the statements were false 
(2) when read in context and at the time they were posted, and 
(3) this ﬁnding must be made beyond a reasonable doubt 
(4) with a court-appointed defense lawyer available to argue the matter, 
if the defendant can’t aﬀord a lawyer. 
Courts also need to consider whether the injunctions are consistent with 
state law principles, even apart from the First Amendment: 
(a) They need to consider whether injunctions’ ability to provide 
criminal remedies without the assent of a prosecutor is consistent with state 
notions of separation of powers. 
(b) They need to consider whether the criminal remedies are consistent 
with the legislative judgment to repeal criminal libel statutes, in those states 
that have repealed those statutes. 
(c) And federal courts considering such injunctions need to follow Erie 
by making sure that the injunctions are consistent with state remedies law as 
well as the First Amendment. 
APPENDIX A: STATES’ VIEWS ON ANTI-LIBEL INJUNCTIONS 
Courts in thirty-four states and nine federal circuits seem to generally 
allow anti-libel injunctions, at least in some situations. I include six states—
Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin—where 
many state courts have issued such injunctions without expressly discussing 
any First Amendment objections, since such a pattern seems to reﬂect custom 
among judges. In all the other states, courts have authorized such injunctions 
with an express holding that the injunctions don’t violate the First 
Amendment, or at least with statements that suggest the injunctions are likely 
constitutional. 
• Alabama (trial court holding, Supreme Court dictum).286 
 
286  Ex parte Wright, 166 So. 3d 618, 633 (Ala. 2014) (dictum) (stating that, “If the trial court 
ﬁnds that the plaintiﬀs or their attorneys have made false or deceptive statements, it has the 
authority to proscribe such statements,” because “demonstrable falsehoods are not protected by the 
First Amendment in the same manner as truthful statements,” citing one non-libel case, Brown v. 
Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982), and one libel case, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 
(1974)); Riley v. Shuler, Nos. 2013-236 & 2013-237, 2013 WL 12376646, at *2-3 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Shelby 
 
138 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 73 
• Alaska (Supreme Court statement so leaning).287 
• Arizona (trial court practice).288 
• Arkansas (trial court practice).289 
• California (Supreme Court holding).290 
• Colorado (trial court practice).291 
• Connecticut (trial court holdings).292 
• Delaware (Court of Chancery holding as to statements that probably 
damage business, dictum as to other statements).293 
 
Cty. Nov. 15, 2013); Griﬃs v. Luban, No. CX-01-1350, 2002 WL 338139, at *6-7 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Mar. 25, 2002), vacated on other grounds, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002) (discussing a similar Alabama 
injunction, though concluding that the injunction extended beyond defamatory statements and 
therefore needed to be narrowed). 
287 Alsworth v. Seybert, 323 P.3d 47, 57 n.34 (Alaska 2014). 
288 See, e.g., CS&P Fiduciare SA v. RC Arden, No. CV2014-094963, at 3 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 
Maricopa Cty. May 2, 2016); Calvary Cmty. Church v. Blogger Brother Tafari, No. CV2015-009060, 
at 2 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. Mar. 2, 2016); Eckley & Assocs v. Tobias, No. CV2013-009316, 
at 3 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa Cty. June 3, 2015). I have many other Arizona anti-libel injunctions 
in my ﬁles. 
289 Mascagni v. McAlister, No. 60CV-19-5451 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Pulaski Cty. Sept. 10, 2019); 
Absolute Pediatric Servs., Inc., No. 04CV-18-2961 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Benton Cty. Nov. 9, 2018); Peretti 
v. Ellis, No. 60CV-18-2524 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Pulaski Cty. Sept. 11, 2018); Thomas v. Wray, No. 04CV-
2018-1484-5 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Benton Cty. May 24, 2017); Hill v. Charvei’, No. 60CV-17-4839 (Ark. Cir. 
Ct. Pulaski Cty. Sept. 8, 2017); Kuettel v. Steward, No. CV-2012-270-5 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Benton Cty. 
June 28, 2012), rev’d on other grounds, 450 S.W.3d 762 (Ark. 2014). In the appellate courts, Esskay Art 
Galleries v. Gibbs, 172 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Ark. 1943), generally rejects injunctions against libel, but 
Webber v. Gray, 307 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Ark. 1957), appears to change course. 
290 Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 349 (Cal. 2007). 
291 See, e.g., Clark v. Doe, No. 15CV31615 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Denver Cty. Jan. 22, 2016); 
Woodbridge Structured Funding, Inc. v. Doe, No. 13CV31613, at 2 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Denver Cty. Feb. 
14, 2014); Woodbridge Structured Funding, LLC v. Doe, No. 14CV33028, at 2 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 
Denver Cty. Dec. 5, 2014); Madwire Media, LLC v. Niemann, No. 2014CV030182, at 2 (Colo. Dist. 
Ct. Larimer Cty. May 6, 2014). Degroen v. Mark Toyota-Volvo, Inc., 811 P.2d 443, 445-46 (Colo. 
App. 1991), took the view that injunctions against libel are categorically unconstitutional, but it 
seems to have left no mark on Colorado law; apparently no cases cite it. 
292 Borg v. Cloutier, No. FST-CV-166028856S, 2018 WL 4441101, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 
23, 2018) (issuing a permanent injunction, presumably concluding that it was consistent with the 
First Amendment, given that an earlier decision in the same case, Borg, 2017 WL 3613494 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. July 17, 2017), refused to issue a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds); 
SBD Kitchens, LLC v. Jeﬀerson, No. FST-CV-126014447S, 2013 WL 6989409, at *9-10 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 16, 2013), aﬀ ’d on other grounds, 118 A.3d 550 (Conn. App. Ct. 2015). But see Whitnum 
v. Robinson, No. FST-CV-125013822S, 2012 WL 1511376, at *6-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2012) 
(stating that injunctions against libel are unconstitutional, though in a case involving a preliminary 
injunction; SBD Kitchens, LLC, which upheld a permanent injunction, distinguished Whitnum on 
this ground). 
293 See Perlman v. Vox Media, Inc., No. CV 10046-VCS, 2019 WL 2647520, at *6 (Del. Ch. 
June 27, 2019) (discussing libelous statements generally); Organovo Holdings, Inc. v. Dimitrov, 162 
A.3d 102, 122 (Del. Ch. 2017) (discussing libelous statements that interfere with prospective 
economic advantage, by producing concrete loss of business). Organovo held that Delaware’s 
chancery courts generally don’t have jurisdiction over libel cases in the ﬁrst instance (unless there is 
a showing of interference with prospective economic advantage). Organovo, 162 A.3d at 122-23. But 
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• Florida (appellate court holdings, but limited to statements that 
damage business).294 
• Georgia (Supreme Court holding, but limited to statements that are 
part of a sustained campaign).295 
• Illinois (appellate court dictum, but limited to statements that 
damage business, coupled with practice in trial court decisions).296 
• Indiana (appellate court holding, as to speech on matters of private 
concern).297 
• Iowa (nonbinding appellate court holding).298 
 
it expressly left open the possibility that, once the law court concludes—after a jury trial, if the 
parties don’t choose a bench trial—that a statement is libelous, an injunction can then be issued. Id. 
at 124-26 & n.105. See also Ritchie CT Opps, LLC v. Huizenga Managers Fund, LLC, No. 2018-0196-
SG, 2019 WL 2319284, at *14, n.158 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2019) (following Organovo, though expressing 
more skepticism about injunctions unrelated to injury to business); CapStack Nashville 3 LLC v. 
MACC Venture Partners, No. 2018-0552-SG, 2018 WL 3949274, at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16 2018) 
(leaving the question open, as was the case in Organovo). 
294 See, e.g., Murtagh v. Hurley, 40 So. 3d 62, 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that actual 
harm to business must be shown before an injunction is issued); Zimmerman v. D.C.A. at Welleby, 
Inc., 505 So. 2d 1371, 1376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); DeRitis v. AHZ Corp., 444 So. 2d 93, 94-95 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). 
295 See, e.g., Ellerbee v. Mills, 422 S.E.2d 539, 540-41 (Ga. 1992); Ga. Soc’y of Plastic Surgeons, 
Inc. v. Anderson, 363 S.E.2d 140, 144 (Ga. 1987); Retail Credit Co. v. Russell, 218 S.E.2d 54, 62-63 
(Ga. 1975). Georgia courts generally reject preliminary injunctions in libel cases. Cohen v. Advanced 
Med. Grp. of Ga., Inc., 496 S.E.2d 710, 711 (Ga. 1998); Fernandez v. N. Ga. Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 
400 S.E.2d 6, 8 (Ga. 1991); High Country Fashions, Inc. v. Marlenna Fashions, Inc., 357 S.E.2d 576, 
577 (Ga. 1987); Brannon v. Am. Micro Distribs., Inc., 342 S.E.2d 301, 302-03 (Ga. 1986); Pittman v. 
Cohn Cmtys., Inc., 239 S.E.2d 526, 528-29 (Ga. 1977). But while some of the cases repeat “the 
general rule that ‘equity will not enjoin libel and slander,’” Brannon, 342 S.E.2d at 303 (quoting 
Pittman, 239 S.E.2d at 528), that appears to be limited to preliminary injunctions: the court has 
expressly distinguished permanent injunctions entered “subsequent to a verdict in which a jury 
found that statements by [defendant] were false and defamatory,” which the court has allowed. 
Cohen, 496 S.E.2d at 711 (quoting High Country Fashions, 357 S.E.2d at 577); see also Hartman v. PIP-
Grp., LLC, 825 S.E.2d 601, 606 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019) (concluding that preliminary anti-libel 
injunctions are unconstitutional, but permanent injunctions may be constitutional). 
296 See, e.g., Allcare, Inc. v. Bork, 531 N.E.2d 1033, 1038 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (stating that an 
injunction can be issued to bar “commercial disparagement” following “a long standing and persistent 
pattern by defendants of defaming plaintiff or of disparaging its products or services”); see also 
Reschke v. Lee, No. 2016-L-008399, at 1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Aug. 30, 2016) (issuing anti-libel 
injunction); Kaupert v. Kim, No. 12 CH 28082, at 2 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Dec. 13, 2012) (same); 
Houlihan Smith & Co. v. Forte, No. 10 CH 16477 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Cty. Apr. 16, 2010) (same). 
297 See Barlow v. Sipes, 744 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (holding both preliminary and 
permanent injunctions constitutionally permissible); see also Eppley v. Iacovelli, No. 1:09-cv-386-
SEB-JMS, at 4 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 17, 2009) (applying Barlow). But see Mishler v. MAC Sys., Inc., 771 
N.E.2d 92, 98-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the Indiana Constitution forbids preliminary 
injunctions against speech entered “after only the most preliminary of determinations by the trial 
court”); St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220, 1223-24 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1996) (dissolving a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds, because speech cannot be 
restricted “before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amendment”). 
298 DeWaard v. Anderson, 1999 WL 1136475, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 13, 1999); see also 
Bierman v. Weier, No. CL 112139, 2009 WL 9152625, at *4 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Polk Cty. Apr. 29, 2009). 
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• Kentucky (Supreme Court holding, as to speech on matters of 
private concern).299 
• Louisiana (appellate court dictum).300 
• Maine (Supreme Judicial Court holding).301 
• Maryland (appellate court dicta, plus practice in trial court 
decisions).302 
• Michigan (nonbinding appellate court holdings).303 
• Minnesota (Supreme Court holding).304 
• Mississippi (trial court decision).305 
 
299 See Hill v. Petrotech Res. Corp., 325 S.W.3d 302, 313 (Ky. 2010). The court “emphasize[d]” 
that it was not discussing “injunctions that may relate to media defendants, public ﬁgures, and 
matters of public interest,” which may be treated diﬀerently. Id. at 309 n.2. 
300 Vartech Sys., Inc. v. Hayden, 2005-2499, pp. 17-18 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/20/06); 951 So. 2d 
247, 262 & n.22 (“In addition to damages, the remedy of a permanent injunction . . . relative to the 
making of untrue, disparaging, or false comments or remarks concerning VarTech . . . is also available 
after a trial on the merits”). The court noted that “[c]ourts are generally reluctant to issue an 
injunction to restrain torts such as defamation or harassment,” id. at 261, citing cases such as 
Greenberg v. DeSalvo, 229 So. 2d 83, 86 (1969), but this reluctance is apparently not seen as a 
categorical prohibition; see also Goldenberg v. Dirty World, LLC., No. 16-12002 (La. Dist. Ct. 
Orleans Parish Dec. 8, 2016) (issuing anti-libel injunction); Psychonautic Entm’t, LLC v. Witches 
Brew Tours, LLC, No. 2019-11899 (La. Dist. Ct. Orleans Parish Nov. 13, 2019) (likewise). Lasalle v. 
Daniels, 673 So. 2d 704, 709 (La. Ct. App. 1996), states that, “even if Daniels’ words were 
defamatory, an injunction would not be a proper remedy”; but in the preceding paragraph, the court 
says merely that “Courts are generally reluctant to issue an injunction to restrain torts such as 
defamation or harassment,” and that such injunctions may be available “where the petitioner is 
threatened with irreparable loss or injury without adequate remedy at law.” 
301 Truman v. Browne, 2001 ME 182, ¶ 15, 788 A.2d 168, 172 (2001) (holding that an anti-libel 
injunction was overbroad, because it could apply to statements that the speaker believed were true, 
but remanding so the trial court could impose a narrower injunction). 
302 Prucha v. Weiss, 197 A.2d 253, 257 (Md. 1964), and Warren House Co. v. Handwerger, 213 
A.2d 574, 576 (Md. 1965), held that anti-libel injunctions couldn’t be issued by equity tribunals 
(Maryland hadn’t merged law and equity then), but they also noted that a libel plaintiﬀ “may claim 
an injunction as ancillary relief in an action at law,” Prucha, 197 A.2d at 256; Warren House, 213 A.2d 
at 576. Many Maryland courts have indeed recently issued anti-libel injunctions. See, e.g., Hanna v. 
Qin, No. 24-C-16-007000, 2018 WL 3953864, at *1 (Md. Cir. Ct. Baltimore City June 13, 2018); 
Callender v. Anthes, No. C13-1616 (Md. Cir. Ct. Calvert Cty. Jan. 15, 2014), available at Callender v. 
Anthes, No. 8:14-cv-00121-DKC, at 23 (D. Md. Apr. 18, 2014), ECF No. 4; Docket Entry, Muziani 
v. Trankle, No. 02-C-13-182491 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 15, 2013); McCauley v. Caveo Network Sols., Inc., 
No. C09-1062, 2011 WL 8908026, at *3 (Md. Cir. Ct. Frederick Cty. Feb. 9, 2011); Docket Entry, 
Am. Global Holdings Corp. v. Dayton, No. 135416V (Md. Cir. Ct. Montgomery Cty. May 3, 1995). 
303 Gerald L. Pollack & Assocs., Inc. v. Pollack, Nos. 319180, 320917, 320918, 320919, 2015 WL 
339715, at *24 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2015); Rooks v. Krzweski, No. 306034, 2014 WL 1351353, at 
*31 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2014); Dupuis v. Kemp, No. 263880, 2006 WL 401125, at *3 (Mich. Ct. 
App. Feb. 21, 2006). 
304 Advanced Training Sys., Inc. v. Caswell Equip. Co., 352 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 1984). 
305 Lewis v. Lewis, No. 25CH1:15-cv-000927, 2019 WL 1245272, at *10 (Miss. Ch. Hinds Cty. 
Aug. 25, 2015 & Feb. 13, 2019). 
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• Missouri (appellate court holding, though not reaching First 
Amendment defense because of waiver).306 
• Montana (trial court holding, plus Supreme Court holding in related 
context).307 
• Nebraska (Supreme Court dictum and appellate court holding).308 
• Nevada (Supreme Court holding, but limited to statements that 
damage business).309 
• New Jersey (nonbinding appellate court holding).310 
• New Mexico (appellate court holdings so suggesting, but limited to 
statements that are part of a “continue[d pattern of] attacks”).311 
• New York (appellate court holdings, but limited to statements that 
are part of “a sustained campaign”).312 
 
306 MB Town Ctr., LP v. Clayton Forsyth Foods, Inc., 364 S.W.3d 595, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2012); see also Boemler Chevrolet, Co. v. Combs, 808 S.W.2d 875, 880-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) 
(describing picketing as protected against an injunction when “the messages are not false”); Maxx 
Media, Inc. v. Lieu, No. 15CG-CC00222 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Dec 9, 2016) (issuing an anti-libel 
injunction); Boyd v. Does, No. 14BA-CV03038 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Boone Cty. Jan. 20, 2015) (same); Jim 
Butler Chevrolet, Inc. v. Cooney, No. 14SL-CC00556, at 1 (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Louis Cty. Feb. 24, 
2014) (same). 
307 St. James Healthcare v. Cole, 178 P.3d 696, 705 (Mont. 2008) (holding that speech 
“intended to embarrass, annoy, harass or threaten” can be enjoined, and repeatedly favorably citing 
Balboa Island Village Inn v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339 (Cal. 2007), which upheld injunctions against 
libel); see also Geiszler v. Sayer, No. DV101586, 2012 WL 11981118 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Missoula Cty. 
June 25, 2012) (issuing preliminary anti-libel injunction and expressly rejecting constitutional 
defense), injunction made permanent, 2012 WL 11981120, at *1 (Mont. Dist. Ct. Missoula Cty. Sept. 5, 
2012). 
308 Sid Dillon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac v. Sullivan, 559 N.W.2d 740, 747 (Neb. 1997) 
(stating the principle in dictum); Nolan v. Campbell, 690 N.W.2d 638, 651-52 (Neb. Ct. App. 2004) 
(holding the dictum in Sid Dillon to be binding). 
309 Guion v. Terra Mktg. of Nev., Inc., 523 P.2d 847, 848 (Nev. 1974); Gillespie v. Council, No. 
67421, 2016 WL 5616589, at *3 (Nev. Ct. App. Sept. 27 2016) (following Guion). 
310 Chambers v. Scutieri, No. A-4831-10T1, 2013 WL 1337935, at *13, *16 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Apr. 4, 2013); see also Barres v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 330 A.2d 38, 51 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1974), aﬀ ’d on other grounds, 378 A.2d 1148 (N.J. 1977). 
311 Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 306 P.3d 495, 499, 507–08 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (reversing anti-libel 
injunction but only “[b]ecause the district court did not make factual ﬁndings regarding defamation,” 
and remanding “for the district court to consider the . . . arguments and evidence regarding 
defamation in light of the facts of this case, should [defendant] wish to persist in his publication 
eﬀorts”), rev’d on other grounds, 331 P.3d 915 (N.M. 2014); Best v. Marino, 404 P.3d 450, 457–60 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2017) (holding that an injunction banning speech that would “caus[e] Petitioner to suﬀer 
severe emotional distress” was constitutional, using logic that would equally apply to injunctions 
banning libelous speech). Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Allen, 469 P.2d 710, 711 (N.M. 1970), concluded 
that an injunction is unavailable when “[t]he complaint does not allege that appellee will continue 
his attacks upon the tribe, and there is nothing to support the contention that further libelous letters 
will be written,” but did not decide what would happen if there was indeed evidence of an ongoing 
campaign of defamation. 
312 LoPresti v. Florio, 71 A.D.3d 574, 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010); Ansonia Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. 
Ansonia Tenants’ Coal., Inc., 253 A.D.2d 706, 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Bingham v. Struve, 591 
N.Y.S.2d 156, 158 (App. Div. 1992); Trojan Elec. & Mach. Co., Inc. v. Heusinger, 557 N.Y.S.2d 756 
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• North Carolina (appellate court holding, but limited to statements 
that damage business).313 
• Ohio (Supreme Court holding).314 
• South Carolina (trial court practice).315 
• Tennessee (nonbinding appellate court holdings).316 
• Utah (trial court practice, though more clearly for orders to take 
down speech than for orders banning repetition of the speech).317 
• Washington (appellate court holding).318 
• Wisconsin (trial court practice).319 
 
(App. Div. 1990); see also Dennis v. Napoli, 148 A.D.3d 446, 446-47 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (applying 
this limitation to interference with employment). 
313 Burke Transit Co. v. Queen City Coach Co., 47 S.E.2d 297, 299 (N.C. 1948); see also Regional 
Waterproofing, Inc. v. Hickman, No. 19 CVS 13073 (N.C. Super. Ct. Wake Cty. Oct. 2, 2019) (issuing 
TRO in such a case); Place v. Doe, No. 12-CV-04196 (N.C. Super. Ct. Buncombe Cty. Oct. 1, 2012) 
(issuing injunction in such a case); Lewis v. Rapp, No. 10 CVS 932, 2010 WL 9598800, at *1 (N.C. 
Super. Ct. Brunswick Cty. Apr. 19, 2010) (noting that a TRO had been entered in the case, even though 
it did not involve damage to business); 17 N.C. INDEX 4TH Injunctions § 33 (2019) (citing Burke Transit 
as authoritative). 
314 O’Brien v. Univ. Cmty. Tenants Union, Inc., 327 N.E.2d 753, 755-56 (Ohio 1975). 
315 Adili v. Yarnell, No. 2017-CP-08-552, at 2 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Feb. 27, 2017); Monster T-
Shirts, LLC v. Reed, No. 2015-CP-32-01803, at 4 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 18, 2016); 52 Apps Inc. v. 
SmartPhoneRecordsLLC, No. 2016-CP-40-1016, at 2-3 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 11, 2016); Vacation 
Station, LLC v. Doe, No. 2013-CP-10-2036, at 2-3 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 19, 2013); Everest Wealth 
Mgmt., LLC v. Doe, No. 12-CP-08-2583, at 2-3 (S.C. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 29, 2012). 
316 In re Conservatorship of Turner, No. M2013-01665-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 1901115, at *20 
(Tenn. Ct. App. May 9, 2014). Unpublished opinions are potentially persuasive precedent in 
Tennessee courts, see Watts v. Watts, 519 S.W.3d 572, 579 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2016), and Turner has 
indeed proved persuasive. See Gider v. Hubbell, No. M2016-00032-COA-R3-JV, 2017 WL 1178260, 
at *10-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2017) (following Turner); Loden v. Schmidt, No. M2014-01284-
COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1881240, at *8–9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2015) (same). 
317 Stern v. Lindsey, No. 160902290, at 6-7 (Utah Dist. Ct. Oct. 4, 2017) (ordering removal); 
Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Rafahi, No. 160902584, at 1 (Utah Dist. Ct. July 12, 2016) (same); Legally 
Mine, LLC v. Doe, No. 150400521, at *10 (Utah Dist. Ct. Dec. 4, 2015) (same); Vision Bankcard v. 
Hruska, No. 150401307, at 2 (Utah Dist. Ct. Utah Cty. Aug. 26, 2015) (banning repetition); Salt Lake 
City Mack Sales & Serv. v. Stoker, No. 110918085, at 2 (Utah Dist. Ct. Salt Lake Cty. Aug. 16, 2012) 
(ordering removal). 
318 In re Marriage of Meredith, 201 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009); see also In re 
Guardianship of Janzen, No. 33272-1-III, 2015 WL 6395663, at *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2015); 
Armesto v. Rosolino, No. 70424-9-I, 2014 WL 3360238, at *5 (Wash. Ct. App. July 7, 2014). 
319 E.g., Docket Entry No. 7, Petitioner v. Alvarado, No. 2017CV002741 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 
Milwaukee Cty. Apr. 14, 2017); Docket Entries Nos. 6-8, Jokinen v. Alldredge, No. 2015CV000074 
(Wis. Cir. Ct. Ashland Cty. Sept. 1, 2015); Docket Entries Nos. 8-11, Petitioner v. Brandon, No. 
2010CV014072 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. Milwaukee Cty. Sept. 8, 2010), vacated Oct. 22, 2010; Docket Entries 
Nos. 7-8, Stuckey-Osthoﬀ v. Dobbs, No. 2007CV000202 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. Richland Cty. Oct. 5, 2007); 
Docket Entries Nos. 1-3, Bell v. Maday, No. 2005CV000009 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Ashland Cty. Feb. 8, 
2005). All these were harassment restraining order cases, but the injunctions speciﬁcally banned 
libeling or slandering the plaintiﬀ. 
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• Second Circuit (nonbinding appellate court holding, though in some 
tension with discussion in an earlier case).320 
• Third Circuit (appellate court statement so leaning).321 
• Fourth Circuit (district court opinions).322 
• Fifth Circuit (appellate court holding, though in a case that could be 
read as limited to commercial speech).323 
• Sixth Circuit (appellate court holding).324 
• Seventh Circuit (appellate court statement so leaning).325 
• Ninth Circuit (appellate court holding).326 
 
320 Ferri v. Berkowitz, 561 F. App’x 64, 65 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he district court remains free 
to craft a narrow injunction that applies only to Appellee’s unprotected [defamatory] speech, should 
the court so choose.”); see also D’Addio v. Kerik, No. 15-cv-597, 2019 WL 4857320 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 
2019). Metro. Opera Ass’n. v. Local 100, Hotel Emps. and Rest. Emps. Int’l Union, 239 F.3d 172 (2d 
Cir. 2001), is sometimes cited as rejecting anti-libel injunctions, and it did express skepticism about 
them, id. at 177. But the court expressly declined to hold that such injunctions, if narrowly crafted, 
were categorically unconstitutional. Id. at 179. 
321 Kramer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666, 676 (3d Cir. 1991). 
322 Brennan v. Stevenson, Civ. No. JKB-15-2931, 2015 WL 7454109, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2015) 
(dictum) (taking the view that an anti-libel injunction would be a permissible injunction against 
“unprotected speech,” and thus consistent with the First Amendment); Maye v. Worrell, No. 13-cv-
00510, 2013 WL 5545077, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2013) (issuing anti-libel injunction and rejecting 
First Amendment objection); see also Wengui v. Li, Civ. No. PWG-18-259, 2019 WL 2288348, at *4 
(D. Md. May 29, 2019) (issuing anti-libel injunction without discussing any First Amendment 
objection); Barﬁ v. Malekolkottabkhiabani, No. 8:16-cv-01418-PX (D. Md. June 24, 2016) (likewise). 
323 Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 50-51 (5th Cir. 1992). 
324 Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206, 1208-09 (6th Cir. 1990). 
325 McCarthy v. Fuller, 810 F.3d 456, 462 (7th Cir. 2015). An earlier opinion, e360 Insight v. 
Spamhaus Project, 500 F.3d 594, 606 (7th Cir. 2007), brieﬂy discussed the question but ultimately 
“express[ed] no opinion on the constitutional validity” of a suitably narrow anti-libel injunction. 
326 San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. So. Cal. Council of Carpenters, 125 F.3d 1230, 1235, 1239 (9th 
Cir. 1997). The court characterized the enjoined speech as “fraud,” id. at 1239, but the plaintiﬀs’ claim 
was essentially defamation, and the court elsewhere so labeled it, id. at 1235 (notwithstanding the 
dissent’s argument that this would make the injunction an unconstitutional prior restraint, id. at 
1240 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)); see also San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. So. Cal. Council of Carpenters, 
137 F.3d 1090, 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). On the other hand, despite this seemingly binding precedent, the matter in the 
Ninth Circuit appears not to be entirely settled. In re Dan Farr Prods., 874 F.3d 590, 596 n.8 (9th 
Cir. 2017), generally concluded that the “proper remedy” for actionable speech “is almost 
certainly retrospective damages, not a broader prior restraint [referring generally to an 
injunction against speech],” and stated that “[s]ubsequent civil or criminal proceedings, rather 
than prior restraints, ordinarily are the appropriate sanction for calculated defamation or other 
misdeeds in the First Amendment context” (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., in chambers)), but did not discuss San Antonio Cmty. Hosp., and recent district court 
decisions reﬂect this tension. Compare Andreas Carlsson Prod. AB v. Barnes, No. CV 15-6049 DMG 
(AJWx), 2016 WL 11499656, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2016) (concluding that “‘Injunctions against 
any speech, even libel, constitute prior restraints’ and are therefore presumptively unconstitutional” 
(internal quotation and citation omitted)), and New Show Studios LLC v. Needle, No. 2:14-cv-
01250-CAS (MRWx), 2016 WL 7017214, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2016) (concluding that 
“injunction[s] against defamatory statements” are only allowed in “exceptional circumstances”), with 
Vachani v. Yakovlev, No. 15-cv-04296-LB, 2016 WL 7406434, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) 
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• Tenth Circuit (district court opinions).327 
• Eleventh Circuit (district court opinions).328 
Courts in six states plus D.C., as well as two federal circuits, have 
concluded that such injunctions are unconstitutional: 
• District of Columbia (high court decision so suggesting).329 
• Massachusetts (Supreme Judicial Court dictum, but possibly with 
exception for speech on private matters).330 
 
(concluding that “an injunction [to remove defamatory allegations and not to repeat them] is 
permissible”), and aPriori Technologies, Inc. v. Broquard, No. 2:16-cv-09561, 2017 WL 11319740, at 
*1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2017) (enjoining defendant from “[m]aking any statement that refers to both 
aPriori or its oﬃcers, customers, investors, or aﬃliates, and Mr. Frank Iacovelli with respect to his 
alleged acts of child endangerment, child abuse or child molestation”), and with List Industries, Inc. 
v. List, No. 2:17-CV-2159 JCM (CWH), 2017 WL 3749593, at *3 n.1 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017) (citing 
various opinions but “tak[ing] no position” on the dispute). The issue is now pending before the 
Ninth Circuit in Ferguson v. Waid, No. 18-36043 (argued Dec. 13, 2019). 
327 Wagner Equip. Co. v. Wood, 893 F. Supp. 2d 1157, 1160-64 (D.N.M. 2012); Natural Wealth 
Real Estate, Inc. v. Cohen, No. 05-cv-01233-LTB-MJW, 2006 WL 3500624, at *9-10 (D. Colo. Dec. 
4, 2006); see also Power Places Tours, Inc. v. Free Spirit, No. 16-cv-02725, 2017 WL 2718473, at *4 (D. 
Colo. June 23, 2017) (issuing injunction but not discussing the First Amendment question); Derma 
Pen, LLC v. 4EverYoung Ltd., No. 2:13-cv-00729-DN-EJF, 2017 WL 2258362, at *19 (D. Utah May 
22, 2017); Whole Living, Inc. v. Tolman, No. 2:03-CV-272 TS, 2004 WL 2733614, *2 (D. Utah Nov. 
29, 2004) (discussing preliminary injunction that had been issued, but not discussing the First 
Amendment question). 
328 Ward v. Triple Canopy, Inc., No. 8:17-cv-802-T-24 MAP, 2017 WL 3149431, at *8-9 (M.D. 
Fla. Jul. 25, 2017); Int’l Auto Logistics, LLC v. Vehicle Processing Ctr. Of Fayetteville, Inc., No. 
2:16-CV-10, 2016 WL 6609189, at *14-15 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 7, 2016); Holmes v. Dominique, No. 1:13-
cv-04270-HLM, 2015 WL 11236539, at *6 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2015) (entering permanent injunction 
after having denied a preliminary injunction on First Amendment grounds, 2014 WL 12115947, at *2 
(N.D. Ga. May 5, 2014)); Gold & Diamond Buyers, LLC v. Friedlich, No. 11-21843-CIV-JORDAN, 
2011 WL 13322791, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2011); Saadi v. Maroun, No. 8:07-cv-1976-T-24-MAP, 
2009 WL 3617788, at *23 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2009); see also Friedman v. Schiano, No. 9:16-cv-81975-
BB, 2017 WL 2901211, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2017) (issuing an injunction but without any First 
Amendment discussion); Webimax v. Johnson, No. 3:11-cv-993-J-34JBT (M.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2011) 
(same). District Judge Steven D. Merriday has issued several opinions that state that injunctions 
against speech are only allowed in “extraordinary circumstances,” but does not elaborate further on 
that. McGowan v. CSPS Hotel, Inc., No. 8:09-cv-2311-T-23MAP, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2010) 
(dictum); Valdez v. T.A.S.O. Props., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-2250-T-23TGW, 2010 WL 1730700, at *3 n.1 
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 28, 2010) (dictum); Gunder’s Auto Ctr. v. State Farm Ins., 617 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 
1225 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
329 Richardson v. Easterling, 878 A.2d 1212, 1217-18 (D.C. 2005). 
330 Nyer v. Munoz-Mendoza, 430 N.E.2d 1214, 1217 (Mass. 1982) (noting in dictum that such an 
injunction would be unconstitutional). See also Clay Corp. v. Colter, No. NOCV1201138, 2012 WL 
6928132, at *5-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 12, 2012) (following Nyer to reject an anti-libel injunction in 
a private dispute); Shawsheen River Estates Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Herman, No. 95-1557, 1995 WL 
809834, at *5-7 (Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 1995) (same, though possibly limited just to preliminary 
injunctions); Clement v. Sheraton Boston Corp., No. 930909F, 1993 WL 818763, at *3-4 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. Dec. 17, 1993) (same). But see Krebiozen Research Found. v. Beacon Press, Inc., 134 N.E.2d 1, 5 
(Mass. 1956), on which Nyer chiefly relies, and which holds that “that equity jurisdiction does extend 
to cases of libel and slander” but that “the constitutional protection of free speech and public interest 
in the discussion of many issues greatly limit the area in which the power to give injunctive relief may 
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• New Hampshire (Supreme Court holding, though some trial courts 
have recently been dissenting from it).331 
• Oklahoma (Supreme Court holding).332 
• Pennsylvania (Supreme Court holding).333 
• Texas (Supreme Court holding, though with exception for orders to 
take down already posted material).334 
• West Virginia (Supreme Court holding).335 
• First Circuit (appellate court holding).336 
• D.C. Circuit (appellate court holding).337 
 
or should be exercised in defamation cases.” Id. at 6. The Krebiozen Court expressly declined to offer 
a “more precise definition than our cases now afford of the line dividing the special situations in which 
equity should exercise its jurisdiction to restrain the use of words from those in which public policy 
or constitutional provisions stay its hand,” because in that case the subject—the efficacy (or not) of a 
proposed cancer cure—was of such great “public interest.” Id. 
331 Mortg. Specialists, Inc. v. Implode-Explode Heavy Indus., Inc., 999 A.2d 184, 197 (N.H. 
2010). But see Anagnost v. Mortg. Specialists, Inc., No. 2162016CV00277, 2017 WL 7693151, at *1-2 
(N.H. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (declining to apply Mortgage Specialists, seemingly because the trial 
court was more persuaded by out-of-state authorities than by the binding N.H. Supreme Court 
precedent), aﬀ ’d on other grounds, No. 2017-0311, 2018 WL 4940850 (N.H. Sept. 25, 2018); Walker v. 
Gill, No. 2162016CV00316, 2017 WL 9807400, at *2 (N.H. Super. Ct. Apr. 10, 2017) (declining to 
apply Mortgage Specialists on the grounds that it did not consider “whether an injunction may issue 
when a defendant has engaged in a continuous course of conduct of making statements which have 
been found to be defamatory”); Advanced Siding & Window Co. v. Kenton, No. 218-2013-CV-1155, 
at 3-5 (N.H. Super. Ct. Rockingham Cty. Dec. 17, 2013) (likewise). 
332 House of Sight & Sound, Inc. v. Faulkner, 912 P.2d 357, 361 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995) 
(recognizing a narrow exception for “conspiracy, intimidation, or coercion”); First Am. Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Sawyer, 865 P.2d 347, 352 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993) (recognizing the same exception and holding 
that the “coercion” element is not satisﬁed simply by speech being aimed at pressuring a business to 
give the speaker a refund or similar beneﬁt). 
333 Willing v. Mazzocone, 393 A.2d 1155, 1157-58 (Pa. 1978) (applying state constitution’s free 
expression guarantee). One more recent Pennsylvania trial court decision, though, allowed an 
injunction and distinguished Willing on the grounds that (1) the injunction only ordered the removal 
of past statements rather than prohibiting posting future statements, and (2) online statements have 
a much greater reach than the picketing in Willing. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg v. JPA Dev., 
Inc., No. 2095 EDA 2004, 2004 WL 5175146 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Aug. 27, 2004). A recent federal 
district court decision, which was applying Pennsylvania law, took the view that an order to take 
down already posted material would be permissible even if an order forbidding future speech would 
not be. Vonderheide v. Harrisburg Area Community College, No. 19-cv-3096, 2019 WL 5423089, *11 
n.3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2019) (distinguishing Krmaer v. Thompson, 947 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1991), which 
applied Willing, on the grounds that,  “because the Website is currently functioning, . . . the court is 
not imposing an injunction restraining future speech”) (dissolved when the federal claims were 
dismissed and the court declined to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction, ECF No. 33, at 
2, 5 n.5 (Dec. 18, 2019)). 
334 Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 97-101 (Tex. 2014). 
335 Kwass v. Kersey, 81 S.E.2d 237, 242-43 (W. Va. 1954); see also Roberts v. Stevens Clinic 
Hosp., Inc., 345 S.E.2d 791, 808 (W. Va. 1986) (citing Kwass favorably for the broad proposition that 
the West Virginia Constitution preserves traditionally recognized rights to trial by jury, a 
proposition that Kwass relied on in concluding that anti-libel injunctions were unconstitutional). 
336 Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 31-36 (1st Cir. 2018). 
337 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Pierce, 814 F.2d 663, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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Ten states have not resolved the matter, and the cases are likewise sparse 
in the Eighth and Federal Circuits: 
• The Idaho Supreme Court has held that injunctions are unavailable 
in libel cases brought by “public oﬃcials,”338 but didn’t have occasion 
to opine on the much more common cases brought by other 
plaintiﬀs. 
• Courts in Virginia339 and Wyoming340 have brieﬂy discussed the 
question but have not resolved it. 
• I have seen anti-libel injunctions (with no First Amendment 
discussion) from courts in Hawaii,341 Idaho,342 Kansas,343 North 
Dakota,344 Oregon,345 Rhode Island,346 Vermont,347 and Virginia,348 
but not enough to show a solid pattern in any of those states. 
• I have seen nothing on the subject from courts in South Dakota. 
 
338 Nampa Charter Sch., Inc. v. DeLaPaz, 89 P.3d 863, 867 (Idaho 2004). 
339 D’Ambrosio v. D’Ambrosio, expressly declined to “reach [the] constitutional argument that 
[an] injunction [against libel] constitutes an impermissible prior restraint.” 610 S.E.2d 876, 885 n.3 
(Va. Ct. App. 2005). 
340 Hill v. Stubson, concluded that a “request for ‘a permanent injunction barring the Defendant 
from engaging in defamatory conduct toward Mrs. Hill’”—a catchall injunction—”is so broad and 
general” “that it is diﬃcult to see how such relief would not run afoul of the First Amendment as a 
prior restraint on protected speech”; but it did not discuss the more common injunctions that ban 
repetition of speciﬁc statements. 420 P.3d 732, 744 n.7 (Wyo. 2018). 
341 Perrone v. Gao, No. CAAP-12-0001008, 2014 WL 399063, at *5, *9 (Haw. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 
2014) (noting such an injunction and reversing it on other grounds); Walch v. Does, No. 11-0699-04 
BIA (Haw. Cir. Ct. July 6, 2017); Sulla v. Horowitz, No. 12-1-0417, at 1 (Haw. Cir. Ct. June 17, 2013). 
342 Blom v. Callan, No. CV-OC-2011-16232, at 2 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Ada Cty. Apr., 9, 2012); see 
also Endobiogenics, Inc. v. Chahine, No. 4:19-CV-00096-BLW, 2019 WL 4667669, *6 (D. Idaho 
Sept. 23, 2019) (applying Idaho libel law, id. at *4–*5, and endorsing the propriety of 
“enjoining Defendant from . . . making further defamatory statements”). 
343 Karats Jewelers, Inc. v. Dugan, No. 09CV10771, at 1 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Johnson Cty. July 9, 
2013) (ordering removal of web pages); Selim v. Khawaja, No. 12CV06711 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Johnson 
Cty. Aug. 23, 2012); Quinn v. Waters, No. 12CV01028 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Johnson Cty. Feb. 7, 2012); 
HEV-Overland Park, Ltd. v. Keeler, No. 06CV8401 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Johnson Cty. Oct. 25, 2006). 
Unlike the other orders I cite in this Appendix, the Karats Jewelers order was entered pursuant to a 
stipulation between the plaintiﬀs and the defendant. Docket, Karats Jewelers, No. 09cv10771 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct. Johnson Cty. July 9, 2013) (July 7, 2013 entry). But the order purported to bind “search 
engines,” plus presumably the hosting companies, and not just the consenting parties. 
344 Carag v. Kellogg, No. 27-2015-CV-00371, at 2 (N.D. Dist. Ct. McKenzie Cty. Mar. 24, 2016). 
345 Castillo v. Donovan, No. CV205-1725 (Or. Cir. Ct. Umatilla Cty. Dec. 28, 2005). 
346 Sara Zarrella Photography, LLC v. Reyes, No. PC-2019-9209 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 
2019); Narcisi v. Turtleboy Digital Mktg., Inc., No. WC-2019-52, 252 (R.I. Super. Ct. May 16, 2019), 
available in Notice of Removal, exhibit D, Narcisi v. Turtleboy Digital Mktg., Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00329 
(D.R.I. June 18, 2019). 
347 Hyperkinetics Corp. v. Flotec, Inc. No. 247-11-02 (Vt. Super. Ct. Orange Cty. Nov. 26, 2002), 
available at Hyperkinetics Corp. v. Flotec, Inc., No. 1:03-cv-00033 (D. Vt. Feb. 5, 2003), ECF No. 12. 
348 Tellier Family, Inc. v. Ely, No. CL14-000952-00, at 2 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 16, 2014); DM 
Signs, LLC v. Dunn, No. CL00588, at 2 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2012). 
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Focusing on just the largest three-quarters of states—the ones that are 
most likely to yield publicly available decisions on the subject—thirty (over 
eighty percent) seem to fall in the pro-libel-injunction camp (at least in 
part),349 four fall in the anti-libel-injunction camp,350 and three have not 
spoken.351 
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE CATCHALL INJUNCTIONS 
PayPal, Inc. v. Doe, No. cv2016-013343, at ¶ 2 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Maricopa 
Cty. Apr. 20, 2017). 
Mascagni v. McAlister, No. 60CV-19-5451 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Pulaski Cty. 
Sept. 10, 2019). 
Absolute Pediatric Servs., Inc., No. 04CV-18-2961 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Benton 
Cty. Nov. 9, 2018). 
Hill v. Charvei’, No. 60CV-17-4839 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Pulaski Cty. Sept. 8, 
2017). 
Wang v. Lee, No. BC573818 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. July 16, 2016). 
Cardoza v. Ortiz, No. FAMSS 1707719 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Bernardino 
Cty. Sept. 28, 2017). 
DeJager v. Burgess, No. 112CV219299, at ¶ 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara 
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APPENDIX D: SAMPLE INJUNCTIONS ENFORCED THROUGH THREAT 
OF JAIL 
Just as one extended illustration, consider the case of Stephanie Martin 
and the Raths. Martin had apparently had a brief aﬀair with the husband at 
some time in the past, Order of Protection, Rath v. Martin, No. SK1401024, 
at 2 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. Dec. 19, 2014), and this prompted her 
to start posting various defamatory statements about both the husband and 
the wife. The Raths sued, and got a judgment for over $500,000 in September 
2015. Rath v. Martin, No. A1406457 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. Sept. 
4, 2015). They tried to enforce it in Florida, where Martin was living, with 
little success—until the judge started threatening Martin with jail for 
criminal contempt (and possibly civil contempt). See Order, Rath v. Martin, 
No. 15-21701 CACE (04) (Fla. Cir. Ct. Broward Cty. Feb. 8, 2017) 
(threatening, in bold, underlined, capital letters, that “Defendant’s failure to 
comply with this order shall result in the court proceeding with a show cause 
hearing against the defendant as to why the defendant should not be found 
guilty of indirect criminal contempt for failure to comply with the court’s 
June 30, 2016 order” and that “defendant is warned that failure to comply with 
this order shall result in an order of arrest of the defendant”); Order to Show 
Cause and Directing Clerk of Court to Assign Criminal Case Number 
Consistent with This Order, Rath, No. 15-21701 CACE (04) (July 28, 2017). 
Finally, some months later, the Raths’ lawyer certiﬁed that Martin had 
indeed removed the defamatory materials listed in the injunction. Notice of 
Compliance with Feb. 7, 2016 & Dec. 22, 2017 Orders, Rath, No. 15-21701 
CACE (04) (Jan. 16, 2018). Naturally, this is just one example, and one that 
took the defendants years. But it oﬀers evidence of what we would normally 
assume: the threat of jail may work even when the threat of damages doesn’t. 
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Contempt Order, Appel v. Zona, No. PSC1802924, att. 1 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Riverside Cty. Aug. 8, 2018). 
Judgment & Sentence for Contempt, Computer Sci. Res. Ed. & Applications 
v. Prasad, No. 2013 CA 582 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Leon Cty. Apr. 9, 2018). 
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In re McConnell, No. 2:14-AP-01420-BB, 2015 WL 6125649, at *6–7 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Oct. 8). 
And some that involved the threat of jail for civil contempt, so long as the 
defendant refused to take down libelous material: 
Brim, noted above. 
Riley v. Shuler, Nos. 2013-236, 2013-237, 2013 WL 12376646, at *2 (Ala. 
Cir. Ct. Shelby Cty. Nov. 15, 2013). 
Incareration Order, Absolute Pediatric Servs v. Humphrey, No. 04CV-18-
2961-5 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Benton Cty. Oct. 3, 2019). 
Rucki v. Evavold, No. 19AV-CV-17-1950, at ¶ 2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Dakota 
Cty. Mar. 1, 2018) (restraining order case, but based in part on the apparently 
defamatory nature of some of the posts). 
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Blake v. Carter, No. 6:15-cv-02085 (M.D. Fla. Dec 11, 2015). 
